Economics of regulation and antitrust/ (Registro n. 3165)
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Campo fixo de controle local | 190617s2005 us gr 000 0 eng u |
020 ## - ISBN | |
ISBN | 026222075x |
040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
Localização na estante | 341.3787 V827e |
Cutter | V827e |
100 10 - Autor | |
Autor | VISCUSI, W. Kip |
245 10 - Titulo Principal | |
Título principal | Economics of regulation and antitrust/ |
250 ## - Edição | |
Edição | 4. ed. |
260 ## - Editora | |
Cidade | Cambridge, Inglaterra: |
Editora | MIT Press, |
Data | 2005. |
300 ## - Descrição Física | |
Número de páginas | 927 p. |
505 ## - Conteúdo | |
Conteúdo | Contents<br/><br/>Preface to the Fourth Edition <br/><br/>1 Introduction <br/>The Rationale for Regulation and Antitrust Policies <br/>Antitrust Regulation <br/>The Changing Character of Antitrust Issues <br/>Reasoning behind Antitrust Regulations <br/>Econornic Regulation <br/>Development of Economic Regulation <br/>Facrors in Setting Rate Regulations <br/>Health. Safety. and Environmental Regulatiuti <br/>Role of the Courts <br/>Criteria for Assessrnent <br/>Questiuns and Frobiems <br/>Recomniended Reading <br/>Appendix <br/><br/>2 The Making of a Regulation <br/>State versus Federal Regulation: The Federalism Debate <br/>Advantages of Federalism <br/>Advantages ol. National Regulations <br/>Produci Labeling Example <br/>The Overlap of State and Federal Regulations <br/>The Character of the Rulemaking Process <br/>The Chronology of New Regulations <br/>Nature of the Regulaturv Oversight Process <br/>The Nixon und Foid Adininivations <br/>The Cai-ter Administration<br/>The Reagan Administi-ation<br/>The BUSh Administration <br/>The Clinton Administration<br/>The George W. Bush Administration <br/>Regulatorv Relorrn Legislation <br/>Benefit-Cost Analvsts <br/>Discounting Deferred Effects <br/>Present Value <br/>The Criteria Applied in the Oversight Process <br/>Regulatory Success Stories <br/>Promotion of Cost-Effective Regulation <br/>Distortion of Benefit and Cost Estimates<br/>The Regulatory Role of Price and Quality <br/>The Impact of the Oversight Process<br/>The Cost of Regulation <br/>Other Measures of the Size of Regulation <br/>The Character of Regulatory Oversight Actions <br/>What Do Regulators Maximize? <br/>The Capture Theory <br/>Other Theories of Influence Patterns <br/>Comprehensive Modeis of Regulatory Objectives <br/>Conclusion <br/>Questions and Problems <br/>Appendix: Trends in Regulatory Agency Budgets and Staif <br/>ANTITRUST <br/><br/>3 Introduction to Antitrust <br/>Industrial Organzation <br/>Structure <br/>Conduct <br/>Performance <br/>Government <br/>Antitrust <br/>Federal Antitrust Laws <br/>Enforcement and Remedies <br/>Exçmptions from Antitrust <br/>Summary and Overview of Part I <br/>Appendix; Antitrust Statutes <br/>Sherman Act <br/>Clayton Act <br/>Federal Trade Comniission Act<br/><br/>4 Efficiency and Technical Progress <br/>Econornic Efficiency <br/>Partial Equílibrium Welfare Tools<br/>Monopoly-versus-Competition Example <br/>Oil Industry Application <br/>Some Complícations <br/>X-Inefficiency <br/>Monopoly-Induced Waste <br/>Estimates of the Welfare Loss from Monopoly <br/>Technical Progress <br/>Importance of Technological Change <br/>A Model of R & D Rivairy <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>5 Oligopoly, Coilusion, and Antitrust <br/>Game Theory <br/>Example 1: Advertising Competition <br/>Example 2: Compatihility of Standards <br/>The Strategic Form of a Game <br/>Nash Equilibrium<br/>Oligopoly Theory <br/>The Cournot Solution <br/>Other Modeis of Oligopoly<br/>Product Differentiation <br/>Collusion <br/>A Theory of Collusion <br/>Chalienges to Coilusion <br/>Coilusion in Practice <br/>Antitrust Law and Policy toward Price Fixing <br/>Eeonomic Analysis of Legal Categories <br/>Per Se Rule Cases <br/>Tacit Collusion <br/>Enforcemenr Policy <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problems<br/>Appendix <br/>Carne Theory: Formal Definitions <br/><br/>6.Market Structure and Strategic Competition <br/>Market Structure <br/>Concentration <br/>Seale Economies <br/>Entry Conditions <br/>Dorninant Firm Theory <br/>Static Anal ysis <br/>Dynamic Analysis.: Limit Pricing <br/>Strategic Competition <br/>Liniit Pricing <br/>lnvestment in Cosi-Reducing Capital <br/>Raising Rivais' Costs <br/>Preemption and Brand Proliferation<br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>7 Mergers <br/>Antitrust Laws and Merger Trends <br/>Reasons for Mergers <br/>Monopoly <br/>Econornies <br/>Reducing Mana.gernent lnefficiencies <br/>Horizontal Mergers<br/>Benetits and Costs <br/>Effects of Airline Mergers <br/>Cases <br/>U.S. Departrnent nt Justice Merger Guidelines. <br/>Congiornerate Mergers <br/>Potential Benefits <br/>Anticompetitive Effects and Cases <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/><br/>8 Vertical Mergers and Vertical Restraints <br/>Vertical Mergers <br/>Benefits <br/>Anticompeti tive Effects<br/>Cornrnitment and the Restoration of M:arket Power <br/>Raising Rivais' Costs <br/>Antitrust Law and Policy <br/>Historical Development <br/>Time Warner and Turner <br/>Vertical Restraints <br/>Exclusive Dealing <br/>Antitrust Law and Policy <br/>Tying <br/>Modern Theories of Leveraging <br/>Manufacturer-Retailer Restraints <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>9 Monopolization and Price Discrimination <br/>Establishing Monopolization Claims <br/>Measuring Monopoly Power <br/>Assessing Intent to Monopolize <br/>Development of Antitrust Case Law <br/>1890-1940: Standard Oil and United States Steel <br/>1940-1970: Alcoa and United Shoe Machinery <br/>1970 to Present: Kodak, IBM, Microsoft, and Others <br/>Predatory Pricing <br/>Theories of Predatory Pricing <br/>Efficiency Rationales <br/>Antitrust Policy <br/>The Areeda-Turner Rule and Other Single-Parameter Rules<br/>The Brooke Case and the Two-Tier Rule <br/>Recent Developments <br/>Refusal to Deal and the Essential Facilities Doctrine <br/>Essential Facilities Doctrine <br/>Inteilectual Property Rights <br/>Kodak and Monopoly Power in Aftermarkets <br/>Microsoft Case<br/>Network Externalities <br/>Antitrust Case <br/>Tying and Monopolization of the Browser Market <br/>Maintenance of Monopoly in the Operating Systems Market<br/>Rernedies and Harrn<br/>Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act <br/>Systernatic Discrimination <br/>Unsystematic Discrimination <br/>Cases <br/>Summary <br/>Questiuns and Problerns <br/><br/>II ECONOMIC REGULATION <br/><br/>10 Introduction to Econoniic Regulation <br/>What Is Economic Regulation? <br/>Instruments of Regulation <br/>Control of Price <br/>Control of Quantity <br/>Control of Entry and Exit <br/>Control of Other Variabies <br/>Brief History of Economic Regulation <br/>Formative Stages <br/>Trends in Regulation <br/>The Regulatory Process <br/>Overview of the Regulatory Process <br/>Regulatory Legislation <br/>independent Regulatory Comniissions <br/>Regulatory Procedures <br/>The Theory of Regulation <br/>Normative Analysis as a Positive Theory <br/>Capture Theory <br/>Economic Theory of Regulation <br/>Testing Theories of Regulation <br/>Summary and Overview of Part II<br/>Appendix<br/> <br/>11 A Theory of lnterest Group Conipetition <br/>Questions and Problerns <br/>Theory of Natural Monopoly <br/>The Natural Monopoly Problein <br/>Perrnanent and Temporary Natural Monopoly <br/>Subadditivitv and Multiproduct Monopoly <br/>Alternative Policy Solutions <br/>Ideal Pricing <br/>Franchise Bidding <br/>Actual Solutions <br/>Summary <br/>Appendix <br/>The Troublesome Case of a Natural Monopoly <br/>Questions and Problenis<br/> <br/>12 Natural Monopoly Regulation and Electric Power <br/>Traditional Rate-of-Return Regulation <br/>The Rate Case <br/>Averch-Johnson Effect <br/>Incentive Regulation <br/>Performance Standards <br/>Earnings Sharings <br/>Price Caps <br/>Yardstick Regulation <br/>Rate Structure <br/>FDC Pricing <br/>Undue Discrirnination<br/>Peak-Load Pricing <br/>Costs of Power Production <br/>Peak-Load Pricing Model <br/>Regulation and Resiructuring of Electric Power <br/>Historical, Technological. and Regulatory Background <br/>Overview of Recent Legislation <br/>Restructuring in California <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>13 Franchise Bidding and Cable Television <br/>Theory of Franchise Bidding <br/>Competition at the Bidding Stage <br/>Contractual Arrangements for the Postbidding Stage <br/>Assessment of Franchise Bidding <br/>Cable Television <br/>HistoricallRegulatory Background <br/>Cable Television as a Natural Monopoly <br/>Franchising Process <br/>Assessment of Franchise Bidding <br/>Rate Regulation <br/>Is There a Role for Government Intervention? <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>14 Public Enterprise <br/>General Background <br/>Positive Theory of Public Enterprise <br/>Managerial Model of a Firm <br/>Managerial Model of a Private Enterprise <br/>Managerial Model of a Public Enterprise <br/>Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise <br/>Municipal Electric Utilities <br/>Pricing Behavior <br/>Aliocative Efficiency Comparison <br/>Productive Efficiency Comparison <br/>Assessment of Private versus Public Utilities <br/>Aírlines <br/>Privatization <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>15 Dynamic Issues in Natural Monopoly Regulation: Teleeommunieations <br/>Transformation of a Natural Monopoly <br/>Basis for Natural Monopoly Regulation <br/>Sources of Natural Monopoly Transformation <br/>Regulatory Response <br/>Intercity Telecommunications Market<br/>Telecommunications Adi of 1996 <br/>Separation of Regulated Monopolies and Conipettive Markets <br/>Benefits and Costs of Separation <br/>Breakup of AT&T <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problems<br/><br/>16 The Regulation of Potentially Competitive Markets: Theory and Estimation <br/>Methods <br/>Theory of Price and Entry/Exit Regulation <br/>Direct Effects of Price and Entry/Exit Regulation: The Competitive Model 556<br/>Direct Effects of Price and Entry/Exit Regularion: The Imperfcctly Conipetitive <br/>Model <br/>Indirect Eifects of Price and Entry Regulation <br/>Some Indir&ct Effects of Price and Exit Rcgulation <br/>Regulation and innovation <br/>Methods for Estimating the Effects of Regulation <br/>Overview of Estimation Methods <br/>Intertemporal Approach <br/>Application: New York Stock Exchange <br/>Intermarket Approach <br/>Application: Advertising of Eyeglasses <br/>Application: 44 Liquorinari Decision <br/>Counterfactual Approach <br/>Application: State Usury Laws <br/>Measuring rhe Return to Price and Entry Restrictions: Taxicab Regulation <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problerns <br/><br/>17 Economic Regulation of Transportation: Surface Freight and Airlines <br/>Transportation lndustrv <br/>Surface Freight Transportation <br/>Regulatory Hisiory <br/>Description of Rcvulatory Practices <br/>Effects of Regulation <br/>Airlines <br/>Regulatory History <br/>Descriptioii of Regulatory Practices <br/>Effects of Regulation <br/>Competition atd Antitrust Poiicy after Deregulation <br/>Lessons from Regulation and Deregulation <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>18 Economic Regulation of Energy: Cnide 0i1 and Natural Gas <br/>The Theory of Price Ceilings <br/>Price and Quantity Regulation of the Crude Oil lndustry <br/>Regulatory History <br/>011. Prorationing <br/>Regulatory Practices <br/>Rationale for Prorationing <br/>Solutions to lhe Comrnon Pool Problem <br/>Effects of Prorationing <br/>Mandatory Oil Impori Prograni <br/>Regulatory Practices <br/>Effects of Regulation <br/>Crude Oil Price Controis <br/>Regulatory Practices <br/>Effects of Price Regulation <br/>Price Regulation of the Natural Gas Industry <br/>Regulatory History <br/>Regulatory Practices <br/>Effects of Price Regulatiõri <br/>Transilion froni Regulation to Markets in the Transmission of Natural Gas <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problerns <br/><br/>III HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION<br/> <br/>19 Introduction: The Emergence of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation <br/>Risk in Perspective <br/>Measuring Mortality Risks <br/>The Infeasibility of a No-Risk Society <br/>Homeland Security <br/>Wealth and Risk <br/>Irrationality and Biases in Risk Perception <br/>Policy Evaluation <br/>Regulatory Standards <br/>Benefit-Cost Analysis <br/>The Role of Heterogeneity <br/>Uncertainty and Conservatism <br/>The Role of Risk Ambiguity <br/>The. Role of Political Factors <br/>Economic Modeis of Environmental Policies<br/>Voting Patterns <br/>Summary and Overview of Part III<br/>Questions and Problems <br/>Recommended Reading <br/><br/>20 Valuing Life and Other Nonnionetary Benefits <br/>Policy Evaluation Principies <br/>Willingness-to-Pay versus Other Approaches <br/>Variations in the Value of Statistical Life <br/>The Labor Market Model <br/>Empirical Estimates of the Value of Life <br/>Value of Risks to Life for Regulatory Policies <br/>Survey Approaches to Valuing Policy Effects <br/>Valuation of Air Quality <br/>Exploratory Nature of the Survey Approach <br/>Sensitivity Analysis and Cost-Effectiveness <br/>Risk-Risk Analysis <br/>Establishing Prices for Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>21 Environmental Regulation <br/>The Coase Theorem for Externalities <br/>The Coase Theorem as a Bargaining Game<br/>A Poliution Example <br/>Long-Run Efficiency Concerns <br/>Transaction Costs and Other Problems <br/>Smoking Externalities <br/>Special Features of Environmental Contexts <br/>Siting Nuclear Wastes <br/>Selecting the Optirnal Policy: Standards versus Fines <br/>Setting the Poilution Tax <br/>The Role of Heterogeneity <br/>The Role of Uncertainty <br/>Poliution Taxes <br/>Cosi Heterogeneity for Water Poliution Control <br/>Current Market Trading Policies <br/>The Future of Market Approaches <br/>Global Warming and In-eversible Environmental Effects <br/>Assessing the Merits o! Global Warming Policies <br/>How Should We Reaci to Uncertainty? <br/>Multiperson Decisions and Group Externalines <br/>The Prisoner's Dilemnia <br/>The N-Person Prisuners Dilemnia <br/>Applications of the Prisoner's Dilenuna <br/>The En forcenieni and Performance of Envi ronmen tal Regulation <br/>Enforcenient Options and Consequences <br/>Hazardous Wastes <br/>Contingent Valuation for the Evwn Valdez Oil Spill <br/>The Senior Discounr for the Value of Life <br/>Evaluating Performance <br/>Sunirnary<br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>22 Product Safety <br/>Emergence of Product Safety Regulations <br/>Current Safety Decisions <br/>Changing Ernphasis of Product Regulation <br/>Prernanufacniring Screening: The Case of Pliarmaceuticais <br/>Weighing the Signilicance of Side Effects <br/>Drug Approval Strategic <br/>The Behavioral Response tu Product Safety Regulation <br/>Consurner's Potential for Muting Safety Device Beneflis <br/>The Cosis o' Product Safety Regulation: The Autornobile Industry Case <br/>Trends in Motor Vehicle and Home Accident Deaihs <br/>Accident Rate influences <br/>The Decline of Accident Rates <br/>The Rise of Product Liability <br/>The Negligence Standard <br/>The Strjct Liability Standard <br/>The Ford Pinto Case <br/>Escalaton of Damages <br/>Risk Information and Haard Warnings <br/>SeIf-Certification of Safe Products <br/>Government Determination of Safety <br/>Alternatives to Direct Comniand and Control Regulation <br/>Regulation through Litigation<br/>Breast Implani Litigation and Regulation <br/>The Future of Produet Safety Policy <br/>Questions and Pro.blerns <br/><br/>23 Regulation of Workplace Health and Safety <br/>The Potential for Inefficiencies <br/>How Markets Can Prornote Safety <br/>Cornpensating Wage Differential Theory <br/>Risk information <br/>On-the-Job Experience and Worker Quit Rates <br/>Inadequacíes in the Market <br/>Externalities <br/>OSHA's Regulatory Approach <br/>Setting OSHA Standard Leveis <br/>The Nature of OSHA Standards <br/>The Reforrn of OSHA Standards <br/>Regulatory Reform initiatives <br/>Changes in OSHA Standards <br/>OSHA's Enforcernent Strategy <br/>Inspection Policies <br/>Trivial Violations <br/>OSHA Penaities <br/>Enforcement Targeting <br/>The Irnpact of OSHA Enforcernent on Worker Safety <br/>OSHA Regulations in Different Situations <br/>OSHA and Other Factors Affecting Injuries <br/>The Role of Workers' Compensation <br/>Agenda for Policy Reform Efforts <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>24 Patents and Pharmaceuticals <br/>Economics of Invention and Patents <br/>Background on Patents <br/>Incentives to Irivent: Monopoly versus Competition <br/>Welfare Analysis of Patents <br/>Pharmaceuticals and the Role of Patents <br/>Industry Structure <br/>The 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Restõration Act <br/>Other Policies That Affect R&D Incentives <br/>Summary <br/>Questions and Problems <br/><br/>Author Index <br/>Subject Index <br/><br/><br/><br/><br/> |
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9 (RLIN) | 1174 |
Nome pessoa | HARRINGTON, Joseph Emmett |
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Nome pessoa | VERNON, John Mitcham |
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942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
Tipo de Material | Livros |
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Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2020-02-11 | Compra | 32097 | 341.3787 V827e | 2020-0017 | 1 | 2020-02-11 | Livros | ||
Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2020-02-11 | 31237 | 341.3787 V827e | 2019-1554 | 2 | 2024-06-19 | Livros | |||
Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2020-02-11 | 31238 | 341.3787 V827e | 2019-1555 | 3 | 2024-06-19 | Livros | |||
Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2020-02-11 | 31239 | 341.3787 V827e | 2019-1556 | 4 | 2024-06-19 | Livros |