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Contents<br/>Acknowledgements<br/>General Introduction Claude <br/>Ménard !ntroduction Claude Ménard<br/><br/>PART I BACKGROUND<br/>1. Bernard Mandevilie ([ 173211988), The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves turn'd Honest', in The Fable of the Bees: or Private Vices,<br/>Publick Benefits, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, 17-37 <br/>2. Adam Smith ([17761 1976), 'Of the Division of Labour', 0f the Principie Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour' and 'That the Division of Labour is Limited by the Exient of the Market', in R.H. Campbeli, A.S. Skinner and W.B. Todd (eds), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations, Giasgow Edition, Volume 1, Book 1, Chapters 1, 11 and III, Oxford: Clarendon<br/>Press, 13-24, 25-30, 31-6 <br/><br/>PART II CLASSIC REFERENCES<br/>3. R.H. Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4 (16), <br/>New Series, November, 386-405 <br/>4. H.B. Malmgren (1961), 'Information, Expectations and the Theory <br/>of the Firm', Quarterly Journal o! Economics, 75 (3), August,399-421 <br/>5. Herbert A. Simon (1962), 'The Architecture of Compiexity', <br/>Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106 (6), December, 467-82<br/>6. Kenneth J. Arrow (1970), 'The Organization of Economic Activity: <br/>Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket <br/>Aliocation', in Robert H. Haveman and Julius Margolis (eds), <br/>Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis, Chapter 2, Chicago, IL: <br/>Markham Publishing Company, 59-73<br/>7. Lance E. Davis and Douglass C. North with the assistance of Calia <br/>Smorodin (1971), 'ATheory of Institutional Change: Concepts and <br/>Causes', in institutional Change andAmerican Economic Growth, <br/>Chapter 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-25 <br/>8. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), 'Production, <br/>Information Costs, and Economic Organization', American Economic Review, 62 (5), December, 777-95<br/>9. Steven N.S. Cheung (1973), 'The Fabie of the Bees: An Economic <br/>Investigation', Journal o! Law and Economics, XVI (1), April, 11-33 <br/>10. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations', Journal o! Law and<br/>Economics, XXII (2), October, 233-61 1<br/>11. Leonid Hurwicz (1987), 'Inventing New Institutions: The Design Perspective', A,nerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69 (2),<br/>May, 395-402 <br/><br/>PART III MODELING INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS<br/>12. Andrew Schotter (1981), 'The Nature and Function of Social <br/>Institutions', in The Economic Theory o! Social Institutions, Chapter <br/>1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-17, 165-6, references<br/>13. Leonid Hurwicz (1996), 'Institutions as Families of Game Forms', <br/>Japanese Economic Review, 47 (2), June, 113-32 <br/>14. Masahiko Aoki (2000), 'Institutional Evolution as Punctuated <br/>Equilibria', in Claude Ménard (ed), Institutions, Contracts and <br/>Organizations: Perspectives froin New institutional Economics, <br/>Chapter 3, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward <br/>Elgar, 11-33 <br/>15. David M. Kreps (1996), 'Markets and Hierarchies and <br/>(Mathematical) Economic Theory', industrial and Corporate <br/>Change, 5 (2), 561-95 <br/>16. Mjchael H. Riordan and Oliver E. Williamson (1985), 'Asset <br/>Specificity and Economic Organization', Inrernational Journal of <br/>Industrial Organization, 3 (4), 365-78 <br/>17. Patrick Bajari and Steven Tadelis (2001), 'Incentives versus <br/>Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts', RAND <br/>Journal of Economics, 32 (3), Autumn, 387-407 <br/>18. Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast (1981), 'Structure- <br/>Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37, 503-19 <br/><br/>PART IV SOME MAJOR ISSUES<br/>19. Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (1997), 'Introductory Observations', in Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contributio,z of the New institutional Economics, Chapter Ann<br/>Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1-37, references <br/>20, James M. Buchanan (1975), 'A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory', American Economic Review, Papers and<br/>Proceedings, 65 (2), May, 225-30 <br/>21. Elinor Ostrom (1986), 'An Agenda for the Study of Institutions',<br/>Public Choice, 48 (1), 3-25 <br/>22. Mark Granovetter (1992), 'Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis', Acta Sociologica, 35 (1),3-11<br/>23. R.C.O. Matthews (1986), 'The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth', Economic Journal, 96 (384), December,903-18 <br/>24. Masahiko Aoki (1996), Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations and Some Tentative Theorizing', Japanese<br/>Econornic Review, 47 (1), March, 1-19<br/>25. Claude Ménard (1995), 'Markets as Institutions versus Organizations as Markets? Disentangling Some Fundamental Concepts', Journa<br/>Of Economic Behavior and Organization, 28 (3), 161-82 <br/>26. Ronald Coase (1998), 'The New Institutional Economics',American<br/>Econornic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 88 (2), May, 72-4 <br/>Narne Index<br/><br/><br/> |
