Exclusionary practices: (Registro n. 3275)
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| 007 - Campo Fixo - Descrição Física | |
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| 008 - Campo de Tamanho Fixo | |
| Campo fixo de controle local | 210520b2018 bl ||||g |||| 00| 0 eng u |
| 020 ## - ISBN | |
| ISBN | 9781107017382 |
| 040 ## - Fonte da Catalogação | |
| Fonte de catalogação | BR-BrCADE |
| 090 ## - Número de Chamada | |
| Localização na estante | 341.3787 F976e |
| Cutter | F976e |
| 100 1# - Autor | |
| Autor | FUMAGALLI, Chiara |
| 245 10 - Titulo Principal | |
| Título principal | Exclusionary practices: |
| Subtítulo | the economics of monopolisation/ |
| 260 ## - Editora | |
| Cidade | Reino Unido: |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press, |
| Data | 2018. |
| 300 ## - Descrição Física | |
| Número de páginas | 636 p. |
| 505 ## - Conteúdo | |
| Conteúdo | List of Figures <br/>List of Tables<br/>Acknowledgements<br/> <br/>Introduction<br/><br/>1 Predatory Pricing <br/>1.1 Introduction<br/>1.2 Theories of Predation<br/>1.2.1 Predation: The Chicago School and rhe Search for a Theory<br/>1.2.2 Traditional Theories of Predatory pricing<br/>1.2.3 A Theory of Predation Based ou Scale Economies and incumbency Advantage<br/><br/>1.3A Simple Theory of Predation*<br/>1.3.1 The Base Model (Supply-side Scale Economies)<br/>1.3.2 Generalisation of the Theory and Extensions*<br/>1.4 From Theory to Practice<br/>1.4.1 Policy Implications from Theories of Predation: Profit Sacrifice and Recoupment<br/>1.4.2 How to Recognise Predation: The Theory of Harm<br/>1.4.3 How to Recognise Predation: Tests for profit Sacrifice<br/>1.5 Case-Law<br/>1.5.1 United States<br/>1.5.2 European Union<br/>1.5 Cases<br/>1.6.1 Napp<br/>1,6.2 Sanofi-Aventis<br/>1.6.3 Cardiff Bus <br/>1.6.4 telecon Italia <br/>1.6.5 Wanadoo<br/>1.6.6 Deutsche Post<br/>1.6.7 Aberdeen Journals<br/>1.6.8 Media 24 <br/>1.6.9 ECS/AKZO <br/>1.6.10 American .airlines <br/>1.6.11 Standard Oil and American tobacco<br/><br/>2 Price Discrimination and SingIe-Product Rebates <br/>2.1 introduction <br/>2.2 Price Discrimination Welfare and Efficiencies<br/>22.1 Forms of Price Discrimination<br/>2.2.2 Welfare effects of price discriminations <br/>2.3 Price Discrimination as an Exclusionary Device <br/>2.3.1 Non-strategic Selective Price cuts<br/>2.3.2 Price Discrimination to Deprive the Rival of the Scale it Needs <br/>2.3.3 Other Anti-competitive concerns af Contracts that Refrence Rivals <br/>2.3.4 Príce Discrimination between Off net and On-net Users<br/>2.4 Price Discrimination when Scale Matters* <br/>2.4.1 Innes, and Sexton's Divide-and-conquer Price Discrimination <br/>2.4.2 (Explicit and implicit) Selective Discounts* <br/>2.4.3 Conditional Rebates to Target the contesttable Dernand"<br/>2.4.4 Discounts ConditionaI on Exclusivity <br/>2.5 From Theory to Practice <br/>2.6 Case-law <br/>2.6.1 United States<br/>2.6.2 European Union<br/>2.7 Cases <br/>2.7.1 Intel<br/>2.7.2 Tomra.<br/>2.7.3 Mentor <br/>2.7.4 Eisai <br/>2.7.5 South african airways I and II<br/>2.7.6 compagnie Maritinze Belge <br/>2.7.7 Michelin II <br/><br/>3 Exclusive Dealing <br/>3.1 Introduction<br/>3.2 Anti-competitive ED<br/>3.2.1 the Chicago School Critique <br/>3.2.2 upstream Competition <br/>3.2.3 Scale Economies Externalities Among Buyers <br/>3.2.4 When Exclusivity can be Breached upon or Renegotiated<br/>3.2.5 Competing Exclusivity <br/>3.2.6 Empirical Evidence <br/>3.3 Efficiency-enhancing Exclusive Dealing<br/>3.3.1Exclusive Dealing and Protection of Relation-specific Investments <br/>3.3.2 Other Efficiency Justifications<br/>3.3.3 Empirical Evidence<br/>3.4Economíc Models of Exclusive Dealing<br/>3.4.1 The Chicago School critique<br/>3.4.2 Upstream competition <br/>3.4.3 Multiple Buyers and Scale Economies* <br/>3.4.4 Penalty fess for Exclusivity Breach<br/>3.4.5 Competing for Exchusivity<br/>3.4.6 ED and Investment Promotion<br/>3.5 From Theory to Practice<br/>3.5.1 Differences between Exclusive Contracts and Rebates<br/>3.5.2 Theory of Harm and Factors which Facilitate exclusion<br/>3.5.3 Pro-competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing <br/>3.6 Case-law <br/>3.6.1 United States <br/>3.6.2 European a Union<br/>3.7 Cases <br/>3.7.1 Langnese-IgIo<br/>3.7.2 TIM<br/>3.7.3 Posten Norge <br/>3.7.4 Lorain Journal <br/>3.75 Dentsply <br/>3.7.6 Nielsen <br/>3.7.7 distrigaz <br/>3.7.8 Events Ticketing <br/><br/>4 Tying, Bundling and Bundled Rebates <br/>4.1 Introduction <br/>4.2 Efficiency and Price Discrimination Rationales <br/>4.2.1 Efficiency Rationales for Tying and Bundling <br/>4.2,2 Tyng and .Bundling as Price Disçrimination Devices <br/>4.3 Anti-competitive Tying, Bundling and Bundled Rebates<br/>4.3.1 The Chicago School Critique ia the Levenige Theory<br/>4.3.2 Imperfect Rent Extraction <br/>4.3.3 Bundling as a commitment to Aggressive Pricing <br/>4.3.4 Bundling where Entry is Possible in All Markets <br/>4.3.5 Anti-competitive Bundled Rebates <br/>4.3.6 Tyng and After-markets <br/>4.4 Economic Models of Bundling and Tying' <br/>4.4.1 Profitabi!ity of bundling with Elastic Demand Functions*<br/>4.4.2 Carlton and Waldman (2012): hnperfect Rent Extraction fromFature Investments <br/>4.4.3 Carlton and Waldman (2002)"The Model with Fixed Entry Costs<br/>4.4.4 Carlton and Waldman (2002) The Model with Network externalities<br/>4.4.5 Tying in After markets with Limited Commitment<br/>4.5 From Theory to Practice <br/>4.5.1 Some General Principles <br/>4.5.2 Tying and Bundling Theories of Harm <br/>4.5.3Bundled Rebates Theory of Harm<br/>4.6 Case Law<br/>4.6.1 United States <br/>4.6.2 European union<br/>4.7 Cases <br/>4.7.1 Microsoft internet explorer - US <br/>4.7.2 Microsoft Windows Media Player - EU<br/>4.7.3 Rio Tinto Alcan<br/>4.7.4 IDEXX<br/><br/>5 Vertical Foreclosure<br/>5.1 Introduction<br/>5.2 The Economics of Vertical Foreclosure <br/>5.2.1 Ownership of an 'Essential Facility<br/>5.2.2 The Chicago Schooi Critique <br/>5.2.3 Imperfect Rent Extraction <br/>5.2.4 A Dynamic Theory.of Vertical Foreclosure<br/>5.3 Formal Models of Vërtical Foreclosure <br/>5.3.1 The Chicago School Result<br/>5.3.2 Regtilation of the wholesale Prices <br/>5.3.3 Foreclosure because of Opportunistic behaviour<br/>5.3.4 Uncertainty and Risk Aversion<br/>5.3.5 Upstream competition and the Raising Rivals costs Argument* <br/>5.3.6 A Dynamic Model of Vertical Foreclosure to Protect or transfer Monopoly Power<br/>5.4 From Theory to Practice<br/>5.4.1 The need to Preserve the incentives to lnvest and to innovate <br/>5.4.2 Policy Implications <br/>5,4.3 Summary: Analysing Vertical Foreclosure Cases in Practice <br/>5.5 Case-Iaw <br/>5.5.1 United States <br/>5.5.2 European Union <br/>5.6 Cases <br/>5.6.1 Microsoft (EU - Interoperability) <br/>5.6.2 Genzyme <br/>5.6.3 BT/THUS/Gamma <br/>5.6.4 Deutsche Telekom <br/>5.6.5 Telefónica <br/>5.6.6 Long term Capacíty Bookings (RWE. GDF,E.ON) <br/>56.7 ENI <br/>5.6.8 Google (comparison shopping) <br/><br/>References <br/>Cases <br/>Index <br/><br/><br/> |
| 650 #0 - ASSUNTO | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 1926 |
| Assunto | Política de Concorrência |
| 650 #0 - ASSUNTO | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 2135 |
| Assunto | Controle de condutas |
| Subdivisão geral | <a href="Práticas de exclusão">Práticas de exclusão</a> |
| 650 #0 - ASSUNTO | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 1953 |
| Assunto | Política econômica |
| 700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 1737 |
| Nome pessoa | MOTTA, Massimo |
| Relação | Autor |
| 700 1# - Entrada secundária - Nome Pessoal | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 2145 |
| Nome pessoa | CALCAGNO, Claudio |
| Relação | Autor |
| 942 ## - Elementos de Entrada Adicionados | |
| Tipo de Material | Livros |
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| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 2021-03-22 | Compra | 21219 | 341.3787 F976e | 2021-0113 | 1 | 2021-05-20 | Livros |