The Foundations of the New Institutional Economics/
[ Livros ] Publicado por : Edward Elgar, (Cheltenham, Inglaterra:) Detalhes físicos: 526 p. ISBN:1843766604. Ano: 2004 Tipo de Material: Livros| Localização atual | Classificação | Exemplar | Situação | Previsão de devolução | Código de barras | Reservas do item | 
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 330.1 M535f (Percorrer estante) | 1 | Disponível | 2019-0122 | 
 
 Contents
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude 
Ménard !ntroduction Claude Ménard
PART I BACKGROUND
1. Bernard Mandevilie ([ 173211988), The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves turn'd Honest', in The Fable of the Bees: or Private Vices,
Publick Benefits, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, 17-37	
2. Adam Smith ([17761 1976), 'Of the Division of Labour', 0f the Principie Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour' and 'That the Division of Labour is Limited by the Exient of the Market', in R.H. Campbeli, A.S. Skinner and W.B. Todd (eds), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations, Giasgow Edition, Volume 1, Book 1, Chapters 1, 11 and III, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 13-24, 25-30, 31-6	
PART II CLASSIC REFERENCES
3. R.H. Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4 (16),	
New Series, November, 386-405	
4. H.B. Malmgren (1961), 'Information, Expectations and the Theory	
of the Firm', Quarterly Journal o! Economics, 75 (3), August,399-421	
5. Herbert A. Simon (1962), 'The Architecture of Compiexity',	
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106 (6),	December, 467-82
6. Kenneth J. Arrow (1970), 'The Organization of Economic Activity:	
Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket	
Aliocation', in Robert H. Haveman and Julius Margolis (eds),	
Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis, Chapter 2, Chicago, IL:	
Markham Publishing Company, 59-73
7. Lance E. Davis and Douglass C. North with the assistance of Calia	
Smorodin (1971), 'ATheory of Institutional Change: Concepts and	
Causes', in institutional Change andAmerican Economic Growth,	
Chapter 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-25	
8. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), 'Production,	
Information Costs, and Economic Organization', American Economic Review, 62 (5), December, 777-95
9. Steven N.S. Cheung (1973), 'The Fabie of the Bees: An Economic	
Investigation', Journal o! Law and Economics, XVI (1), April, 11-33	
10. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations', Journal o! Law and
Economics, XXII (2), October, 233-61	1
11. Leonid Hurwicz (1987), 'Inventing New Institutions: The Design Perspective', A,nerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69 (2),
May, 395-402	
PART III MODELING INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
12. Andrew Schotter (1981), 'The Nature and Function of Social	
Institutions', in The Economic Theory o! Social Institutions, Chapter	
1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-17, 165-6, references
13. Leonid Hurwicz (1996), 'Institutions as Families of Game Forms',	
Japanese Economic Review, 47 (2), June, 113-32	
14. Masahiko Aoki (2000), 'Institutional Evolution as Punctuated	
Equilibria', in Claude Ménard (ed), Institutions, Contracts and	
Organizations: Perspectives froin New institutional Economics,	
Chapter 3, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward	
Elgar, 11-33	
15. David M. Kreps (1996), 'Markets and Hierarchies and	
(Mathematical) Economic Theory', industrial and Corporate	
Change, 5 (2), 561-95	
16. Mjchael H. Riordan and Oliver E. Williamson (1985), 'Asset	
Specificity and Economic Organization', Inrernational Journal of	
Industrial Organization, 3 (4), 365-78	
17. Patrick Bajari and Steven Tadelis (2001), 'Incentives versus	
Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts', RAND	
Journal of Economics, 32 (3), Autumn, 387-407	
18. Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast (1981), 'Structure-	
Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37, 503-19	
PART IV SOME MAJOR ISSUES
19. Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (1997), 'Introductory Observations', in Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contributio,z of the New institutional Economics, Chapter  Ann
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1-37, references	
20, James M. Buchanan (1975), 'A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory', American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings, 65 (2), May, 225-30	
21. Elinor Ostrom (1986), 'An Agenda for the Study of Institutions',
Public Choice, 48 (1), 3-25	
22. Mark Granovetter (1992), 'Economic Institutions as Social Constructions: A Framework for Analysis', Acta Sociologica, 35 (1),3-11
23. R.C.O. Matthews (1986), 'The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth', Economic Journal, 96 (384), December,903-18	
24. Masahiko Aoki (1996), Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations and Some Tentative Theorizing', Japanese
Econornic Review, 47 (1), March, 1-19
25. Claude Ménard (1995), 'Markets as Institutions versus Organizations as Markets? Disentangling Some Fundamental Concepts', Journa
Of Economic Behavior and Organization, 28 (3), 161-82	
26. Ronald Coase (1998), 'The New Institutional Economics',American
Econornic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 88 (2), May, 72-4	
Narne Index
 
 
 
           
          
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