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CONTENTS<br/><br/>List of Abbreviations <br/>Tables of Court ofJustice and the General Court ofthe European Union Cases <br/>Tables ofEuropean Commission Decisions <br/>Table ofNationaland Other Cases <br/>Table ofEU/EC Treaties <br/>Tables ofEU/ECLegislation <br/>Tables ofEU/ECNotices, Guidelines and Other Informal Texts <br/>Table ofNational Legislation <br/>Table ofinternational Treaties<br/><br/>1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES<br/>1.The Economics of Competition Luc Peeperkorn and Vincent Verouden<br/>A.Introduction <br/>B. Structure, Conduct, Performance<br/>(1) Early Developments <br/>(2) The Harvard School <br/>(3) The Chicago Schoo<br/>(4) More Recent Developments <br/>C. Static Welfare Analysis of Market Power <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Basic Microeconomic Concepts <br/>(a) ConsumerSurpius <br/>(b) Production Costs <br/>(c) Short-Run Production Costs <br/>(d) Profit Maximization <br/>(e) Long-Run Production Costs <br/>(f) Economies of Scale and Minimum Efflcient Scale <br/>(g) Entry Barriers <br/>(h) Contestabiity <br/>(3) Perfect Competition<br/>(a) lheModel <br/>(b) lhe Outcome <br/>(4) Monopoly <br/>(a) The Model <br/>(b) The Outcome <br/>(5) Oligopoly <br/>(a) Introduction <br/>(b) Gamelheory <br/>(c) The Scope for Coilusion Illustratcd with the Prisoner's Dilemma <br/>D. Dynamic Welfare Analysis ofMarket Power <br/>(1) Innovation and Welfare <br/>(2) Different Views<br/>(3) Some Empirical Results <br/>(4) lhe 'New Economy' <br/>(5) Some Concluding Remarks <br/>E. Market Definition <br/>(1) Product Market Definition <br/>(a) Demand-Side Substitution <br/>(b) TheSSNIPTest <br/>(c) Elasticity Concepts and the Diversion Ratio<br/>(d) Supply-Side Substitution<br/>(2) lhe Relevant Geographic Market <br/>(a) Demand-Side Substitution <br/>(b) Supply-Side Substitution <br/>(3) Specific Issues in the Context ofMarket Definition <br/>(a) Chains ofSubstitution <br/>(b) Price Discrimination <br/>(c) Captive Production <br/>(4) Further Considerations <br/>(a) Market Definition in Practice <br/>(b) Defining the Market: Not an End in Itself <br/>E Market Power and Dominance <br/>(1) Market Power <br/>(a) Concept <br/>(b) Identification of (Static) Market Power <br/>(2) Dominance <br/>(a) Single Dominance<br/>(b) Coilective Dominance <br/>(3) Enhancing Market Power <br/>(a) Merger with a Competitor: Unilateral vs Coordinated Effects <br/>(b) Exclusionary Strategies <br/>G. Empírica! Methods for Market Definition and the Assessmerit <br/>of Market Power <br/>(1) Analysis of Prices and Price Movements <br/>(a) Price Correlation Analysis <br/>(b) Extension: Stationarity/Co-Integration <br/>(2) Analysis ofPrice Elasticities ofDemand<br/>(3) Critical Loss Analysis <br/>(4) UPP <br/>(5) Event Analysis <br/>(6) Assessment Methods Relating Price to Market Structure <br/>(a) Price Concentration Analysis <br/>(b) Direct Evaluation ofCompetitive Constraints<br/>(7) Analysis ofBidding Data <br/>(8) Merger Simulation <br/>2.The Enforcement System under Regulation 1/2003 <br/>EIdy De Smjrer and Ailsa Sinclair<br/>A.Direct Application of Articles 101 and 102<br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) The Aims and Resuks ofthe System Change <br/>(a) Increased Application ofArticles 101 and 102 at Member State Leve! <br/>(b) The Commission's Focus on Enforcement<br/>(3) Self-assessment and Legal Certainty <br/>(4) lhe Direct Effect ofArticles 101 and 102 <br/>(5) Burden and Standard ofProof <br/>B. The Relationship Between EU Competition Law and National<br/>Competition Law <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Article 3(1): lhe Obligation to ApplyArticles 101 and 102 <br/>(a) Scope of Article 3(1) <br/>(b) Primary Functions ofArticle 3(1) <br/>(3) The Convergence Rule ofArticle 3(2) <br/>(4) The Legal Consequences oflnfringingArticle 3(1) and (2) <br/>(5) Article 3 and the Primacy Rale<br/>(6) Exceptions to Article 3 <br/>(a) National Competition Laws <br/>(b) National Laws Implementing EU Law Directives <br/>(c) Member State Measures Covered by Article 106 <br/>(d) National Merger Control Laws <br/>(e) Criminal Sanctions on Natural Persons <br/>C. Powers and Decisions ofNational Competition Authorities <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) The NCA <br/>(3) The Decisions ofan NCA <br/>(a) Scope of Article 5 <br/>(b) The Decisions Listed in Article 5 <br/>(4) Triggering a Decision by an NCA<br/>(a) The NCAActs on its Own Initiative or on a Compiaint<br/>(b) National Notification Systems <br/>D. Commission Powers and Decisions <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Article 7: Finding and Termination oflnfringements <br/>(a) lhe Power to Find Infringements <br/>(b) lhe Power to Impose Remedies <br/>(i) General PrincipIes <br/>(ii) Structural and Behavioura! Remedies <br/>(iii) Break-ups <br/>(c) Complaints <br/>(3) Article 8: Iriterim Measures <br/>(4) Article 9: Commirments<br/>(a) Introduction <br/>(b)The Nature of Arricle 9 Decisions <br/>(e) The Purpose ofArtic!e 9 Decisions <br/>(d) The Procedure for Adopting Article 9 Decisions <br/>(e) Adoption ofthe Decision and Reopening of the Proceedings <br/>(f) lhe Scope for Legal Chailenge <br/>(5) Article 10: Finding oflnapplicability <br/>(a) Introduction <br/>(b) The Nature and Purpose ofArticle 10 Decisions <br/>(c)The Legal Effects ofArticle 10 Decisions <br/>(i) The Relationship BetweenArticles 9 and 10 <br/>E. Cooperation Between Enforcers <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Cooperationwithin the ECN <br/>(a) lhe Sharing ofWork Amongst the Competition Authorities <br/>(b) An NCA's Request co Another NCA co Carry Out an Investigarion <br/>(c) Exchange of Information and lts Use in Evidence <br/>(i) Exchange of Information wichin the ECN <br/>(z) Empowering ECN Members to Exchange Information <br/>(ii) AiowingECNMembers to Exchange Information <br/>(iii) ExchangingInfiïrnation Voluntarily Submitted by a Lenieny Applicant <br/>(ii) lhe Use of the Exchanged Informacion in Evidence<br/>The Relatiõn Betu'een Article 12 and the National Law <br/>Provisions Prohibiting NCAsfiom Divaiging Confidential Information <br/>(ii) A Wider Urnbrela for the Protection ofConfidentiallnformation <br/>(iii) lhe Use in Evidence of the Information Exchanged within the ECNT<br/>The General Princples ofEULaw<br/>(ii) Information Exchanged 6'an Only Be Used in Evidencefor the <br/>Application ofEU ('ompetition Rules <br/>(iii) Information Exchanged Can Only Be Used in Evidence in <br/>Respecr ofthe SubjecrMatterfor Which it was Collected <br/>(iv) lhe Limitations With Regard to the Use oflnformation in <br/>Evidente to Impose Sanctions on Natural Persons <br/>(v) Experience with Article 12 <br/>(d) lhe Obligarion of Professional Secrecy and the Need co <br/>Disclose Information 2.192<br/>(i) Which Information is Covered by Professional Secrecy?<br/>(i)The Wide Coverage ofProfessional Secrecy <br/>(ii) Specific Sub-Catego7y Within the Wider Concept of <br/>Professional Secrecy: Business Secrets and Other <br/>Confidential Information <br/>(iii) Business Secrets <br/>(iv) Other Confidential Information <br/>(ii) lhe Disclosure oflnformation Acquired or Exchanged <br/>Pursuanr to Regulation 1/2003 <br/>(é) Disclosure Necessaiy to Prove an Jnfringement of <br/>Article 101 or 102 <br/>(iii) Disclosure in granting access to lhe file<br/>Access to the FileJbr the Addressee ofa Statement ofObjections<br/>(ii) Access to Information by Other Parties with Legití mate Interest, <br/>in Particular Complainants <br/>(3) CoherentApplicarion within the ECN <br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) Information underArtide 11 (3)<br/>(e)The Procedu rei nArticle 11 (4) <br/>(i)The Scope oftheArticle 11(4) Procedure <br/>(ii) The Article 11 (4) Process and irs Objective <br/>(iii) The Legal Consequences ofFailure co Comply with Article 11 (4) <br/>(d) Arricle 11(6): lhe Comniission's Power to Withdraw a Case <br/>(i)The Legal Nature ofArticle 11(6) <br/>(ii) The Authorities Covered byArticle 11 (6) <br/>(iii) Circumstances in Which Withdrawal may be Envisaged <br/>(iv) The Procedure for Applying Article 11 (6) <br/>(4) CoherentApplication by National Courts <br/>(a) The Competence ofNational Courts to Apply EU <br/>Competition Rules <br/>(b) The Coherent Application of EU Competition Rules by <br/>National Courts<br/>Commission Initiatives towards Coherent Application of EU <br/>Competition Rules<br/>The Commission's Policy Notices and Guidelines <br/>(ii) Co-Financing the Training ofNationalJudges in EU <br/>Competition Rules <br/>(iii) A Database on NationalJudginents <br/> (ii)Consisrency in the Case of Parailel or Consecutive Application of <br/>EU Competition Rules <br/>(c) Cooperation Between the Cornmission and the National Courts <br/>(i)The Opportunity for the National Courts to ask the Commission <br/>for Information or for its Opinion <br/>(i)lThe Opportunity to As/e the Com missionfor Information<br/>(ii) The Opportuniiy toAsk the Commissionforlts Opinion <br/>(ii) lhe Submission ofObservations <br/>3. Article 101 <br/>Jonathan Fauli, Lars Kjølbye, Henning Leupold, andAli Nikpay <br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. Scope of Article <br/>(1) Scope <br/>(2) Coai and Steel <br/>(3) Defence <br/>(4) Environment and Culture <br/>(5) Sport <br/>C. Article101(1) <br/>(1) Undertakings <br/>(a) Definition<br/>(b) Professions <br/>(e) Public Bodies Exception <br/>(d) The Single Economic Unir Doctrine (No Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy in EU Law) <br/>(i)A Subsidiary Whol1y-Owned, or Almost Wholly-Owned, By <br/>IrsParent <br/>(ii) A Parent Holding a Majority Shareholding in a Subsidiary But Less <br/>than 100 Per Cent <br/>(iii) Parent Liability in the Context ofJoint Control <br/>(iv) Companies with Non-Conrrolling Stakes in Another Company<br/>(e) Successor Underrakings <br/>(2) Agreements <br/>(a) General Definition <br/>(b) Requires At LeastTwo Undertakings <br/>(c) Form Irrelevanr<br/>(d) Notion of'Agreement' and Limitation ofFreedom ofAction <br/>(e) Single Continuous Infringement Doctrine <br/>(f) TacitAcquiescence in Vertical Cases <br/>(i) Volkswagen II <br/>(ii) What Does Tacit Acquiescence Require? <br/>(iii) Gare Should be Taken in App!ying the Bayer! Volkswagen II <br/>Approach <br/>(g) FormalTermination May Not be Sufficient <br/>(h) Judicial Settlement <br/>Decisions by Associations ofUndertakings<br/>Concerted Practices<br/>(a) Definition <br/>(b) Can a Concerted Practice be Inferred from Circumstantial <br/>Eviderice Alone? <br/>(c) Vertical Concerted Practices <br/>(i) 'Hub and Spoke' Concerted Practices <br/>Distinction Between Agreeinents and Concerted Practices <br/>State Compulsion <br/>The Notion ofRestriction ofCompetition under EU Competition Law <br/>Restriction by Object<br/>(a) Concept ofRestriction by Object <br/>(b) Restriction by Object and Appreciability <br/>(i)'The 'Pre-&pedia'Case Law <br/>(ii) The Commissions Approach to Appreciability in Object Cases <br/>(iii) The Expedia Judgmerit <br/>Restriction byEffect <br/>(a) The Commission's Traditional Approach <br/>(b) Modifications by the EU Courts <br/>(c) Restrictions of Rivairy Must Be Assessed in Their Market Context <br/>(d) Ancillary Restraints Doctrine <br/>(i) Commercial Ancillarit<br/>(ii) Public InterestAncillarity <br/>(iii) 'lhe Narrow Scope ofthe Ancillary Restraints Doctrine <br/>(i)Directly Related and Subo rdinate <br/>(ii) Necessary <br/>(iii) Objective Necessily for the Implementation ofthe <br/>Main Operation <br/>(iv)Proportiona1i.y <br/>(iv) Concluding Remark: Ancillary Restraints Doctrine <br/>(e) Exclusivity Necessary for Supply <br/>(i) Exclusivity Must be Objectively Necessary <br/>(ii) Ir is Unclear Whether this Doctrine Applies to Agreements <br/>Between Competitors <br/>(iii) Doctrine OnIy Likely to Apply in Clear-Cut Cases <br/>(iv) Does the Approach App!y to 'Object' Cases? <br/>(v) Difference Between Exclusivity Necessary for Supply and Ancillary <br/>Restraints Doctrines <br/>(f) Appreciability <br/>(g) Cumulative Effects Doctrine <br/>(h) lhe Purpose of the Market Analysis <br/>(i) No Rule of Reason under Article 101(1) <br/>(ii) Gøttrup-Klim<br/>(iii) Wouters <br/>(iv) Metro l and il <br/>(v) 02 <br/>(i) Does 02 Signa/a Change in Direction? <br/>(vi) Explicit Rejection of the Rule of Reason under Article 101(1) by the General Court <br/>(i) Extent ofMarket Analysis <br/>(j) Restrictive Clauses Are Nota Necessary Condirion for the Application of Article 101(1)(k) The Commission's Policy as ser our in the Article 101(3) Guidelines <br/>(1) Step 1: lhe Counterfactual <br/>(ii) Step 2: Assessment ofthe Likely Effect of the Agreement<br/>(1)The Current State ofAffairs: Developments in the Cornrnission's <br/>Policy and the EU Courts' Case Law Subsequent to the Article 101(3) Guidelines <br/>Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines <br/>(ii) Biock Exemption Regulations<br/>(iii) DeMinimisNotice<br/>D. Jurisdiction <br/>(1) General <br/>(2) The Concept ofTrade Between Member States <br/>(3) The Link BetweenTrade and the Agreement or Practice<br/>(4) The Notion of'MayAffect' <br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) A Sufficient Degree ofProbabiiity <br/>(c) An Influence on the Pattern ofTrade <br/>(i) Director Indirect, Actual or Potential <br/>(5) Appreciability <br/>(a) General Principies <br/>(b) Quantification <br/>(6) Assessment of Various Types ofAgreement and Practices <br/>(a) Introduction<br/>(b) Agreements and Practices Concerning lmports and Exports and <br/>Agreements and Practices Implemented in Severa! Member States <br/>(c) Agreements and Practices; Confined to the Whole or Part of a Member State <br/>(d) Agreements and Practices Covering Part of a Member State <br/>(e) Agreements and Practices Involving Third Countries <br/>E. Article 101(2) <br/>EThe Article 10 1(3) Exception <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) The Reiationship Between Article 101(1) and Article <br/>(3) General Principies for theApplication ofArticie <br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) The Narure ofthe Benefits that Can BeTaken into Account<br/>(c)Tlhe Relevant Market as the Proper Framework for Applying <br/>Article 101(3) <br/>(d) The Temporal Application of Article 101(3) <br/>(e) Biock Exemprions <br/> (4) The Four Conditioris ofArticle 10 1(3) <br/>(a) Introduction <br/> (b) The First Test ofArticle 101(3): Efficiency Gains<br/> (i) Examples of Relevant Types ofEfficiencies <br/> (ii) The Substantiation ofEfficiency Claims <br/>(c)The seconds testo of Article 101(3):Indispensabily<br/>(d) The Third Test of Article 101(3): A Fair Share for Consumers <br/> (e) The Fourth Test of Article 101(3): No Elimination of Competition in <br/>Respect of a Substantial Part of the Products in Question <br/>4. Article 102<br/>Miguel dela Mano, Renato Nazzini, and Hans Zenger<br/>A.The System ofEnforcement ofArticle 102<br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(a) Elements ofArticle 102 <br/>(b) Relationship Between Article 101 and Article 102 <br/>(c) Purpose ofArticle 102: Protection ofCompetition or Protection of Competitors? <br/>(d) Role of Efficiencies in Article 102 Assessment <br/>(2) Categorization of Abuses: Exploitative vs Exclusionary<br/>(a) Prohibition of Customer Exploitation <br/>(b) Prohibition ofExclusionary Practices <br/>(3) Consequences of Infringement of Article 102 <br/>(a) Introduction <br/>(b) Guiding Principies <br/>(e) Types ofSanctions and Remedies in Article 102 Cases <br/>(i) Fines <br/>(ii) Cease and Desisr Orders <br/>(iii) Behavioural Remedies <br/>(iv) Structural Remedies <br/>(v) Which Remedy is Most Appropriate? <br/>(d) Procedural Issues<br/>(4) Cornmitment Decisions (Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003) <br/>(a) Basic PrincipIes <br/>(b) Importance ofCommitment Decisions in Ar-dele 102 Cases <br/>(c) Concerns Regarding the Use of Commitment Decisions in <br/>Article 102 Cases <br/>(5) Judicial Review ofArticle 102 Decisions <br/>(a) Review ofFacts and Law 4.71<br/>(b) Review ofComp1ex Economic Matters'<br/>B. lhe Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance <br/>(1) lhe Emergence of the Effects-Based Approach <br/>(a) Traditional Approach under EU Law <br/>(b) Form- vs Effecrs-Based Approach <br/>(e) Pros and Cons ofan Effects-Based Approac<br/>(d) lhe Recent Adoption by the EU Courts of a More Explicitly Effects-Based Approach <br/>(2) lhe Commission's Review of Article 102 Policy <br/>(a) Purpose of the Review <br/>(b) lhe StaffDiscussion Paper <br/>(3) lhe Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance<br/>(a) Adoption of Guidance as opposed to Guidelines <br/>(b) Economics-Based Approach to Enforcemenr <br/>(c) lmpact ofthe Guidance on Future Cases <br/>(d) Overview of the Guidance <br/>(e) Brief Surnmary of the Approach to Abuse <br/>(i) An ti-Competi tive Foreclosure <br/>(ii) Assessment ofthe Effect on Consumers <br/>(iii) Objective Justifications and Efficiencies <br/>C. Dominance <br/>(1) Concept ofSing!e Dominance <br/>(a) Legal Definition ofSing!e Dominance <br/>(b) Concerns Regarding the Elements ofthe Definition of Dominance<br/>(c) ApproachTaken in theGuidance to theTestElements <br/>(d) Assessment of Market Power <br/>(e) How Does the Guidance Approach Fit with the Lega! Approach <br/>(2) Factors Relevant to Single Dominance<br/>(a) Economic Measurement of Market Power<br/>(b) Factors Under the Case Law and the Commission's Guidance <br/>(i)The Position ofthe Undertaking Concerned and Its Competitors<br/>(i)Market Definition<br/>(ii) Market Shares<br/>(iii) Profitability ofthe Undertakin (iv) Conduct ofthe Undertaking <br/>(v) The Position ofCompetitors <br/>(ii) Barriers to Eniry and Expansion<br/>(i)Regulatory Barriers to Ent,y <br/>(ii) Capacity Constraints<br/>(iii) Economies ofScale and Scope <br/>(iv) Netu.'ark Effects <br/>(v) Switching Costs <br/>(vi) Vertical Integration and Exclusive of Preferential Arcess to <br/>Inputsor C'ustomers<br/>(vii) FinancialStrength<br/>(viii) Spare o Excess Capacity <br/>(ix) Orher Facrors <br/>(iii) Courstervailing Buyer Power <br/>(3) Concept ofCollective Dominance <br/>(a) Definition ofCollective Dominance <br/>(b) Non-Oligopolistic Coilective Dominance <br/>(e) Vertical Non-Oligopolistic Coliective Dominance<br/>(d) O!igopolistic Coilective Dominance <br/>(4) Abuse of a Coilective Dominant Position <br/>(a) Joint Abuses <br/>(b) Single Abuses <br/>(5) Dominance and Abuse in Neighbouring Markets <br/>(6) Dominance in New Econorny Markets <br/>D. Concept of Abuse <br/>(1) General Concept ofAbuse <br/>(2) Definition ofAbuse Under the EU Courts' Case Law <br/>(3) lheTestforAbuse <br/>(a) Exploitative and Discriminatory Abuses <br/>(b) Exclusionary Abuses <br/>(i) Potential Tests Based on Economic Principies <br/>(ii) Approach Taken in the Commission's Guidance <br/>(i)Anti-Competirive Foreclosure: General<br/>(ii) Test for Foreclosure in Pricing Cases<br/>(iii)When is Foreclosure Enough to beAnti-Competitive?<br/>(iv) Likely Harm to Cõnsumers <br/>(4) lhe Special Responsibility ofthe Dominant Undertaking<br/>(5) Objective Justification <br/>(a) General<br/>(b) Objective Necessity <br/>(c) Eflciency Defence <br/>E. Predatory Pricing <br/>(1) Whatis PredatoryPricing? <br/>(a) Definition <br/>(b) Economic Theories ofPredarory Pricing <br/>(e) Distinguishing Prcdarory Pricing From Normal Comperition <br/>(2) Predation Under EU Law: lhe AKZO Test <br/>(a) Whecher and How to Assess the Intent ofthe Dominant Firm <br/>(c) Is a Below Cost Test Appropriate? <br/>(i) Above-Cost Price Cuts as Part of a Wider Exclusionary Strategy <br/>(ii) Above-Cost Price Cuts by a Quasi-Monopolist Liable to Exclude <br/>irs Only Competitor <br/>(iii) Above-Cost Price Cuts Restricting Free Trade<br/>(d) Difficukies With Reiying on Price-CosrTests <br/>(i) Beiow Cost Pricing May Not Be a Necessary Condition <br/>(ii) Below Cost Pricing May Nor Be a Suflicient Condition <br/>(iii) Below Cost PricingMay Be Pro-Competitive <br/>(iv) Below-Cost PricingTests Create Measurement Difficulties <br/>(e) The post danmark test<br/>(f) The Role of Recoupment? <br/>(3) The Predation Test in the Artide 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance <br/>(a) Profit Sacrifice <br/>(b) Exciusion ofan Equally Efficienr Competitor <br/>(c) Consumer Harm and Recoupment <br/>(i) Enrry is Unlikely Afrer the Prey is Excluded or Disciplined <br/>(ii)Re-Enrry is Unlikely <br/>(iii) Assessmenr ofthe Competitive Constraint Exercised by the <br/>Excluded Rival <br/>(iv) Dominance Is Nor Evidence of Recoupment <br/>(d) Objecrivejustification <br/>(i) Market-Expanding Eflciencies <br/>(ii) To Facilirate Learning and Awareness of a Producr Among Consumers<br/>(iii) Tolmprovethe Firm's Positioning as a Low-Price Company <br/>(e) MeetingCompetition Defence <br/>(f) Other Loss-Minimizing Strategies <br/>F. Exclusive Dealing Exclusivity Obligations and Loyaky Rebates <br/>(1) Case Law and Comrnission Decisional Practice <br/>(a) Definition and Types of Exclusivity <br/>(i) Legal and De Facto Exclusivity <br/>(ii) Requirements Contracts <br/>(iii) English Clauses <br/>(iv) Irnposition of Exclusive Obligations on Suppliers <br/>(v) Exclusivity Imposed by Distributors <br/>(b) The Abuse Test in Exclusivity Cases <br/>(e) Objective Justification <br/>(d) Definition and Types ofConditional Rebates <br/>(e) Abuse Test in Rebates Cases <br/>(i) Rebates That Are Presumpuvely Lawful (Quantity Rebates) <br/>(ii) Rebates ]bar Are Nakedly Exclusionary <br/>(iii) Fidelity Rebates <br/>(iv) Individualized Target Rebates <br/>(v) Standardized Rebates <br/>(2) Policy and Effects-Based Approach <br/>(a) Commission's Approach Under the Article 102 Enforcement Priorities <br/>Guidance <br/>(b) The Logic of the Commission's Approach Towards Loyalty Rebates and <br/>Exclusive Dealing<br/>(i)Economic Reasoning for Use of Rebate Schemes<br/>(ii) Possible Anti-Competitive Harm From Use of Rebate Schemes <br/>(c) Identifring An ri-Competi tive Foreclosure Under the Article 102 <br/>Enforcement Priorities Guidance<br/>(i)Step 1:The As-Efficient Competi ror Test <br/>(ii) Step 2: Assessment ofAnti-Competitive Foreclosure <br/>(iii) Countervailing Efficiencies and Objective Justification <br/>(d) The Limits of the Article 102 Enforcement Priorities <br/>Guidance Approach <br/>(e) The Commission's Application ofthe New Approach <br/>G. Tying and Bundling <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(a) Definition ofTying and Bundling<br/>(b) Relationship with Article 101 <br/>(2) Legal Analysis and Case Law on Tying <br/>(a) A Dominant Position on the Tying Market <br/>(b) The Two-Product Tesr <br/>(e) Coercion <br/>(d) Anti-Comperirive Effect <br/>(i) The Requirernent to Prove Foreclosure ofAs-Efficient Competitors <br/>(e) Objective Justification <br/>(i) Reduction in Transaction Cosrs <br/>(ii) Preservation ofGoodwill Qualir Assurance, and Ensuring <br/>Compliancewith Safety Requirements <br/>(iii) Dynamic Efflciency <br/>(iv) Standardization <br/>(3) Case Law on MixedBundling <br/>(4) Policy and Effects-Based Approach <br/>(a) lhe Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Gui dance Approach Towards <br/>Tying and Bundling <br/>(b) No Presumprion ofAnti-Competitive Harm <br/>(c) Anti-CompetitíveTying and Bundling <br/>(d) Price Discrimination and Multi-Product Rebates <br/>U. Refusal to Supply<br/>(1) Concept of Abusive Refusal to Supply <br/>(2) Basic Elements<br/>(a) Com petitive Advantage on Downstream Market <br/>(b) Enforcernent of Other Abuse <br/>(e) Constructive Refusal to Supply <br/>(d) De novo Refusais vs Wirhdrawal of Supply <br/>(3) Types of Refusal to Supply<br/>(a) Refusal to Supply a Physical Product or Service <br/>(b) Refusal to ProvideAccess to an Essential Facility <br/>(c) Refusal to License IP Righrs <br/>(d) Refusal to Supply Information Needed for Interoperability <br/>(4) Potential Anti-Comperitive Effects of Refusais to Supply <br/>(5) The Case Law on Refusal to Supply <br/>(a) General Framework<br/>(b) lndispensability <br/>(c) The Foreclosure Effect <br/>(d) Raising Rivais' Costs as Exclusionary Effect? <br/>(e) The Foreclosure Effecr and the 'Essential Facilities' Doctrine in <br/>Commission Practice <br/>(f) Consumer Harm <br/>(g) Interoperability Cases Since Microsoft <br/>(h) Refusal to Supply an Existing Customer <br/>(i) Defences (Objective Necessity and Objective justification) <br/>(6) The Approach Under the Comrnission's Guidance <br/>(a) General Approach <br/>(b) Necessaiy Conditions <br/>(i)Objective Necessity <br/>(ii)Elimination ofEtfective Competirion <br/>(iii) Consumer Harm (and Incentives BalancingTest) <br/>(iv) Objective justifications (Efflciencies) <br/>(7) Refusal to Supply and Patents<br/>1.Margin Squeeze <br/>(1) Conceptofa Mirgin Squeeze Abuse <br/>(2) Legal Analysis ofMargin Squeeze <br/>(a) The Early Case Law <br/>(b) Elernents ofthe Abuse <br/>(i)Margin Squeeze is a Stand-Alone Abuse <br/>(ii) 'The Need to Demonstrate an Anti-Competitive Effect <br/>(iii) Factors Relevani to Assessing Potential Anti-Competitive Effect <br/>(iv) The'As-Efficienç Competitor' Test <br/>(v)Basis for Calculating Potential Effects <br/>(vi) Objectivejustification <br/>(vii) Relevance of Level of Dominance <br/>(3) Economic Assessmenr <br/>(a) General <br/>(b) The Cost Benchmark <br/>(c)ProfitabilityAnalysis <br/>(d) Assessment of the Spread <br/>(e) Specific Considerations in Start-Up Phases <br/>(4) Interplay Between Margin Squeeze and Refusal to Deal: lndispensability <br/>(5) Inrerplay Between Margin Squeeze and Regulatory Obligations <br/>Specific Abusive Practices in Relation to IP Rights <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(a) Complementary Aims of IP Rights and Antitrust <br/>(b) Appropriateness ofAntitrust Intervention in the IP Rights Arena <br/>(e) Potenrial Competi tion Concerns Arising our of IP Rights <br/>(2) Suppiy of Misieading Information to Extend Patent Validity <br/>(a) Nature of the Abuse <br/>(b) Intent Not Determinative <br/>(c) Evidence ofActual Effects <br/>(3) Withdrawal ofMarketing Authorization to Restrict Entry of Generics <br/>(4) Patent Filing Strategies <br/>(a) Early Cases on Strategic Use of Patents <br/>(b) Defensive Patent Strategies: Biocking Patents <br/>(c) Other Strategic Behaviour <br/>(5) Patent Settlements With Reverse Payments (Pay for Delay) <br/>(a) Overview: Potenrial Benefirs and Harms From Patent Settlements <br/>(b) Commission Practice <br/>(6) Patent Hoid-Up in the Context of Standard Setting <br/>(a) Conrext: Standard Setting and Patent Hoid-Up Possibilities <br/>(b) Patent Ambush <br/>(i)Definition <br/>(ii) Anti-Competitive Effects ofParentAmbush <br/>(iii) Condi tions for Abuse: lhe RambusDecision <br/>(c) FRAND Hoid-Up <br/>(i)Definition of FRAND Hoid-Up: lhe Qualcomm Case <br/>(ii)Particular Issues Surrounding Articie 102 Enforcement in <br/>FRAND Licensing<br/>(i)FRAND is Not a Static ar Pre-Defined Concept <br/>(ii)What: Constitutes Fair'and Reasonable? <br/>(iii)What Constitutes 'Non-Discriminatory? <br/>(iii) Importance of FRAND<br/>(7) Anti-Com peti tive Litigation in Relation to Standard Essentiai Patents <br/>(8) IssuesApplicableAcross IP Rights Cases <br/>(a) Assessing Dominance in Pharmaceurical IP Rights Cases <br/>(i)Inferring Dominance from Levei of Renrs <br/> (ii) Dominance Reiative to a Competitive Counterfactual Post-Loss of <br/>Exclusivity <br/>(b) An ti-Compet i tive Foreciosure and Objective Justification in IP Rights <br/>Cases<br/>(c)Applicability ofArticle 102 to Standard' Strategies/Tactics Available <br/>UnderlPRights <br/>(d) Intervention under Article 102 vs Enforcemeru of IP Law<br/>K. Exploitative Abuses <br/>(1) Concept of Excessive Pricing <br/>(2) The Tesr for Excessive Pricing Under EU Case Law <br/>(a) The UnitedBrandsTest <br/>(b) Difficulties in rhe Application ofthe UnitedBrandsTest: Port of Helsingborg <br/>(e) AlternativeApproaches under the Case Law <br/>(3) lmposing Other Unfairlerms <br/>(4) EconornicApproach to Excessive Pricing <br/>(a) Circumstances Suitable for Intervention <br/>(i)To Restore Dynamic Competition <br/>(ii)Exploitative Prices asa Result ofExclusionary Conduct <br/>(iii) Exploitation of Dominance Resulting from <br/>Non-Competitive Forces <br/>(b) DeterminingWhether Prices are Abusive <br/>(i)the Price-Cost Difference is Excessive <br/>(ii)Unfair Price in Itselfor Compared to Others<br/>(i)Discrimination-BasedBenchmarks <br/>(ii)Direct Price-Cost Comparisons <br/>(5) Unfairly Low Prices Extracted by Dominam Buyers <br/>(6) Limiting Production, Markets, or Technical Development <br/>L. Price Discrimination <br/>(1) Concept of Price Discrimination <br/>(2) Competition Concerns Regarding Price Discrimination <br/>(3) Case Law and Commission Practice on Article 102(c) Discriminatory <br/>Pricing Abuses <br/>(a) Discrimination Based on Narionality <br/>(b) Geographicai Price Discrimination <br/>(c) Market-Distorting Price Discrimination <br/>(i)Definition <br/>(ii)EquivalentTransactions <br/>(iii) Dissimilar Conditions <br/>(iv) Competitive Disadvantage <br/>(4) Policy and Effects-Based Approach <br/>(a) The Conimission's Current EnforcementApproach <br/>5. Mergers <br/>Clã es Bengtsson, Josep Maria Carpi Badia, and Massimiliano Kadar <br/>A. Introduction <br/>(1) Origins and Evolution of EU Merger Control <br/>(a) Introduction ofan EU Merger Control System <br/>(b) lhe Firsr Decade ofApplication of EU Merger Control <br/>(c) The Judgments i Airtours, Tetra Lavai, and Schneider<br/>(d) The 2004 Reform <br/>(e) Evolution of EU Merger Control Foliowing the 2004 Reform <br/>(2) Core Principies of EU Merger Control <br/>(a) Compulsory Ex Ante Notification <br/>(b) One-StopShop <br/>(c)One-TierAdministrative Procedure Subject to Judicial Review <br/>(d) Enforcement Objectives <br/>(3) Statistics on Enforcemenr Over Time <br/>B. Jurisdiction <br/>(1) Overview <br/>(a) Two-Lirnbed Test to Determine Jurisdiction<br/>(i)The Concept of a 'Concentration' <br/>(ii) The Requirement ofan 'EU Dirnension' <br/>(b) Regulatory Frarnework: lhe Merger Regulation and the <br/>Jurisdicrional Notice<br/>(c) Discussions with the Commission on Jurisdiction in Individual Cases<br/>(2) The Concept of a Concentration: Merger<br/>(3) The Concept of a Concentration: Acquisition of Control<br/>(a) Overview <br/>(b) Control<br/>(i)Who Acquires Control? (ii) How Can Control Be Acquired? <br/>(iii)The Object of Control<br/>(iv)The Lasting Nature of the Change in Control <br/>(v)Internal Restructurings and Concentrations Involving <br/>State-Owned Undertakings <br/>(c) The Acquisition of Sole Control<br/>(i)De Jure Sole Control<br/>(ii)De Facto Sole Control <br/>(d) The Acquisition ofJoint Control<br/>(i)Equal Voting Rights<br/>(ii)Veto Rights<br/>(iii) Joint Exercise ofVoting Rights <br/>(e) Changes in the Structure and/or Quality of Control<br/>(f) Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings (Structural Links) <br/>(g) Exceptions UnderArticle 3(5) of the Merger Regulation <br/>(4) JointVentures<br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) Concept ofJoint Venture <br/>(c)Relevam: JurisdictionalTest<br/>(i)Creation of a Joint Venture <br/>(ii) JointAcquisitions ofan Undertakingor Business <br/>(iii) Other Operations Involving Joint Ventures <br/>(d) lhe Requirement ofFull-Functionality<br/>(i)Overview <br/>(ii)Sufficient Resources to Operate Independentlyon the Market <br/>(iii) Relations Between the Joint Venture and its Parem: Companies <br/>(iv) Operatingon a Lasting Basis <br/>(5) lncerrelated and Staggered Operations <br/>(a) Interdependent Transactions <br/>(b) Consecutive Transactions Between the Sarne Parties <br/>(Staggered Transacrions) <br/>(6) Ancillary Restraints <br/>(7) The Requirement ofan EU Dimension <br/>(a) The Purpose ofTurnover Thresholds <br/>(b) The Principal llireshold under Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation <br/>(c) The Alternative Threshold under Article 1(3) of the Merger Regulation <br/>(d) Appraisal of the Operation of the Turnover Thresholds<br/>(8) The Calcuiation of Relevant Turnover <br/>(a) Step 1: 1dentif'ing the Undertakings Concerned <br/>(i)GeneralRule <br/>(ii)Specific Scenarios on the Acquiring Side <br/>(iii) Specific Sceriarios on the Acquired Side <br/>(b) Step 2: Methodology for the Calculation of Turnover <br/>(i)Concept ofTurnover <br/>(ii) Attribution ofTurnover Between Undertakings in a Group <br/>(iii) Treatment of Internal Turnover <br/>(iv) Geographic Aliocation ofTurnover <br/>(c) ilhe Relevant Date and Financial Accounts <br/>C. Interaction with Member States and Third Countries <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Realiocation ofjurisdiction between the Commission and Member <br/>States ('Referrais') <br/>(a) Purpose ofthe Referral System <br/>(b) Use ofthe Referral System Over Time<br/>(c) Guiding Principies Applied when Considering Referral Requests<br/>(d) Operation ofrhe Referral System in Practice <br/>(i)Referrais from the Commission to One or More NCAs <br/>('i)Pre-Notification Referrals Requested by the Parties (Article 4(4))<br/>(ii)Post-Notification Referrais Requested by an NCA (Article 9) <br/>(ii) Referrais From One or More NCAs to the Commission<br/>(i)Pre-Notflcation Referrais Requested by the Parties <br/>(Article4(5)) <br/>(ii)Post-notflcation Referrais Requested by an NCA (Article22)<br/>(e) Evaluation and Reform ofthe Referral System<br/>(3) Member State Action on Non-Competition Grounds<br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) Assessmenr ofLegitimate Interests <br/>(i)Recognized Interests <br/>(ii) Non-Recognized Interests <br/>(4) Concentrations in the Defence Sector<br/>(5) Cooperation Between the Commission and Member States <br/>(a) General Cooperation Obligations<br/>(b) Cooperation During Specific Phases ofan Investigation <br/>(i)During the Referral Process <br/>(ii)During Phase 1<br/>(iii) During Phase II<br/>(c) Enhancing Cooperation Between Member States lhrough the ECN<br/>(6) Merger Control in the EEA Context<br/>(a) The Scope of che Merger Control System under the EEA<br/>(b) Aliocation ofJurisdiction Between the Commission and the EFTA <br/>Surveillance Authority<br/>(c) Cooperation Between the Commission and the EFTA <br/>Surveiliance Authoriry<br/>(7) International Cooperation in Merger Control<br/>(a) Framework for international Cooperation<br/>(b) Practical Aspects ofinternational Cooperation in Merger Cases<br/>(c)Statistics on International Cooperation <br/>D. Merger Control Procedure <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Principal Features ofthe Procedural Framework <br/>(a)Underlying Rationale: Proportionate, Effective Contrai <br/>(b) Binding Procedural Deadlines <br/>(c) The Instruments ofthe Procedural Framework <br/>(d) The Different Actors in EU Merger Proceedings <br/>(i)The Notifying Parties and Other Involved Parties<br/>(ii) The Commission <br/>(iii) 'Third Parties <br/>(iv) Member State NCAs <br/>(v)Non-EU Agencies <br/>(vi) The EU Courts <br/>(3) The Main Steps and Timetable for EU Merger Control Proceedings <br/>(4) The Pre-Notification Phase <br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) Timing ofPre-Notification Contacts <br/>(c) Initial Contact and Request for a Case Team <br/>(d) Confidentia!ity <br/>(e)Discussions on Jurisdiction<br/>(f) Discussions on Substance, Procedure, and Timing<br/>(g) Review ofDrafr(s) Form CO and Requests for Waivers <br/>(h) Submission oflnternal Documents <br/>(i)Fact Finding: Contacts with 'Third Parties <br/>(j)Green Light for Notification <br/>(5) Notification of a Concentration <br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) Obligation to Notify and Standstiil Obligation<br/>(i)Automatic Exceptions: Pubiic Bids and Series ofTransactions <br/>in Securiries <br/>(ii) Ad Hoc Derogations ar the Requesr ofthe Parties <br/>(iii) Preventing Early Implementation <br/>(c) Consequences ofFailure to Notify <br/>(d) Timing ofNotification<br/>(e)Notif'ing Parties <br/>(f) Submission ofForm CO <br/>(g) Incompiereness <br/>(h) Publication ofthe Fact ofthe Notification<br/>(6) PhaseI<br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) Timetable and Deadlines <br/>(c)Fact-Finding <br/>(d) Where Competition Concerns are ldentified <br/>(e)Decision <br/>(O Notification and Publication <br/>(i)Notification To The Parties<br/>(ii)Publication<br/>(7) Phase II: In-Depth investigation <br/>(a) Introduction<br/>(b) Procedural Safeguards in Phase II <br/>(c) Timetable and Deadlines <br/>(d) Initial Stage: Review of Key Documents, Reply to the Article 6(1)(c)<br/>Decision and State ofPlay Meeting <br/>(e) In-Depth Investigarion <br/>(f) Where the Competition Concerns are Dispelled <br/>(g) Where Competition Concerns Remain <br/>(Ii) The Statement ofObjections <br/>(i)Purpose and Content <br/>(ii)Timing <br/>(iii) Scope of the SO <br/>(iv) Orher Parties <br/>(i)Access to File <br/>(i)Purpose <br/>(ii)Timing <br/>(iii) Scope <br/>(i)InternalDocuments <br/>(ii)Business Secrets and Confidentiallnformation <br/>(iv) Protection ofBusiness Secrets and Confidential Information <br/>(v)Use of the Information/Access to Documents<br/>(j)Reply to the SO and Oral Hearing <br/>(i)Reply to the SO <br/>(ii)Oral Hearing <br/>(i)Attendees<br/>(ii)Preparation<br/>(iii)Conduct ofthe Hearing<br/>(iv)Post-Hearing Report<br/>(k) lilie Post-SO/OraI Hearing Stage<br/>(i)Final State of Play Meetings<br/>(ii)Peer Review Pane!<br/>(iii) AdvisoryCommittee<br/>(1)Decision<br/>(m) Notification and Publication<br/>(n) Post-Decision Remedies Process<br/>The Simplified Procedure <br/>(a) Overview and Rationale <br/>(b) The Commission's Discretion in App!ying the Simplified Procedure<br/>(c) Use of the Simplified Procedure in Practice <br/>(d) Impact of the Simplified Procedure on Deadlines <br/>(e)lhe Scope of the Simplified Procedure: Categories of Suitab!e Cases<br/>(i)Five Categories ofSuitab!e Cases <br/>(ii)Exclusions <br/>(f)ProceduralAspects <br/>(g) Decision <br/>Abandonment of a Concentration, Withdrawal and Re-submission of a <br/>Notification, Change ofan Authorized Transaction <br/>(a) Abandonment <br/>(b) Withdrawal of a Notification <br/>(c)Cliange in theTransaction Structure<br/>Particular Procedures <br/>(a) Interim Measures<br/>(i)General <br/>(ii)Coriditions Necessary for the Imposition ofinterim Measures <br/>(iii) Scope oflnterim Measures <br/>(iv) Process <br/>(b) Revocation of a Clearance Decision <br/>(c)Inspections and Requests for Information by Decision <br/>(d) Imposition of Fines and Periodic Penalties <br/>(1)Fines <br/>(ii)Periodic Penalty Payments <br/>E. Substantive Assessment <br/>(1) Main Elements of the Assessment under Article 2 of the <br/>Merger Regulation <br/>(a)Aconcentration<br/>(b) 'whichwould' <br/>(c)'impede effective competition' <br/>(i)Intermediate and Ultimate Consumers<br/>(ii) Concept ofConsumer Welfare <br/>(d)'significantly'<br/>(e)'in the common market or in a substantial part of ir,' <br/>(f)'in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.' <br/>(2) Definition of the Relevant Market<br/>(a) Relevant Product Market <br/>(i)Demand-Side Substitution <br/>(ii)Supply-Side Substitution<br/>(b) Relevant Geographic Market <br/>(i)Defining the Geographic Market on the Basis ofLocation of <br/>Customers or Producers<br/>(c) The SSNIPTest and Critica! Loss Analysis <br/>(d) PriceDiscrimination Markers <br/>(e) Factors Relevant to Market Definition and Types ofEvidence <br/>Relied On <br/>(i)Views 011 Functionality<br/>(ii) Commercial Strategies and Marketing Material(iii) Analysis of Price Leveis <br/>(iv) Analysis of Price Correlation<br/>(v)Event Analysis<br/>(O Market Definition for Merger Cases and Antitrust Cases are Similar <br/>butDistjnct <br/>(g) Market Definition in an Effects-Based Analysis<br/>(3) Analysis of the Effects of a Concentration <br/>(a) lhe Move to a More Effecrs-Based Approach<br/>(b) Gravitation Towards Unilateral Horizontal Effects<br/>(c) Increasingly Complex Assessments<br/>(4) Horizontal Mergers<br/>(a) Non-Coordjnated Effects (Unilateral EWects)<br/>(i)Market Share Thresholds<br/>(i)Which Market Shares are Relevantfor the Assessment? <br/>(ii)Market Shares Indicatinga Lack ofSubstantive Concern<br/>(iii)Market Shares indicatinga LikelihoodofSubstantive Concerns<br/>(ii)Intervention Thresholds: Removal of a Significant Competitive <br/>Constraint <br/>(iii)Assessment of Effect: Additional Factors <br/>(iv) Differentiated Product Markets: Closeness ofCompetition<br/>(i)Views of the Market Particzants<br/>(ii)Internal documents<br/>(iii)Bidding Data<br/>(iv)Switching Data <br/>('v)PriceAnalysis <br/>(vi)Cross-Price Elasticities <br/>(vii) Mode/ling the Market <br/>(v)Homogeneous Product Markets: Capacity <br/>(vi)Multi-Sourcing <br/>(vii)Abilityto Hinder Expansion <br/>(viii) Merger with a Potential Competitor <br/>(ix)Buyer Power Created by the Merger <br/>(b) Coordinated Effects <br/>(i)Concept and History <br/>(i)Collective Dorninance Under the 1989 Merger Regulation <br/>(ii)lhe Airtours Benchmark <br/>(iii)The SONYlBMGJurisprudence <br/>(ii)Analytical Framework <br/>(i)The Airtours Criteria<br/>(ii)TheApproach Under the JiorizontalMerger Guidelines<br/>(iii) Creating Coordination or Strengthening Existing <br/>Coordination<br/>(1)Creating Coordination (ii) Strengthening Coordination<br/>(iv) The Criteria for Coordination <br/>(i)Reaching Terms of Coordination (A Conducive Market <br/>Environment) <br/>(ii)Monitoring Deviations <br/>(iii)Adequate DeterreritMechanisrns <br/>(iv)Reactions ofOutsiders <br/>(5)Non-Horizontal Assessment <br/>(aNon-Coordinated Effects (Unilateral Effects) <br/>(i)Theories of Harm <br/>(i)Example oflnput Foreclosure: UTC/Goodrich <br/>(ii)Example af Custo ner Foreclosure: Mobile Wailet Platform <br/>(iii)Exainple of Conglornerate Effects: Intel/McAfee <br/>(ii)Who is Entitled to Protection From the Potential Effects of Non-Horizontal Mergers?<br/>(iii) Framework for Analysing Foreclosure <br/>(i)Ability of Foreclose <br/>(ii)Incentive <br/>(iii)Effect <br/>(iv) The Diminished Role of Dominance in Non-Horizontal <br/>Cases <br/>(b) Coordinated Effects<br/>(i)ReachingTerrns of Coordination <br/>(ii)Monitoring Deviations <br/>(iii) Deterrent Mechanisms <br/>(iv) Reactions From Outsiders <br/>(6) Countervailing Factors <br/>(a) Buyer Power <br/>(i)The Exercise ofBuyer Power<br/>(i)Immediately Switch Supplier <br/>(ii)Vertically Integrate Upstream <br/>(iii)Sponsor Entry <br/>(iv)Refrse to Buy Other Products <br/>(ii) Buyer Power Must Benefit AI] Customers <br/>(b) Entry <br/>(i)Types ofEotry Barrier<br/>(ii) Link Berween Entry Barriers and Market Definition<br/>(iii) Condirions for Entry to be Sufficient Countervailing Factor <br/>(i)Entry Must Be Likely 5.905<br/>(ii)Entry Must Be Timely 5.916<br/>(iii)Entry Must Be Sufficient <br/>(c)Efficiencies<br/>(i)HistoricTreatmeot ofEificiencies: The 'Efficiency Offence'? <br/>(ii)RecentPractice<br/>(iii) Criteria for an Efficiency Defence<br/>(i)Efficiencies Must Benefit Consumers<br/>(ii)Efficiencies Must Be Merger-Specific <br/>(iii)Efficiencies Must Be Verifiable<br/>(d) Failing Firm Defence <br/>(i)Conditions Necessary for Failing Firm Defence <br/>(i)ExitDue to Financia1Dfficufries <br/>(ii)No Less Anti-Competitive Solution <br/>('iii) Exít Fron the Market <br/>(ii)Failing Division <br/>(iii) Parties Must Provide the Evidence <br/>(f) Remedies<br/>(1) Overview <br/>(2) General Principies <br/>(a) Roles of notifyng parties and commision <br/>(b) Attachrnent to Decision as Condirions or Obligations <br/>(c) Disrinction Berween Remedies, Take-Note' Com mitment, and <br/>FactsTaken IntoAccount <br/>(i)Take-NoteComrnitmerits <br/>(ii)FactsTakenlntoAccount <br/>(iii) Potential Remedy for Breach <br/>(3) Conditions That Remedies Must Meet <br/>(a) Remedies Must Eliminate the Competition Concerris <br/>(b) Remedies Must Be Proportionate <br/>(c)Remedies Must Be Capable ofEifective Implementation <br/>(i)Tirnely Implementarion <br/>(ii)Lasting and Workable Solution <br/>(iii) Capable ofAdequate Monitoring<br/>(d) Remedies Must Not Lead to New Competi tion Concerns <br/>(4) Remedies in Phase I and Phase II<br/>(a) Phase I Remedies <br/>(i)Substantive Requirements<br/>(ii)Formai Requirernents <br/>(iii) Timing <br/>(iv) Assessment Process <br/>(v)Modifications <br/>(vi) Outcome <br/>(b) Pbase II Remedies <br/>(i)Substantive Requirements <br/>(ii)Formal Requirements <br/>(iii) Time Limjts <br/>(iv) Assessrnent Process <br/>(v)Modifications<br/>(vi) Outcome <br/>(5) Types of Remedies <br/>(a) Typology and Terminology <br/>(b) Acceptability of the Various Categories <br/>(c)Divestiture of a Business<br/>(i)Overview<br/>(ii)Purpose<br/>(iii) Divestiture of a Viable and Competitive Stand-Alone Business <br/>(iv) Carve-Qut Divestitures <br/>(v)Alternative to Carve-Outs<br/>(vi) Alternative Divestitures: Crown Jewels<br/>(vii) Suitable Purchaser<br/>(i)Standard Requirements<br/> (ii) When a Suítable PurchaserMust Be Identfied<br/>(d) Rernoval ofLinkswith Competitors <br/>(e) Access Remedies <br/>(f) Commitments to Enter Into, Modify orTerminate Long-Term <br/>Agreements <br/>(g) Conduct Remedies in Conglomerate Cases <br/>(h) Other Conduct Remedies <br/>(6) Implementation and Modification of Remedies Post-Decision<br/>(a) Implementation of Remedies<br/>(i)Timing <br/>(ii)Obligations of the Parties in the lnterim Period<br/>(iii) Hold-Separate Manager <br/>(iv) MonitoringTrustee<br/>(v)Proposai for a Suirable Purchaser<br/>(vi) DivesritureTrustee<br/>(b) Modification of Remedies Posr-Decision<br/>(i)Extension ofFirst Divestiture Period <br/>(ii)Other Modifications Requested by the Parties<br/>(iii) Other Modifications Requesred by the Commission<br/>(c) Breach of Remedies<br/>(i)Breach of Obligations<br/>(ii)Breach of Conditions <br/>(iii)Fines <br/>G. Judicial Review <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Types ofActs That Can Be Reviewed <br/>(3) Legal Standing in Actions for Annulment <br/>(a) Member Srares, Parliament, and Council<br/>(b) Natural and Legal Persons <br/>(1)The Norifying Parties <br/>(ii)Other Parties to the Concentration <br/>(iii) Third Parties <br/>(4) Grounds for Chailenge <br/>(a) Lack ofCompetence <br/>(b) Infringement ofan Essential Procedural Requirement<br/>(e) Infringement ofthe Treaties or ofAny Rule ofLaw Relating to <br/>TheirApplication<br/>(d) Misuse of Powers <br/>(5) Procedure <br/>(a) General<br/>(b) Interim Measures <br/>(e) Expedited Procedure <br/>(d) Appeals from the General Court to the Court ofJusrice<br/>(6) 'lhe ScopeofReview <br/>(a)Introduction<br/>(b) Burden of Proof<br/>(e) Standard ofProof<br/>(d) Standard of Review: lhe Margin of Appreciation <br/>(e)Fulijurisdiction Over Fines and Periodic Penalty Payments <br/>(7) Consequences ofAnnulment<br/>(a)Introduction<br/>(b) lhe New Exarnination<br/>(8) Actions for Damages <br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) Unlawful Conduct <br/>(c) Harm <br/>(d) Causal Link <br/>6. Article 106-Exclusive or Special Rights and Other Anti-Competitive <br/>State Measures <br/>José Luis Buendia Sierra <br/>A. Introduction <br/>(i)Com petition Law Normally Deals Only With the Behaviour of <br/>Undertakings <br/>(ii)State Defence Doctrine <br/>(iii) State Liability Under Competirion Law <br/>B. Application ofArticles 4(3) and 3(3) TEU and Articles 101 and 102<br/>EU to Anti-Competitive State Measures <br/>(i)Initial Position (Broad Interpretation) <br/>(ii)Court Narrows Interpretation <br/>(iii) Iinpact of the LisbonTreaty <br/>(iv) Application ofArticles 106, 107, and 108 to Anti-Competitive <br/>State Measures <br/>C. Article 106(1): State Measures in Respect ofPublic or <br/>Privileged Undertakings <br/>(1) Addressees and Regulatory Content <br/>(2) State Measures <br/>(3) Related to Public or Privileged Undertakings <br/>(a)Economic Activity <br/>(i)Article 106(1) Applies to State Regulation of Economic Activities <br/>(ii)Definition of'EconomicActivity'<br/>(iii)Criteria Used By the Court of justice <br/>(iv)Public' Undertaking <br/>(v)Definition ofPublic Undertaking <br/>(vi)A Separate Legal Enrity is Nor Necessary<br/>(vii)Public Underrakings After Privatization <br/>(viii) 'Privileged' Undertakings <br/>(b) Exclusive Rights <br/>(i)Notion of'Exclusive Right' <br/>(ii)Exclusive Right and Dominant Position are Different llhings<br/>(iii) Exclusive Rights are Created hy State Measures <br/>(iv) Need for a Discretionary Decision by the State <br/>(v)Special Rights<br/>(e) lhe Connection Between the Measure and the Undertaking <br/>(i)Types ofConnection Required byArticle 106(1)<br/>(ii)State Measures Wliich Benefir the Undertaking <br/>(iii) State Measures Which Use the Undertaking as an lnstrument <br/>(iv) State Measures Granting an Exclusive Right <br/>(v)The Dual Role of Exclusive Rights Within Article 106(1) <br/>(vi) General Measures Do Not Fail Under Article 106(1) <br/>(4) Contrary to Another Provision oftheTFEU <br/>(5) Article 106(1) in Combination with the Competition Rules Addressed to <br/>Undertakings <br/>(a) Article 106 (1) in CombinationwithArticle 102 <br/>(i)Dorninarit Position <br/>(ii)State Measures Leading to Actual Abusive Behaviour of the <br/>Undertakings <br/>(iii) Different Types of Abuse <br/>(iv) Only the State is Responsible for State-Imposed Abuses <br/>(v)Both the State and the Undertaking are Liable for State-Induced <br/>Abuses <br/>(vi) State Inactivity <br/>(b) State Measures Affecting the Structure ofCompetiuon and Leading to <br/>Potential Abusive Behaviour ofUndertakings <br/>(i)No Requirement for Actual Abuse <br/>(ii)The Granting ofRegulatory Powers to an Undertaking <br/>(iii)The 'Bundling' ofRegulatory and Commercial Activities <br/>(iv)The Granting of an Exclusive Right <br/>(v)The Demand Limitation Doctrine <br/>(vi)The Conflict oflnterest Doctrine <br/>(vii)Presumprion of Causal Link <br/>(viii) Effects Similar to Those of Abusive Behaviour<br/>(ix)The Doctrine of the Extension of a Dominant Position <br/>(x)The Automatic Abuse Doctrine <br/>(xi)The La Crespelle Case <br/>(xii)More Recent Cases <br/>(xiii) The Current Status Quo <br/>(xiv) Effect on Intra-EU Trade <br/> (c) Article 106(1) in Combination with Article 101 <br/>(6) Article 106(1) in Combination with theTreaty Rules Addressed to the <br/>Member States <br/>(a) The Double Function of Article 106(1) <br/>(i)Article 106(1) as a 'Reminder' ofProhibitions <br/>(ii)'Lifting the Veil' <br/>(b) Article 106(1) in Combination with the Rules on Free Movement of <br/>Goods: Articles 34 and 37 <br/>(i)The General Regime: Measures of Equivalent Effect and Article 34 <br/>(ii) The Special Regime: State Monopolies and Article 37<br/>State monopolies of a commercial character<br/>(iv) Obligations Contained in Article 37 <br/>(v)Obligations During theTransitional Period <br/>(vi) ObligarionsAfrer the Transitional Period <br/>(vii) lhe Borderline Between the General and Speciai Regimes <br/>(c) Article 106(1) in Combination with the Rules on Freedom to Provide <br/>Services and on Establishment: Articies 49 and 56 <br/>(i)Article 106(1) in Combination with Article 56<br/>(ii) Article 106(1) in Combination with Article 49 <br/>(iii) Obligation to Select the Operator of a Public Service Concession <br/>Through a Competitive Tender<br/>(iv) Need for a Cross-Border Element <br/>(7) DirectEffect <br/>D. Article 106(2): Services of General Economic Interest and Other<br/>Public Interest Objectives <br/>(1)The Undertakings to which Article 106(2) Relates<br/>(i)Undertakings <br/>(ii) Undertakings Entrusted With the Operation of Services of General <br/>Economic Interest <br/>(iii) Services of General Economic Interest <br/>(iv) Entrustment <br/>(v)Revenue-Producing Monopolies <br/>(2) Article 106(2) as an Exception Applicable to the Behaviour of Undertakings <br/>and to State Measures <br/>(3) Conditions for the Application of Article 106(2) <br/>(i)The Necessity of the Measure <br/>(ii)The Proportionality Principie <br/>(iii)The Old Approach: A Strict Interpretation of the <br/>ProportionalityTest <br/>(iv)The Need for a More Flexibie Interpretation <br/>(v)Universal Service as ajustification for Exclusive Rights <br/>(vi)The Corbeau Case <br/>(vii)The AlmeloCase <br/>(viii) Other Cases <br/>(ix)Case lawof the General Court <br/>(x)Need for an Economic Analysis <br/>(xi)The Dynamic Characrer ofProportionalíty <br/>(xii) Different Approaches Depending on the Sector <br/>(xiii) The Strict Approach and the Flexible Approach<br/>(xiv) Universal Services and Other Services of General <br/>Economic lnterest <br/>(xv)Examples of Measures Considered NonProportiona1 <br/>(xvi) lhe Interest of the EU <br/>(4) Invocation of Article 106(2) and Burden ofProof 6.216<br/>(5) Relationship between Article 106(2) and Other Exceptions <br/>(i)Mandatory Requirements' Within the Framework of <br/>Article 106(2) <br/>(ii)Article 101(3) <br/>(6) Relationship between Article 106(2) and Article 14 <br/>E. Article 106(3): Procedural Rules Applying to Anti-Competitive State<br/>Measures <br/>(1) Article 106(3) Decisions <br/>(i)General Issues <br/>(ii) AnalogyWith Other Procedures <br/>(iii) Discretionary Character of the Procedure Under Article 106(3) <br/>(iv) Lodging ofComplaints and Ex Officio Cases <br/>(v)Dismissal ofComplaints <br/>(a) The lnfringement Procedure <br/>(i)Inrerim Measures <br/>(ii)Letter of Formal Notice <br/>(iii)The Rights of the Member State and of the Undertaking that <br/>Benefits from the Measure <br/>(iv)End of the Procedure Without a Formal Decision <br/>(v)The Formal Decision and Its Effects <br/>(vi)Binding Effecrs<br/>(vii)Action for Annulment Against anArticle 106(3) Decision <br/>(viii) Action for Failure to Implernent an Article 106(3) Decision <br/>(2) Article 106(3) Directives <br/>(i)Preventive Funcrions of Article 106 (3) Directives <br/>(ii)Article 106(3) Directives as Instruments for Detecting Future <br/>lnfringements <br/>(iii) Article 106(3) Directives as Instruments for 'Specifying' the <br/>Provisions of the Treaty <br/>(3) Legal Regime ofArricle 106(3) Directives <br/>(i)The Exclusive Comperence of the Commission <br/>(ii)Limits to the Commission's Competence <br/>(iii)Article 106(3) Directives Cannot Deal With the Autonomous <br/>Behaviour ofUriderrakings <br/>(iv)Formal Limits tu the Cornmission's Power under <br/>Article 106(3) <br/>(v)Binding Effects <br/>(vi)Lack of Direct Effect <br/>(vii)Relationship Between Directives Under Article 106(3) and <br/>Harmonizing Directives <br/>(viii) Article 106(3) Overlaps Wirh OtherTreaty Provisions <br/>(ix)Article 106(3) OverlapswirbArticle 14 <br/>(x)The Dissuasive Role of Article 106(3) <br/><br/>II SPECIFIC PRACTICES<br/><br/>7. Horizontal Cooperation Agreements <br/>Matthew Bennett, Francisco Enrique González Díaz, HenningLeupold» <br/>Anna Vernet, and Donncadh Woods <br/>A.Introduction<br/>(1) Definition of Horizontal Agreements and Practices <br/>(2) Background to Horizontal Agreements and Practices <br/>B. Assessment of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements under Article 101 <br/>(1) Purpose and Scope <br/>(2) Framework ofAnalysis <br/>C. JointVentures InvolvingJoint Control<br/>(1) Definition and Constitution of a Joint Venture <br/>(a)Definition <br/>(b) Constitution ofaJointVenture <br/>(2) Distincrion Between Cooperative and ConcentrativejointVentures <br/>(3) 'lhe Rationale Behind the Difference in Treatmenr Between Full-Function <br/>Concentrative and Full-Function Cooperative Joint Ventures <br/>(4) 'lhe Application of Article 101(1) by the Commission to Cooperative <br/>Joint Ventures Prior to the Entry into Force of the 1997 Arnendment <br/>to the First Merger Regulation<br/>(5) 'lhe Notion and Role ofPotential Competition in Assessing the Validity of <br/>JointVentures under Article 101 <br/>(6) Conditions Leading to the Incentive to Coordinate (Spillover Effects) <br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) Spillovers on the Sarne Market As That of the joint Venrure<br/>(c) Spillovers on to Other Markets<br/> (i)Spillovers on to Downstrearn Markets<br/>(ii) Spillovers on to Adjacent Product Markets <br/>(iii) Spillovers on to Adjacent Geographic Markets<br/>(d) Network Effects <br/>(7) Direct Contractual Restrictions Between Parents<br/>(8) hirra-Group Agreements and Joint Ventures<br/>(9) Spillovers under the Merger Regulation<br/>D. Research and Development Agreements <br/>(1) Overview <br/>(2) Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines <br/>(a) Relevant Markets <br/>(b) Calculation ofMarket Shares <br/>(c)Competi tive Assessrnent under Article 101(1) <br/>(d) Competirive Assessrnent under Article 101(3) <br/>(e) Time ofAssessment <br/>(3) 'lhe R&D BER <br/>(a) Background and Overview <br/>(b) KeyConcepts ofthe R&D BER<br/>(i)Article 1 of the R&D BER: Definitions<br/>(ii) Article 2 of the R&D BER: Scope ofApplication <br/>(iii) Article 3 of the R&D BER: Positive Exeniprion Criteria<br/>(iv) Article 4 ofthe R&D BER: Market Share Threshold and Duration <br/>Of Exemption <br/>(v) Article 5 ofthe R&D BER: Hardcore Restrictions <br/>(vi) Article 6 ofthe R&D BER: Excluded Restrictions<br/>(vii) Article 7 ofthe R&D BER: Application ofthe Market Share <br/>Threshold <br/>E. Production Agreements <br/>(1) Introduction<br/>(2) Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines<br/>(a) Main Changes Compared to the 2001 Text <br/>(b) Scope <br/>(c) Relevant Markets <br/>(3) Competi tive Assessment under Article 101(1) <br/>(a) Main Competition Concerns<br/>(b) Restrictions ofCompetition by Object <br/>(c) Restrictions ofCompetition by Effect<br/>(d) Safe Harbour<br/>(4) Competitive Assessment under Article 101(3)<br/>(5) The Specialisation BER<br/>(a) Background and Overview <br/>(b) Key Concepts ofthe Specialisation BER <br/>(i)Article 1: Definitions <br/>(i)Specialization Agreement: Article 1(1)(a) <br/>(ii)Unilateral Specialization Agreement: Article 1 (1)(b) <br/>(iii)Reciprocal Specialization Agreement: Artick 1 (1)(c) <br/>(iv)Agreements onJoint Production: Article 1(1)(d) <br/>(v)Agreement:Article lO)(e)<br/>(vi)Product: Article 1(1)cf)<br/>(vü) Production:Article I(1)(g) <br/>(viii) lhe Preparation ofServices: Article 1(1)(h) <br/>(ix)Relevant Market:Article 1(1)(i)<br/>(x)Specialization Product:Article 1(1)0) <br/>(xi)Downstream Products: Article 1 (1)(k)<br/>(xii) Competing Undertaking: Article 1(1)(l); Actual <br/>Competitor: Article 1 (1)(m); and Potential Competitor: Article 1(1)(n) <br/>(xiii) Exclusive Supply Obligation: Article ](])(o)<br/>(xiv) Exclusive Purchase Obligation: Article l(l)(p)<br/>(xv) Joínt:Articlel(1)(q)<br/>(xvi) Distribution: Article 1(I)(r)<br/>(xvii) Undertaking, Parties, and ConnectedParties:Artick 1(2)<br/>(ii) Article 2: The Exernption-Scope ofApplication <br/>(i)Assignment or Licensing ofIP Rights <br/>(iii) Article 3: Market Share Threshold<br/>(i)The Dfferent Market Share lhreshalds <br/>(iv) Article 4: Hardcore Restrictions<br/>(i)Price-RelatedRestrictions:Article 4(a)<br/>(ii)Limitation af Output ar SaIes: Article 4(b)<br/>(iii)TheAllacation ofMarkets and Customers: Article 4(c) <br/>(v)Article 5: Application ofthe Market Share Thresholds <br/>(i) The CalcuLation ofMarket Shares: Article 5(a), (b), and (c) <br/>(vi) Article 6: Transirional Period <br/>(vii) Article 7: Period of Vaiidity <br/>E Joint SellingAgreements<br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(a)Definition<br/>(b) Potential or Actual Competi tors <br/>(c)Consortia <br/>(d) Main Competition Issues <br/>(2) Application ofArticle 10 1(1) toJoint SellingAgreements <br/>(a)Restrictions ofCompetition By Object <br/>(b) Restrictions ofCompetition By Effect <br/>(c) Safe Harbour <br/>(3) Factors Addressed in Commission Decisions and the Guidelines <br/>(a)Market Structure; Oligopo!istic Markets <br/>(b) Market Entry<br/>(c)Price Restrictions<br/>(d) Output Restrictions <br/>(e)Exclusivity Clauses<br/>(f)Coliusion <br/>(4) Application ofArticle 101(3) to Joint Selling Agreements <br/>(a)Efliciencies <br/>(b) Specific Circumstances Aliowing for an Exemption ofPrice Fixing <br/>G. Joint Purchasing Agreements <br/>(1)Introduction <br/>(a)Definition <br/>(b) Relevant Markets <br/>(e)Potential orActual Competitors <br/>(d) Main Competition Issues <br/>(e) Buying Power<br/>(2) Application ofArticle 101(1) to Joint Purchasing Agreements <br/>(a)Restrictions ofCompctition By Object<br/>(b) Restrictions ofCompetition By Effect <br/>(c) Safe Harbour <br/>(d) Coliusive Outcome <br/>(3) Facrors Addressed in Commission's Guidelines and Decisions <br/>(a) lhe Existence ofDownstream Market Power <br/>(b) The Existerice ofUpstream Market Power <br/>(c) Measurement of Buyer Power <br/>(d) SMEs <br/>(e) Countervailing Power ofStrong Suppliers <br/>(f) Exclusive Purchasing Obligations <br/>(4) Application ofArticle 101(3) to Joint Purchasing Agreements<br/>H. Information Exchange Agreements <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Main Competition Issues <br/>(a) Information Exchanges May Facilitate Coordination <br/>(b) Information Exchanges That Exclude Competitors <br/>(c) Competition Issues Absent Coordination or Exclusionary Concerns<br/>(3) Poteritial Benefits<br/>(a) Enhanced Consumer Transparency<br/>(b) Enhanced Allocative Efficiencies <br/>(c) Reduction in Asymmetric Information Problerns <br/>(d) Benchmarking <br/>(4) Criteria for Assessment <br/>(a)Restrictions ofCompetition By Object<br/>(b) MeaningofFuture Intentions<br/>(c) Frequency asa Determinative Criteria for Object Assessment<br/>(d) Cartel Agreements vs Exchange oflnformation Agreements <br/>(e)Concerted Practices<br/>(5) Assessment of Likely or Actual Effects <br/>(a) Characteristics of Relevant Market <br/>(i)Degree ofConcentration <br/>(ii) Stability of Supply and Demand <br/>(iii) Symmctric Costs and Market Structures <br/>(iv) Frequency ofFirms' Interactions <br/>(v)Barriers to Entry <br/>(b) Characteristics of Information Exchanged <br/>(i)Coverage of Relevant Market <br/>(ii)Srrategic Significarice of Information <br/>(iii) Public vs Non-Public Information <br/>(iv) Exchanges Made Pubiicly vs Exchanges Made Non-Publiciy<br/>(v)Degree ofAggregation <br/>(vi) Age of Data <br/>(vii) Frequency of Exchange<br/>1.Standardization Agreements <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Recent Investigations in the Arca of Standard-Setting Agreements <br/>(3) Agreements on Standards under the 2010 Horizontal <br/>Cooperation Guidelines <br/>(a)Definition<br/>(b) Relevant Markets <br/>(c) of Harm <br/>(d) When Could There Be a Restriction By Object? <br/>(e) The Safe Harbour Principies<br/>(f) FRAND Benchmarks <br/>(g) Effects-Based Assessment <br/>(h) Articie 101(3): Efficiencies <br/>J.Standard Ternis<br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Standard Terms under the 2010 Horizontal Cooperarion Guidelines <br/>(a)Relevant Markets<br/> (b) Theories ofHarm <br/>(c)Restriction By Object <br/>(d) Effects-Based Assessment <br/>(e)EflciencyGains<br/>(f)lndispensability <br/>(g) Pass-On to Consumers <br/>(h) No Eliminarion of Competition <br/>8. Carteis <br/>Antojne Colombani, Jindrich Kloub, and Ewoud Sakkers <br/>A. Introduction<br/>(1)Definition <br/>(2) lhe Per Se Prohibition ofCartels in EU Competition Law <br/>(3) Harm Caused by Carteis <br/>B. Typology of Cartel Arrangements and Common Features ofCollusion<br/>(1) Typoiogy of Cartel Arrarigements<br/>(a) Director Indirect Fixing of Purchase or Selling Prices or Any Other <br/>Trading Conditions<br/>(i)Uniform Prices and Price Formulae <br/>(ii)Minimum Prices <br/>(iii)Target' Prices <br/>(iv)Recommerided Prices <br/>(v)Discussion of Prices for Individual Customers/Customer Lists <br/>(vi)Agreement on Part of the Price or on Price Supplements <br/>(vii) Maximum Rebates <br/>(viii) Agreements on Other Trade Conditions <br/>(ix)Agreement on the Purchase Price ofRaw Materiais <br/>(x)Coordinated Price Increa.se 'Campaigns' <br/>(b) Limitation or Control of Production, Markets, Technicai Development, <br/>or Investment <br/>(i)Production or Sales Quotas <br/>(ii) Other Types ofJoint Limitation or Control of Production <br/>(iii) lhe Control or Limitation aí Commercial Investment <br/>(iv) Coilusive Product Specialization<br/>(v)Channeiling Output/Grant ofReciprocal Selling Rights and Joint <br/>Sales Arrangements<br/>(vi) Standard Setting <br/>(vii) Other Practices Limiring Production orTechnological Development <br/>(c) Sharing ofMarkets, Customers, or Sources ofSuppiy <br/>(i)Aliocation ofMarket Shares<br/>(ii)Aliocation ofTerritories or Distribution Channeis <br/>(iii) Aliocation ofCustomers and Other Customer-Specific Practices <br/>(iv) Bid Rigging <br/>(v)Sharing Sources ofSupply <br/>(d) Coordinated Boycorts, Bans on Imports, Concerted Refusal to Deal <br/>(i)Keeping Competitors Away From the Cartel's Market<br/>(ii)Piacing Certain Com petitors ata Competi tive Disadvantage <br/>(iii) Boycott ofReluctant Llnderrakings <br/>(e)Exchange of Commercially Sensitive Information/Unilateral Signalling/ <br/>I-Iub-and-Spoke Carteis<br/>(i)Exchange oflnformation<br/>(ii)Focusing on the Object' <br/>(iii)The 2010 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines <br/>(iv)Coilusion With Only an Indirect Effect on Prices Also Prohibited <br/>(v)Form of Coilusion is Immaterial ifObject is Established <br/>(vi)informarion Exchanges lllicit Based on Evidence of' Effect'? <br/>(vii)Conciusion as to Information Exchange <br/>(viii)Unilateral Signalling <br/>(ix)Hub-and-Spoke' Carteis<br/>(f) The Problem of'Tacit Coilusion<br/>(i)The TheoryofTacitCollusion <br/>(ii)Does Tacit Coilusion Amount to Cartel Behaviour? <br/>(iii) Conclusion on Tacit Coilusion <br/>(g) Assessment ofCartels underArticle 101(3) <br/>(2) Common Features ofCollusion <br/>(a) Factors Conducive to the Establishmenr ofCartels <br/>(i)Oligopolistic Markets <br/>(ii) Coilusive Business Values and Established Communication <br/>Cbannels <br/>(iii) Exogenous Triggering Events <br/>(iv) lhe Determining Role oflnstigators <br/>(b) Organizational Aspects ofCartels <br/>(i)Regular Meetings <br/>(i)From Informal Contacts to Highly InstitutionalizedSchemes <br/>(ii)Multile Working Leveis<br/>(iii)Pre-Meetings' and 4dHoc Meerings'<br/>(ii) The Role of Trade Associations and Fiduciary Companies and Their Liability <br/>(i)Liability of TradeAssociations in Earlier Cases <br/>(ii)Towards a DiscretionaryApproach ia TradeAssociation Liability <br/>(iii) Addressing the Role Played by Certain Fiduciay Companies ia <br/>Facilitating Coliusion: Earlier Cases <br/>(iv)Towards a Systematic Sanctioning ofFacilirating Companies as <br/>Co-Perpetrators <br/>(iii) Coricealment Measures <br/>(i)Ccvering the Cartel Tracks <br/>(ii)PaperlessPolity <br/>(iii)Storing Cartel Documents ia Pri vate Homes <br/>(iv)Usiag Code Names <br/>(v)OtherMeasures <br/>(c) Running the Business ofCollusion <br/>(i)Managing the Elimination ofCompetition <br/>(i)Getting OtherMarket Operators on Board <br/>(ii)Achieving Compara bilisy ofthe Products <br/>(iii)Coilection ofData and Circulation ofDetailed Implementation <br/>Documents <br/>(iv)Coordi nai ors' and Market Leaders<br/>(ii)Enforcing Cartel Arrangements between the Participants<br/>(i)MonitoringSchemes<br/>(ii)Penalties and Compensation Measures<br/>(iii)Threats, Boycotts and CoordínatedAttacks on Competitors <br/>(iii) The Insrability ofCollusive Schemes <br/>(i)Claimsfor Higher Quotas <br/>(ii)Mutual Suspicion ofCheating <br/>(iii)Leniency Prog'rammes as an Additional Factor oflnstability <br/>C. Investigating Hardcore Carteis <br/>(1) The Initiation of a Case: Information Sources<br/>(a) Market Monitoring and Information From Other Investigations <br/>(i)Sector Inquiries <br/>(b) Information Received From OtherAuthorities <br/>(i)Pre-Investigation Exchanges of Information within the European <br/>Competition Network <br/>(ii)Excharige aí Information with Third Country Authoriries <br/>(c) Complaints (Formal and Informal) <br/>(d) lnformanrsfWhistleblowers <br/>(e) Applications under the Leniency Notice <br/>(2) Leniency: Inducing lnsiders to Break Rank <br/>(a) Rationale and Origins of the EU Leniency Policy<br/>(i)The Problem of Detecting and Deterring Cartel Behaviour<br/>(ii)Difficulties in Detecting and ProvingCartels <br/>(iii) The Rarionale for a Leniency Policy: lhe Prisoner's Dilemma<br/>(iv) Introduction and Development of the Commission's <br/>Leniency Policy<br/>(v)Temporal Scope of the Notices <br/>(vi) Structure<br/>(b) lhe 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices and the Reasons for Revision of <br/>the l996Policy<br/>(i)Content and Application of the 1996 Leniency Notice (:) Basic Principies<br/>(ii)Section B: 75- 100 Per Cent Reduction (Total Exemption) in the Fine<br/>(iii) Section C: 50-75 Per Cent Reduction in the Fine<br/>(iv)Section D: Reductions of 10-50 Per Cent of the Fine <br/>(v)Retracrion of Non-Contestation<br/>(vi)ProceduralAspects (Section E)<br/>(ii)Issues Regarding the Effecriveness of the 1996 Leníency Notice <br/>(iii) The 2002 Leniency Notice and its 2006 Revision <br/>(i)Principies Governing the 2002 Revision ofthe 1996 Leniency Notice<br/>(ii)Changes Introduced ia the 2006 Leniency Notice<br/>(ii:)Content and Implementation ofthe 2002 and2006 Leniency Notices <br/>(iv) Criteria for immunity under the 2002 and 2006 <br/>Leniency Notices <br/>(i)Substantive Tests <br/>(ii)The Scope of the Leniency Policy: Are Stand-A lone Concerted <br/>Practices Cc'vered? <br/>(iii)Only One Imrnunity Per Cartel<br/>(iv)Other Conditions Which Must Be Satisfied in Order to Qua4/j' <br/>for Immunity <br/>(v)ProceduraiAspects <br/>(v)Reduction in the Fine under the 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices <br/>(i)Substantive Tests<br/>(ii)Available Bands of Reduction and Relevam Criteria <br/>(ii:)ProceduraiAspects<br/>(iv)Non-Conrestarion ofFacrs is Not Reu'arded Under the 2006 <br/>and 2002 Leniency Notices<br/>(v)Signficanr Added Vaiue' Tes:Commission Pracrice<br/>(vi) Judicial Review of the Commission's Leniency Policy Under the <br/>2002 and 2006 Notices <br/>(i)Sign(flcant CourtApproval ofebe Commissions Practice under <br/>the 2002 Leniency Notice <br/>(ii)Legality ofthe Leniency Notice <br/>(iii)The Commissionç Discretion in the Assessment ofLeniency <br/>Applications <br/>(iv)Limits to the Commjssjon's Discretion: Manifrst Error <br/>(v) Leniency and Equal Treatment<br/>(vi)Cooperation Under the Leniency Notice Must Be Diffi'renriated <br/>from Cooperation as an 4ttenuating Circwnstance<br/>(vii) Protection of Information Submitted Under the 2002 and 2006 <br/>Leniency Notices and Incentives for Applications <br/>(i)A SensitiveAspect ofthe Commission's Leniency Policy <br/>(ii)Identity oflmmunityApplicants <br/>(iii)Limitations in the Conditions ofAccess to Corporate Statements <br/>(iv)Consequences ofViolation ofthe Limitation Imposed in Respece <br/>Of Access to the File <br/>(v)Leniency and Public Access to Documents <br/>(vi)Can Leniency Documents be Protecredfrom PublicAccess? <br/>(vii) Communication ofLeniency Documents Co Other Enforcement <br/>Authorities <br/>(viii) Disclosure ofLeniency Documents in Civil Litigarion <br/>(c) Leniency and Settlements<br/>(i)Leniency and Settlements are Complementary in Nature<br/>(ii) lhe Reductions Granted Under Each Policy are Cumulative <br/>(iii) Inreractions Between Leniency and Settlements <br/>(d) Leniency within the ECN <br/>(i)Advantages ofthe New System and Measures Taken to Tackle <br/>Porenrial Risks <br/>(ii)Leniency Applications and Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003 <br/>(iii)Leniency Applications and Article 12 ofRegularion 1/2003<br/>(iv)Guarantees to be Provided by the Receiving Authority 8.239<br/>(v)Guarantees Regarding Information Relating to Individuais <br/>(vi)Binding Nature ofthe Policy Set Out in the Network Notice<br/>(vii)Leniency Applications and Transmission of Information to <br/>National Courrs<br/>(viii) Where (Best) to File a Leniency Application within the ECN<br/>(ix)Favouring Convergence: lhe ECN Model Leniency Programme<br/>(x) A Significam Tool ofConvergence: lhe 'Summary Application System' <br/>D. The Commission's Powers of Investigarion: Information Requesrs,<br/>lnterviews, Inspections<br/>(1) PreliminaryObservations<br/>(a) Documented Evidence as the Principal Basis for Commission Cartel Decisions <br/>(b) Applicability to rheTransport Sector <br/>(c) Relevance oflxiterpretation Under Regularion 17<br/>(d) Outline for Discussion <br/>(2) General Aspects ofthe Commission's Fact-Finding Powers <br/>(a) Principies ofLaw and Fundamental Rights Applicable to Commission<br/>Investigations <br/>(i)The Applicability of General Principies of Law and Fundamental <br/>Rights <br/>(ii)General Principies and Fundamental Rights Particularly Relevant <br/>to Cartel Investigations <br/>(b) The Rights ofDefence<br/>(i)The Privilege Against Supplyirig Seif-Incrixninating Information<br/>(i)An EU Competition Law Version ofthe Right to Remain Silent<br/>(ii)Compatibility ofthe RightAgainst Self-Jncriminarion as <br/>Esta blished in Orkem with the ECHR and its Case Law <br/>(iii)Precise Scope ofthe PrivilegeAgainse Self-Incrimination: The <br/>Elements of Compulsion' and 2ldmission<br/>(iv)Pre-Existing Documents and Factual Information Must <br/>BeSupplied<br/>(ii)Legal Professional Privilege <br/>ei)The Right to the Protection ofLawyer-Client Correspondence <br/>(ii)Scope ofLPP under EU Law<br/>(iii) Summaries ofExternalAdvice Prepared by In-House Counsel May Be Protected <br/>(iv)The Commission Is Not Permitted co Reada Documentfor <br/>Which Legal Pri vilege is Claimed <br/>(u)Procedurefor Claiming Legal Privilege<br/>(vi)Cursory Look'andEnvelope Procedure in Jnspections <br/>(vii) Role ofthe Hea ring Officer <br/>(viii) Abusive Claimsfor Legal Privilege <br/>(iii) lhe Right to Legal Assistance <br/>(iv) lhe Right to be Informed on the Subject Matter and Purpose of <br/>the Investigation <br/>(v)No Right to be Heard Prior to Investigative Measures <br/>(c) Other General Features ofthe Commission's Investigative Powers <br/>(i)Applicarion of the Principie ofProportionality: <br/>Practical Implications<br/>(i)The Investigative Action Must Be Proportionate to the <br/>GoalPursued <br/>(ii)Necessity<br/>(iii)The PrincipIe of Proportionality and the Quantiiy of <br/>Information RequestediBurden on the Undertaking <br/>(ii) The Content and Form of Information/Business Records That <br/>May Be Requested<br/>(i)Contents <br/>(ii)Form <br/>(iii) The Undertakings From Which Information May Be <br/>Sought: Suspected Cartel Participants As Well As Other Parties <br/>(iv) The Territorial Scope of the Commission's Irivestigarion Powers <br/>(i)The Jurisdictional Scope ofthe Commission Investigative <br/>Powers: Subject Marterjurisdiction vs Enforcemenejurisdiction <br/>(ii)StateSovereigniy <br/>(v)The Timing ofAny Investigative Steps/Application of Limiration <br/>Periods <br/>(vi)The Duty of Active Cooperation and its Implication for Requests <br/>for Information and Inspections <br/>(d) Requests for Information: Article 18 <br/>(i)The Use of Requests for Information in Cartel Cases <br/>(ii) Two Types ofRequest for Information: 'Simple Requests' and Requests by Decision<br/>(i)Procedural Requirements: lhe Duty te State the Legal Basis and <br/>Purpose ofthe Request and te Set a Time Limit<br/>(ii) Sanctionsfor Late, Incomplete, Incorrect, orMisleading Replies <br/>(iii)Incomplete or UntruthJiílReplies are Considered te Obstruct the <br/>Investigation<br/>(iv) Article 18 Requests, the Duty of Cooperation, and Reductions of <br/>Finesfor Voluntary Submissions<br/>(v) Various OtherAspects ofRequeses for Information <br/>(e) Interviews (the Power to Take Statements): Article 19 <br/>(i)Rationale <br/>(ii)Legal Basis <br/>(iii) Possible Interviewees: Natural and Legal Persons<br/>(iv) Procedural Aspects and Rights of the Interviewee <br/>(f) Inspections of Business Premises: Article 20<br/>(i)The Difference Between 'Announced' and 'Unannounced' <br/>Inspections <br/>(ii) General Aspects Common to Inspections by Authorization and <br/>Inspections by Decision <br/>(i)Commission Inspections and the Principie ofthe Protection of the Private Sphere ofthe Undertaking<br/>(ii)Determining the Addressee ofan Inspection Decision: The <br/>Notion of 'Undertaking'for the Purpose oflnspections <br/>(iii)Notification ofthe Inspection Decision <br/>(iv)The Commission's On-the-SpotPowers <br/>(v)Te enter anypremises, land and means oftransport of undertakings and associations ofundertakings<br/>(vi)'Means oftransport ofundertakings'<br/>(vii)To examine the books and other records rel.ated te the business, <br/>irrespective ofthe medium on which they are stored'<br/>(viii) 'Te take or obtain in anyferm copies of or extractsfrem such <br/>books or records' <br/>(ix)Te seal any businesspremises and books or record.sfor theperiod <br/>and te the extent necessaryfer the inspection' <br/>(x)'Te as/e any representative or member ofstaffof the undertaking <br/>or associatien ofundertakingsfor explanations offacts ar <br/>documents relating te the subject-matter and purpose of the <br/>inspection and te record the answer'<br/>(iii) Orher Practical Aspects Relating to Inspections <br/>(i)Precedure Upen Arrival ofthe Commission Inspectors <br/>(ii)Activity oflnspectors During the Inspection <br/>(iii)Right te Legal Assistance <br/>(iv)Penalties in the Case ofa Refisal te Submit te (or Obstruct) an <br/>Inspection by Decision<br/>(v)Commission Present During Normal Business Hours <br/>(vi) Protocols Made Up During an Inspection and the Possibilities<br/>for SubmittingExculpatory Information <br/>(vii) Taking of Copies and Creatinga Documentlnventory<br/>(viii) Treatment ofBusiness Secrets and Confidentialinformation<br/>(ix)Endofthe Inspection <br/>(x)Post-Inspection Procedure<br/>(iv)The Adoption oflnspection Decisions under Article 20(4)<br/>(i)Requirements Relating to the Substance ofthe Inspection <br/>Decision<br/>(ii)Procedural Formalities Relating to theAdoption oflnspection Decisions <br/>(v)Additioiial Substantive and Procedural Aspects oflnspections by <br/>Written Authorization (Announced Inspections) <br/>(i)Substantive Elements oftheAuthorization <br/>(ii)Prior Notice To-Not Consultation Of-the Member State <br/>Concerned <br/>(vi)Opportunities to Chailenge the Inspection Decision and/or the <br/>Use ofthe Evidence Collected in Inspections <br/>(i)Little Scope in Practicefor Preventing the Inspection From <br/>GoingForward<br/>(ii)Challenging theAdmissibility and Use ofEvidence Collected <br/>(vii)The Role ofthe Member States in Commission Inspections <br/>Under Article 20<br/>(i)General Duty iv ProvideAssistance <br/>(ii)Role in Case ofOpposition 8.404<br/>(iii)Review by National Courts is Limitedto theArbitrariness and <br/>Proportionality ofthe Coercive Measures <br/>(iv)Coercive Measures Can Lead to San ctions Under National <br/>Law-EvenAgainst Pri vate Persons<br/>(viii)Inspections Carried Out by the Competition Authorities ofthe <br/>Member States on Behalfofthe Commission: Article 22(2)<br/>(i)Member States are Obligedto Execute Article 22(2) <br/>Inspections When Requested<br/>(ii)Inspections Under A rticle 22 are Executed Under National Law<br/>(iii)Commission Officials May Particiate in the Inspection <br/>CarriedOutBy the Member State<br/>(g) Inspections on Other Premises (Private Homes): Article 21 <br/>(i)Rationale and Use <br/>(i)Meaning of other premises land,andMeans of Transport <br/>(ii)Applicability ofPrinciles ofLaw and Fundamental Rights <br/>(iii)Reasonable Suspicion'Aboutlnformation BeingStoredat the <br/>Premises<br/>(iv)Only To Be Usedin Case of 'Serious Violations<br/>(ii) Legal Framework<br/>(i)A Two-PartBasis Requiredfor Executingan Inspection under <br/>Article21<br/>(iii) Procedural Aspects <br/>(i)The Commission Decision <br/>(ii)Authorization by a NationalJudicialAuthority <br/>(iii) Addressee ofthe Decision <br/>(iv)Notificarion ofthe Decision and theJudicial Authorization <br/>(v)On-7he-SpotPowers<br/>(vi)Assistance by Officials From tbe NationalAuthorities <br/>(vii) SanctionsforNon-compliance, Pursuane to NationalLaw <br/>(iv) Other Aspects <br/>(i)Right to LegalAssistance <br/>(ii)A Duty ofActive Cooperation for theAddressee? <br/>(h) European and International Cooperation in Cartel Investigations <br/>(i)European Cooperation<br/>(i)The ECN <br/>(ii)Cooperation with the ESA<br/>(ii)International Cooperation, Multilateral and Bilateral <br/>(i)Multilateral Cooperation <br/>(ii)Bilateral Cooperation <br/>E. Evidence in Cartel Cases <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) What Needs to be Proven<br/>(a) lhe Concept of Cartel Offence <br/>(b) lhe EU Courts' Purposive View of What Constitutes lllegal 'Cartel' Behaviour <br/>(c) Agreernent vs Concerted Practice <br/>(d) Cartels are Irifringements By Object: No Need to Prove Actual Effects<br/>e) No Market Definition Required <br/>f) No Need to Demonstrate the Precise Mechanism By Which the Restrictive Object was Attained <br/>g) No Requirement to Prove Subjective lnterit<br/>(h) Complex Infringement<br/>(i)Single and Continuous Infringement <br/>(i)Liability for a Single and Continuous Infringement <br/>(ii) Consequences ofLack ofAwareness of the Overali Conduct <br/>(iii)Single' and 'Continuous'<br/>(iv)The 'Single' Narure ofan Infringement <br/>(v)The 'Continuous' Nature ofan Infringement <br/>(vi)The 'Repeated' Nature ofan Infringement <br/>(vii) Duration ofan Undertaking's Participarion in an Infringement <br/>(3)The Burden ofProof <br/>(a)The Burden ofProofon the Commission <br/>(b) 'Shifting' ofthe Burden ofProof <br/>(4) The Standard ofProof <br/>a)The EU courts reluctance to use the Term 'Standard of Proof'<br/>(b) What Matters is the Balance of Evidence as aWhole <br/>(5)Admissibility of evidence<br/>(a) Evidence Collected or Used in Contravention of General Principies or <br/>Fundamental Rights is Not Admissible <br/>(i)Information Covered by Legal Privilege<br/>(ii)Self-Incriminating Information<br/>(iii) Evidence on Which the Undertakings Have Not Been Heard is Inadmissible <br/>(b) Documents Obtained in an Inspection ThatTurned Ourto be <br/>Unlawfui are Inadmissible <br/>(c) Documents Which Do Not FalI Witihin the Scope ofan Inspectien <br/>Decision are Inadmissible <br/>(d) Confidential Information is Admissible as Evidence <br/>(e)Evidence Provided Oraily is Admissible <br/>(f) Ano nyrnous Evidence Can Be Admissible<br/>(g) Lack ofCross-Exarnination ofWitnesses Does Not Render Their <br/>Staternents Inadmissibie <br/>(6) Probative Value of Evidence <br/>(a) Whether, On Its Face, the Evidence Appears Sound and Reliable<br/>(b) The Time When the Evidence Carne Into Being <br/>(c) The Levei ofDetail of the Evidence<br/>(d) The Source of the Information Has Direct Knowledge <br/>(e) Evidence Which Coes Against the Interests of the Source Providing ir <br/>has Greater Probative Value <br/>(f) Evidence From an Undertaking llhat Has Resolved to Cooperare With <br/>the Investigation Has High Probative Value <br/>(g) Evidence Provided Where There is a Risk ofSanction <br/>(h) Evidence Provided After Mature Reflection is More Credible<br/>(1)Evidence or Statements Provided by Executives ofCompanies are of <br/>Greater Probative Value <br/>(j)Evidence Suppiied by One Entity May Be Used Against Another <br/>(k) Motives of the Witness <br/>(1)Information Provided by Applicants for Immunity or for a Reduction <br/>of Fines <br/>(rn) Anonymous or Unidentified Sources of Evidence <br/>(7) Types of Evidence<br/>(a) Docurnentary Evidence <br/>(b) Oral Evidence <br/>(i)Quaiified Obiigation to HearWitnesses <br/>(ii) Traditional Reliance on Documentary Evidence: Increased Use of Oral Evidence <br/>(c)Direct and indirect (Circurnstanrial) Evidence <br/>(d) When is Corroboration Necessary?<br/>(e)Econornic Evidence<br/>(i)The Use of Economic Evidence as ari Excuipatory Factor<br/>E EstablishingLiability <br/>(1) The 'Undertaking' as the Infringing Entity <br/>(2) Attribution ofLiability to the Undertaking as a Whole: Underlying Reasons <br/>(3) Principal Grounds for Liability <br/>(a) Parent Company Liability: The Concept ofthe 'Actuai Exercise of Decisive Influence<br/>(i)The Parent Company's Shareholding in the Subsidiary <br/>(i)Subsidiary Wholly Owned (orAlmost Wholly Owned) by the <br/>Parent: Existence ofa Rebuttable Presumption <br/>(ii)Subsidiary Owned (Signficant1y) Less Tban 100 Per Cent by <br/>the Parent <br/>(iii) JointVentures <br/>(ii)The Articles ofAssociationfStatutes <br/>(iii) The Parent Entity Being Active on the Sarne or Adjacent Markets <br/>(iv) The Use of the Sarne Cornmercial Name By the Parent and Subsidiary <br/>(v)Instructions From a Parent Company to a Subsidiary <br/>(vi) Functional Links ]Ihrough Personnel <br/>(vii) lhe Attitude of the Parent Company During the Administrative<br/>Procedure <br/>(b) Sister Companies <br/>(4) Liability in Cases ofSuccession <br/>(a) Cases ofChange of Legal Denomination, Resulting in the Dissolurion <br/>of the Previous Legal Person<br/>b) Transfer of a Liabie Entity, Which Renia.ins in Existence, To Another <br/>Undertaking <br/>(c) Transfer ofAssets/Activities to Another Undertaking, the Entity <br/>Previously Operating the Business Remaining in Existence<br/>(d) Transfer of a Legal Entity or ofAssets/Activities, the Entity Previously <br/>Operating the Business Ceasing to Exist<br/>(e) Scenarios oflntra-Group Restructuring and Succession<br/>(5) Voiuntary Acceptance ofLiability by the Acquiring Underraking <br/>(6) Determination ofLiabiiity and the Appiication of the Leniency Notice <br/>G. Cartel Fines <br/>(1) Overview <br/>(2) The Basic Amount of the Fine <br/>(a) Calculation of the Value of Sales<br/>(i)General Principies <br/>(ii)Sales of Products or Services To Wbich the lnfringement Relates <br/>(iii) Sales in the Relevam Geographic AreaWithin the EEA<br/>(iv) Last Fuil Year Before the End of the Infringement <br/>(b) Gravity: 'lhe Percentage Appiicabie to the Value of Sales<br/>(1)General Principies <br/>(ii)Nature ofthe Infringernent<br/>(iii) Geographic Scope <br/>(iv) Combined Market Share<br/>(v)Impiementarion<br/>(c) Duration of the Infringement<br/>(i)General Principies<br/>(ii)Previous Practice <br/>(iii) Method for Calculating Duration<br/>(d) Additional Amount <br/>(i)General Principies <br/>(e) Conciusion on the BasicAmount<br/>(3) Individuaiizing 'Subjective' Responsibiliry: Aggravating and Mitigating <br/>Circumstances <br/>(a) Individual Conduct vs Overail Gravity of the Infringemenr<br/>(b) lhe Commission is Bound by the Fining Guidelines, But Nor By Prior <br/>Decisions <br/>(c) Method ofCalculation When Both Aggravating and Attenuating Circumstances Appiy<br/>(i)Aggravating Circumsrarices <br/>(i)General Principies <br/>(ii)Repeated Infringernents ofthe Sarne Type by the Sarne <br/>Undertaking<br/>(iii)Reflisai to Cooperate With or Obstruction of the Cornrnission in <br/>carrying Out its Investigations<br/>(iv)Role of Leader in, or instigator of the Infringement <br/>(v) Steps to Coerce Other Undertakings andior Retaliarory Measures<br/>Agaínst Other Undertakings with a View to Enforcing the <br/>Practices Constituting the Infringement <br/>(vi)OtherAggravating Circumstances<br/>(ii)Mitigating Circumstances <br/>(i)Terminarion of the InfringementAs Soon As the Com mission <br/>Intervenes (NotApplicable to Carteis) <br/>(ii)Infringement Committedas a Result ofNegligence <br/>(iii)Substantially Limited Involvement in the Infringement <br/>(iv)Effective Cooperation by the Undertaking Outside the Scope of <br/>the Leniency Notice and Beyondlts Legal Obligation To Do So<br/> (v)Anti-Competitive Conduct Authorized ar Encouraged by Public <br/>Authorities ar by Legislation 8.638<br/>(vi)OtherAcceptedAttenuating Circumstances<br/>'vü) RejectedArguments <br/>Specific Increase for Deterrence <br/>(a) Increase for Undertakings With a Large Turnover <br/>(i)Concept and Rationale <br/>(ii)Commission's Practice <br/>(b) Legality of the Deterrence Multiplying Factor <br/>(c)Lirnited Scope of the Duty to State Reasons <br/>(d) Basis for the Assessment and Levei of the Deterrence <br/>Multiplying Factor <br/>(e) Increase to Exceed the Improper Gains <br/>Legal Maxirnum of 10 Per Cent ofAnnual Group Turnover <br/>(a) Upper Limit Ser By Article 23(2) <br/>(b) 10 Per Cent of the Total Turnover <br/>(c) Preceding Business Year <br/>(d) Application to Each Infringement <br/>(e) Joint and Several Liability Within the Sarne Underraking <br/>(f)The 10 Per Cent Cap is Caiculated Before Leniency <br/>(g) The 10 Per Cent Cap Applies Only to the Final Arnount <br/>(Before Leniency) <br/>(h) Irnpact of the Legal Maximum<br/>Application of the Leniency Notice <br/>Application of the 10 Per Cent Reduction of the Settlernent Notice <br/>Abiiiry to Pay <br/>(a)Inahiliry to Pay Claims Systernatically Rejecred before 2006 Fining <br/>Guidelines<br/>(b) Application of Inabiliry to Pay Reductions by the Commission <br/>(c)Procedure for Inability to Pay Requests<br/>(d) Comrnission Anaiysis oflnabiity to Pay Claims under the 2006 <br/>Fining Guidelines <br/>(e) Court Review <br/>(f) Assessrnent of the Ability to Pay Poiicy <br/>Other Factors That May Be Taken inro Account <br/>(a) Ad HocAdjustrnents <br/>(b) Poor Financial Situation and Previous Payrnent of Fines in Other <br/>Proceedings <br/>(c)Excessive Durarion ofAdministrarive Procedure <br/>H. Procedural Aspects of the Adoption of Decisions in Cartel Cases and<br/>'Direct Settlements' <br/>(1) Main Common Aspects of the Adoption of Cartel Decisions<br/>(a) The Commission '2011 Best Practices' and Outline of the Procedure <br/>Leading to a Decision <br/>(i)The Adoption of a Cartel Decision Foliows a Model That Is <br/>Common For Ali Commission Decisions <br/>(ii) General Outline of the Standard Procedure Followed Between the <br/>Fact-Finding Stage and the Final Decision—and the Alternative of <br/>the Setdement Procedure <br/>(iii) lhe Commission May Halt an Investigation at Any Stage<br/> (b) Particular Aspects Relating to Access to File in Cartel Cases <br/>(c) lhe Statement ofObjections and Indications on the Parameters <br/>of the Fine <br/>(d) The Oral Hearing and State ofPlay Meetings(2) Direct Settiements in Cartel Cases<br/>(a) The Lead Up to the Adoption of the 2008 System of'Direct <br/>Settlements' in Cartel Cases <br/>(b) Sequence of the Regular Procedure and Potential Benefits of the <br/>Sertlement Process<br/>(c) lhe Main Features of the Settlement System<br/>(i)Stakes on Both Sides: the Parties and the Commission <br/>(ii) Not To Be Mistaken for 'Commitment' Decisions<br/>(iii) Based on a 'Common Understanding' Berween the Parties and the <br/>Commission, But Nota Negotiation <br/>(d) lhe Settlement Procedure Dissected<br/>(i)Based on a Fui! Investigation<br/>(ii)Deciding lhat a Case is Fit for Settlement/ Initia! Contact with <br/>the Parties<br/>(iii)Start of the Settlement Process <br/>(iv)Three Rounds ofMeetings<br/>(v)Confidentiaiity ofDiscussions<br/>(vi)Formal Settiement Submission, Statement ofübjections, Decision <br/>(vii)Interaction with Leriiency <br/>(viii) Lessons from Settlement DecisionsfHybrid Cases<br/>(ix)Miscellaneous Aspects<br/>9. Vertical Agreements<br/>Andrei Gurin and Luc Peeperkorn<br/>A. Introduction<br/>(1) Applicability ofArticle 101 to Vertical Restraints<br/>(2) EarlyApplication ofArticie 101 to Vertical Restraints <br/>(3) Theory ofActive/Passive Sales <br/>(4) System ofBlock Exemption Regulations <br/>(5) Green Paper on Vertical Restraints<br/>(6) Two Council Regulations Enabling the Adoption of the <br/>Commission's Policy <br/>(7) A NewType ofBlock Exemption Reguiation and Guidelines<br/>B. lhe New Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines <br/>(1) Background <br/>(2)The De Minimis Notice <br/>(3)Agency Agreements <br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b)Agency Agreements in the Vertical Restraints Guidelines<br/>(c)AgencyAgreements and the Internet<br/>(4)Subcontracting Agreements <br/>(5)lhe Underiying Philosophy of the BER and the Vertical Restraints Guidelines <br/>(6)The Scope of the BER and Guidelines <br/>(a)Definition ofVerticai Agreements <br/>(b)Vertical Agreements between Competitors <br/>(e)Vertical Agreements Conciuded by Associations ofRetailers<br/>(d) Vertical Agreements Containing IP Rights Provisions(e) lhe Interface Between the BER and Other Biock Exemption Regulations <br/>(7)Hardcore Restrictions under Article 4 of the BER<br/>(a)Vertical Price Fixing Under Article 4(a) <br/>(b) Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions under Article 4(b)<br/>(c)Selective Distribution Systems and Sales Restrictions under Article 4 <br/>(d)Internet Selling and Sales Restrictions Under Article 4 <br/>(e)The Combination of Selective and Exclusive Distribution<br/>(f)Aftermarkets<br/>(g)Individual Assessment ofHardcore Resale Restrictions<br/>(8)ExcludedRestrictions under Article 5 of the BER <br/>(a) Non-Compete Obligations Exceeding Five Years <br/>(b) Post-Term Non-Compete Obiigations <br/>(c)Boycott Under Selective Distribution <br/>(9)Transitionai Period and Expiry Date of the BER <br/>(10)Withdrawal of the beneíit of the BER <br/>(11)Disappiication of the BER <br/>(12)Market Share 'Thresho!ds and Market Share Calculatjon <br/>(13)lhe Framework ofAnalysis for Individual Assessment<br/>(a) Anti-Competitive Effects <br/>(b) Efhciencies <br/>C. Analysis of Different Categories of Vertical Restraints<br/>(1)SingleBranding <br/>(a) Market Position of the Supplier <br/>(b) Incidence and Duration of the Single-Branding Obligation(e) Market Position ofCompetitors <br/>(d) Barriers to Entry <br/>(e) Countervailing Power <br/>(f) Level ofTrade<br/>(g)Possibie Efliciencies <br/>(2)Exclusive Distribution<br/>(a)Supplier's Market Position <br/>(b) Competi tors' Market Position <br/>(e) Buying Power <br/>(d) Levei ofTrade <br/>(e) Maturity of the Market <br/>(f) Combinarion with Exclusive Sourcing <br/>(g)Possible Efficiencies <br/>(3)Exclusive Customer Allocation <br/>(4)Selective Distribution <br/>(a) Qualitative vs Quantitative Selective Distribution <br/>(b) Quandtative Selective Distribution <br/>(c)Supplier's Market Position<br/>(d) Competitors' Market Position <br/>(e)Barriers to Entry <br/>(f) Buying Power <br/>(g) Maturity ofthe Market <br/>(h) Possible Efriciencies<br/>(5)Franchising <br/>(6)Exclusive Supply <br/>(a) Buyer's Market Share <br/>(b) Duration ofthe Agreement<br/>(e) Competitors' Market Position <br/>(d) Countervailing Power <br/>(e) Level ofTrade and Nature ofthe Product <br/>(f)Possible Efficiencies <br/>(7)Upfront Access Payments <br/>(8)Category Management Agreements <br/>(9)Tying <br/>(10)Recommended and Maximum Resale Prices <br/>10. Intelectual Property<br/>Kevin Coates, Lars Kjølbye, and Luc Peeperkorn<br/>A. Introduction <br/>(1) Overview<br/>(2) Purpose ofIP Rights<br/>(3) lhe Relationship berween IP Protection and EU Law <br/>(a) IP Protecrion and the Free Movement Provisions <br/>(b) IP Prorection and the Competition Rules<br/>(i)General Approach <br/>(ii) Biock Exernptions<br/>B. IP Rights and EU Law <br/>(1) Introduction<br/>(2) Existence vs Exercise and the Specific Subject Matter ofan IP Right <br/>(a)Existence and Exercise <br/>(b) Specific Subject Matter <br/>(3) The Specific Subject MatteroflP Rights <br/>(a)Patents <br/>(b) Know-How <br/>(c) Copyright <br/>(d) Trademarks <br/>(e)Plant Breeders' Rights <br/>(4) Exhaustion ofIP Rights<br/>(a) Exhaustion Requires Consent <br/>(i)Centrafarm v Sterling Drug <br/>(ii) Consent Does Not HaveTo Be Explicit <br/>(b) For a Saie to Exhaust IP Rights Ir Is Not Necessary for rhat Saie to be <br/>Made in a Jurisdiction Where Ir Enjoys IP Right Protection <br/>(i)Merck vStephar <br/>(c) Exhaustion Requires the Consent of the Right Holder Even ifthe <br/>Goods were Lawfully Put on the Market in Another Member State <br/>Without That Consent<br/>(i)EMI/Patricia <br/>(ii) Keurkoop/Nancy Kean Gfts<br/>(d) Exhaustion Requires anActual Saie<br/>(e) Exhaustion Depends on the Specific Subject Matter of the Right in <br/>Question<br/>(i)Warner v Christiansen<br/>(f) Exhaustion for the Purposes of EU Law Requires Use in the EEA <br/>(g) Exhaustion and Licensing Under the Competition Rules<br/>(5) Exhaustion Concept in EU IP Legislation <br/>C. Technology Transfer Agreements<br/>(1) Introduction<br/>(2) lhe Basic Framework and Underlying Philosophy of the TTBER and the <br/>TechnologyTransfer Guidelines <br/>(3) The Scope of the TTBER and the Technology Transfer Guidelines <br/>(a) Agreements for the Production ofContract Products <br/>(b) Technology Transfer Agreements <br/>(c) lhe Interface between the TTBER and Other Biock Exemptions<br/>(4) Competitors vs Non-Competitors<br/>(5) The Hardcore Restrictions<br/>(a) Price Fixing <br/>(b) Output Lirnitations <br/>(c) Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions<br/>(1)Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions between <br/>Competitors <br/>(ii)Territorial and Customer Sales Restrictions between <br/>Non-Competitors <br/>(d) Restrictions on the Use of Own Technology or to <br/>CarryOutR&D <br/>(6) Excluded Restrictions <br/>(7) lhe Safe Harbours <br/>(8) Withdrawal and Disappiication <br/>(9) Application Outside the Scope of the Biock Exemption <br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) RoyakyObiigarions <br/>(c)Exclusive Licences and Sales Restrictions<br/>(d) Output Restrictions <br/>(e)Field of Use Restrictions<br/>(f)CaptivelJse Restrictions<br/>(g) Tying and Bundling <br/>(h) Exclusive Deaiing<br/>(i)Serrlemenrs<br/>(j)Licensing of Future Deveiopments <br/>(10) TechnoiogyPools <br/>(a) lhe Nature of the Pooled Technologies <br/>(b) Competition Concerns Relating to the Creation of the Pool <br/> (c)AssessmentofIndividual Restraints <br/>D. Trademark Licences<br/>(1) Licences and Assignment<br/>(a)Territorial Protection <br/>(b) Prohibition on Competing Products <br/>(c) No-Chalienge Clauses (Ownership) <br/>(d) No-Chailenge Clauses (Validity) <br/>(e) Prohibition on Sub- Licensing or Assignment<br/>(O Quality Control Measures <br/>(2) Trademark Delimitation Agreements<br/>(a)Market Partitioning<br/>(b) Confusion ofMarks<br/>E. Copyright<br/>(1) EU Directives Relating to Copyright <br/>(2) Territorial Protection through Exclusive Licences<br/>(a)Exclusive Territory Does Not Necessarily Infringe <br/>Article 101(1)<br/>(b) Coilecrive Refusais to License<br/>(c) Specific Subject Matter ofCopyright and Article 101(1)<br/>(3) CollectingSocieties<br/>(a) Arrists' Licences to a Collecring Society<br/>(b) Licensing Agreements Between Collecting Societies<br/>(c)Licences from Collecting Societies to Manufacturers <br/>E Article 102<br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) IP and Market Definition <br/>(3) IP and Dominance<br/>(4) Abuse<br/>(a)Refusals to License IP Rights <br/>(i)The IBM Undertaking <br/>(ii)Volvo/Veng <br/>(iii)Magill <br/>(iv)IMS Heafrh <br/>(v)Microsoft <br/>(b) Licensing ofIP Rights and Article 102 <br/>(c) Misuse ofRegulatory Process<br/>(d) Conclusions on Abuses<br/><br/>III SPECIAL SECTORS<br/><br/>11. Financial Services<br/>Nicho/as Banasevic, Stephen Ryan, and Rita Wezenbeek<br/>A. Introduction <br/>(1) General Remarks on Financial Services <br/>(2) Developments in the Commission's Approach<br/>(3) lhe Post-2007 Financial Crisis and Consequences for Competition in the<br/>Financial Sector<br/>(4) Competition and Regulation in the Financial Sector <br/>(5) Social Security <br/>B. Banking <br/>(1) PreliminaryRemarks<br/>(2) Payment Systems <br/>(a) Introduction to Payment Systems<br/>(b) Regulation, SeIf-Regulation, and Competition Law Enforcement <br/>(c)Pricing Issues (Interchange Fees) <br/>(d) Issues Relating to Access<br/>(i)SWIFT/La Poste <br/>(ii)Visa International and Visa Europe<br/>(iii)Groupement des Cartes Bancaires <br/>(iv)European Payments Council<br/>(3) Non-Payment Banking Antitrust Cases<br/>(4) Banking Mergers<br/>(a)Introduction<br/>(b) Turnover Calculation for Credit Institutions and Other Financial <br/>Instirntions <br/>(c) lhe Approach to Market Definition<br/>(d) Significant Cases<br/>(e) Nationalization and Recapitalizarion<br/>(f) Looking Forward<br/>C. Capital Markets<br/>(1) Preliminary Remarks<br/>(a) Importance of Clearing<br/>(b) MiFIDII<br/>(2) Antitrust Cases<br/>(a)Clearstream<br/>(b) Recenr Enforcement <br/>(c) Standard & Poor's <br/>(d) Reuters Instruments Codes (RICs)<br/>(e) Credit Default Swaps<br/>(3) Deutsche Biirse/NYSE Euronext Merger Case <br/>(a)Introduction <br/>(b) lhe Parties and the Deal <br/>(c) Market Definition <br/>(d) CompetitiveAssessment<br/>(e)Claimed Efficiencies<br/>(f) Remedies<br/>(g) Conclusion<br/>D. Insurance<br/>(1) lntroductory/Pre!iminary Remarks<br/>(a) Some Characteristics oflnsurance <br/>(b) Market Definition Issues in the Insurance Sector <br/>(2) 'lhe Commission's Antitrust Policy in the Insurance Sector <br/>(a) Commission Antitrust Case Law on Insurance<br/>(b) Comjnission Biock Exemption Regulation for the Insurance Sector<br/>(c)Sector lnquiry in Business Insurance<br/>(3) Specific Types ofPractices in the Insurance Sector<br/>(a) Agreements on Prices<br/>(b) Jointly Produced Compilations, Tables, and Studies<br/>(c) Standard Policy Clauses<br/>(d) Co-Insurance and Co-Reinsurance Poois <br/>(i) Pools in the Block Exemption<br/>(ii) Com mission Decisions and Other Cases on Pools<br/>(e) Security Devices<br/>(f) Agreements on Settlemenr ofClaims and on Registers of<br/>AggravatedRisks<br/>(g) Insurance Distriburion<br/>E. Conclusions<br/>12. Energy<br/>Céline Gauer and Lars Kjølbye<br/>A. Introduction<br/>(1) Liberalization and the Regulatory Framework<br/>(2) Regulation and Competition Enforcement<br/>(3) Findings ofthe Commission's Energy Sector lnquiry<br/>(a) Market Concentration<br/>(b) Vertical Foreclosure<br/>(c) Market Integration <br/>(d) Downstream Markets<br/>B. MarkerDefinition<br/>(1) Product Market<br/>(a) Gas Markets <br/>(b) Electricity Markets <br/>2) Geographic Market<br/>(a) Exploration, Production, and Saies ofCrude Ou and Gas <br/>(b) Supply Markets <br/>(c) Transport Markets <br/>(d) Flexibility of Markets in Gas <br/>(3) Conciusion <br/>C. Obstacles to Market Integration and Discrimination <br/>(1) Horizontal Market Partitioning <br/>(2) Curtailment ofNetworks <br/>(3) Territorial Restrictions and Destination Clauses in Vertical Agreements <br/>(4) Conciusion <br/>D. Vertical Contractual Restrainrs <br/>(1) Use Restrictions <br/>(2) Customer Foreclosure<br/>(3) Exclusive Distribution and Volume Reduction Clauses <br/>(4) Conclusion <br/>E. Horizontal Contractual Resrraints <br/>(1) Non-Compete Clauses <br/>(2) Joint Investment and Joint Operation ofProduction Capaciry <br/>(3) Network Effects and Minority Sharehoidings<br/>(4) JointPurchasing <br/>(5) JointSelling<br/>(a) PureJointSelling<br/>(b) Joirit Selling as Part ofSupply Chain <br/>(6) Exchange oflnformation <br/>(7) Conclusion<br/>E Network Foreclosure <br/>(1) Refusal to Supply by Vertically lntegrated Undertakings <br/>(a) Access to Transport Networks is Indispensable <br/>(b) Refusais to Access Networks in Various Forms <br/>(c) Elimination ofEifective Competition and Objective Justification <br/>(2) Input Foreclosure <br/>(a) Long-Term Capacity Reservarions: lhe GDF and E. ONGas Cases <br/>(b) Pre-Emptive Capacity Reservation: lhe CEZCase <br/>(a) 'lhe RWE and ENlCases<br/>(b) lhe GDFand E. ONGas Foreclosure Cases<br/>(c) lhe CEZCase <br/>(4) Conclusion <br/>G. Exploitative Abuses <br/>(1) Energy Markets are Prone to Exploirative Conduct <br/>(2) lhe Commission's Practice <br/>(a) E.ON Electriciry: lhe German Electriciry Wholesale <br/>Market Case <br/>(b) E.ON Electricity: lhe German Electricity Balancing Case <br/>(3) Conclusion<br/>H. State Measures and Article 106 TFEU <br/>I.Final Remarks <br/>(1) lhe Energy Sector: Five Years After the Energy Sector Inquiry <br/>(2) Competition Policy: lhe Contriburion ofEnergy Cases <br/>(a) NewTypes of Infringements<br/>(b) First Structural Remedies<br/>(c) Deterrence vs Swift Impact on the Market <br/>(3)Clonclusion<br/>13. Communications (Telecoms and Internet) David Gabathuler and Eduardo Martinez Rivero<br/>A. Introduction <br/>B. EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communication<br/>(1) Introduction<br/>(2) Opening the Market to Competition (1 990s) <br/>(a)Progressive Liberal ization (Relianceon Article 106 Directives)<br/>(b) Harmonization Measures<br/>(3) lhe Regulatory Framework <br/>(a) lhe Regulatory Package<br/>(b) Functioning of the Regulatory Framework <br/>(c) Article 7 consultarion mechanism <br/>(d) Article 7 Oversighr Extended to Regulatory Remedies <br/>(e)Functional Separarion <br/>(O Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications <br/>(BEREC)<br/>(4) Specific Regularory Measures<br/>(a) International Mobile Roamirig<br/>(b) Radio Spectrum Policy <br/>(5) Compieting the Telecoms Singk Market: Commission's 'Connected<br/>Continent' Proposa] <br/>C. Move from Copper Networks to Next Generation Access Networks <br/>(1) lhe Emergence ofNext Generation Access Networks <br/>(2) lhe NGA Recornmendation<br/>(3) lhe Recommendation on Non-Discrimination and Cosring<br/>Methodologies<br/>D. Interaction Between & Post Competition Enforcement<br/>and ExAnte Regulation <br/>(1) lhe Applicability of the Competition Rules to the Electronic <br/>Communications Sector <br/>(2) ACompiementaryApproach<br/>(3) Resoiving Conflicts Between Sector Regulation and Competition <br/>Enforcement <br/>(4) lhe Influence of Com petitiort Law Principies on the <br/>Regulatory Framework <br/>(5) Economic Incentives to Invest<br/>(6) No Exemption for Emerging Markets <br/>(7) Ex Ante Regulation as a Mirigating Circumstance <br/>E. Commission's Antitrust Enforcement in the Electronic <br/>Communications Sector<br/>(1) Margin Squeeze: An AutonomousType of Abuse <br/>(a) Deutsche Telekom (2003)<br/>(b) Telefónica (2007)<br/> (c)TeliaSonera(2011) <br/>(2) Predarory Pricing: Leveraging of Incumbent Power into an Emerging <br/>Market <br/>(3) Refusal to Suppiy: Competition Enforcement in Addition to Regulatory <br/>Intervention <br/>(4) Market Sharing: Article 101 Violation Extending to More than One <br/>Member State <br/>E Mergers in the Electronic Communications Sector<br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Mobile Telecommunications<br/>(a)Horizontal Overlap<br/>(b) Vertical Relarionships<br/>(3) Fixed-Line Telecommun ications<br/>(4) Alternative tnfrastructure: Cable and Sareilite<br/>(a)Cable <br/>(b) Sateilite <br/>(5) Some Notabie Merger Decisions in Other Markets <br/>G. Internet <br/>(1) Overview <br/>(2) Ner Neutraliry Regulation <br/>(3) Proposed Net Neurraliry Measures ar EU Level<br/>(4) Siruation ar the National Level<br/>(5) Net Neutral iry and Com petition Law Enforcement<br/>(6) Google: Online Search and Advcrtising <br/>H. Other Developments<br/>(1) Network Sharing in MobileTeiephony<br/>(2) State Aid to Broadband<br/>(3) Standard Essential IPR Relating to Mobile Teiephony Standards<br/>14. Media<br/>KrzysztofKuik andAnthony Dawes<br/>A. Introduction <br/>(1) Main Features ofthe Media Sector<br/>(i)Musiclndustry<br/>(ii)Audiovisual lndustry<br/>(iii)BookProduction, Publishing, and Distribution<br/>(iv)AdvertisingMarket<br/>(2) Regulatory Framework<br/>(3) Lssues Arismg Across the Media Sector <br/>(i)Enforcement at Both EU and National Levei<br/>(ii)Cultural Diversity<br/>(iii)Copyright<br/>(iv)Exclusivity <br/>(v)Two-Sided Markets<br/>(4) Structure<br/>B. Competition Issues underArticie 101 <br/>(1) Horizontal Agreements<br/>(a)Price-Fixing<br/>(1)Contractual Systems ofFixed Book Prices<br/>(ii)Arrangements Akin to Price Fixing<br/>(i)Agreements ar Concerted Practices Seeking to Influence the <br/>Retail Prices ofPhysical Recordings<br/>(ii)Agreements or Concerted Practices Restr-icting the Freedom to <br/>Grant Rebates<br/>(iii)Concerted Practices Leadi ng to an Increase in Retail Prices <br/>(b) Customer and Territorial Aliocation <br/>(1)Restrictions on the Coilective Licensing ofContent<br/>(ii)Restrictions on the Abiiity of Right Hoiders to Enrrust the <br/>Licensing ofContent to the Person ofTheir Choice<br/>(iii)Agreements or Concerted Practices Resulting in Territorial <br/>Aliocation<br/>(c) Joint Seiling ofTelevision Rights<br/>(i)Does Joint Selling ofRights Fali Within Article 101(1)? <br/>(ii)Horizontal aspectes of joint selling of rights<br/>(iii)Specificity ofSport <br/> (iv)Absence ofDownsrream Exclusivity <br/> (d) Joint Purchasing ofTeievision Rights <br/>(i)Appreciable Restriction ofCompetition<br/>(ii)Main Competirion Concerns<br/>(iii)Joint Purchasing of Sports Rights by Pubiic Broadcasters <br/>(2) Vertical Agreements<br/>(a) ExclusivityCiauses Over Prernium Content <br/>(i)Commissions Policy Objective<br/>(ii)'lhe ApproachinARD <br/>(iii)A More General Framework ofAssessment <br/>(iv)Possible Limits on the Duration and Scope ofSuch <br/>Agreements <br/>(v)The [mpact of the FA Premier League and Murphy Cases on the <br/>Levei ofRemuneration a Right Holder Can Obtain in Return <br/>for Exclusivity <br/>(b) Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses <br/>(i)Most-Favoured-Supplier Clauses<br/>(ii)Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses<br/>(iii)Cross-Platforrn Parity Clauses<br/>(iv)Conclusion<br/>(c)Territorial Restrictions <br/>(i)Territorial Restrictions in Bilateral Reciprocal Agreements <br/>Between CotlectingSocieties <br/>(ii)Absolute Territorial Protection Before FA Premier League and <br/>Murphy <br/>(iii)Absolute Territorial Protection After FA Premier League and <br/>Murphy <br/>(iv)Territorial Restrictions in the Online World <br/>C. Competition Issues underArticle 102 <br/>(1) MarketDeflnition<br/>(2) Dominance<br/>(i)Assessing the Economic Strength of a Content Provider <br/>(ii)Assessing the Economic Strength of a Broadcaster <br/>(3) Abuse<br/>(a) UnfairTrading Conditions <br/>(b) ExcessivePricing<br/>(c)Discriminatory Pricing<br/>(d) Exclusionary Abuses <br/>D.Tlhe Competition Directive: Market Entry, Special or Exclusive Rights,<br/>and Spectrum Assignments <br/>(1) Mernber States Prohibited From GrantingExclusive or Special Rights <br/>(2) Member States Required to Assign Spectrum on the Basis ofAppropriare <br/>Criteria<br/>E. Mergers in the Media Sector <br/>(1) General Remarks <br/>(i)Consolidation <br/>(iiDigital Markers <br/>(iii)Content<br/>(iv)Vertical Issues <br/>(2) The Scope of the Competition Assessment under the Merger Regulation<br/>(3) Concentrations in Selected Media Industries<br/>(a) Concentrations in the Music lndustry <br/>(i)Music Publishing <br/>(i)Relevant Product Markets <br/>(ii)Relevant Geographic Markets<br/>(iii)The Assessmenr of Non- Coo rdinatedEffects<br/>(iv)The Assessment of Coordinated Effects <br/>(ii)RecordedMusic<br/>(1)RelevantProductMarkets <br/>(ii)Relevant Geographic Markets<br/>(iii)TheAssessment ofNon-CoordinatedEjffects<br/>(iv)TheAssessment ofcoordinatedEffects <br/>(b) Concentrations <br/>in the Audiovisual Industry <br/>(i) Relevant Product Markets <br/>(ii) Relevam Geograpbic Markets <br/>(iii) The Assessment ofPay-TV Mergers <br/>(i)Prohibitions Following the Lack of Satisfactory Remedies <br/>(ii)Focus on Vertical Issues (Input Foreclosure) <br/>(iii)Vertical Issues Remain in Mergers with Limited Horizontal Overlaps <br/>(c) Concentrations<br/>in the Book Publishing Industry (Including E-Books) <br/>(i) Relevant Product Markets <br/>(ii) Relevant Geographic Markets <br/>(iii) TheAssessrnent ofNon-Coordinated Effects <br/>(iv) The Assessment ofCoordinated Effects <br/>(d) Concentrations <br/>in the Written Press <br/>(i) Relevam Product Markets <br/>(ii) Relevant Geographic Markets <br/>(iii) The Assessment ofNon-Coordinated Effects <br/>(iv) The Assessment ofCoordinated Effects <br/>(v) The Assessment ofConglomerate Effects<br/>(e)Concentrations <br/>in Advertising Markets <br/>(i) Product Markets <br/>(ii) Relevant Geographic Markets <br/>(iii) The Assessnien t of Coordinated/Non-Coordinated Effects <br/>(iv) Vertical Effects <br/>(4) Conclusion <br/>15. Transport<br/>I-Iubert de Broca, Marta Mielecka Riga, and Anatoly Suboà<br/>A. The Economic Importance ofTransport <br/>B. Competition Law Framework <br/>(1) Historical Evolution <br/>(2) Modernization of Competition Rules in the Transport Sector<br/>C. AirTransport <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) Legal Framework <br/>(a)Liberal ization of the EUAviation Market <br/>(b) lnternationalAspects <br/>(i)Air Service Agreements with Third Countries<br/>(ii)Open Skies Agreement and Orher Comprehensive Air <br/>Transport Agreements <br/>(c) Application of EU Competition Rules in Air Transport<br/>(3) Market Definition in Airline Cases <br/>(a)Inrroduction <br/>(b) Airlransport ofPassengers <br/>(i)Supply of Air Transport Services to End Customers <br/>(i) Starting Point: Origin-and-Destination (O&D) Approach <br/>(ii)Type ofPassenger <br/>(iii)Airport Substiiutabi1iy <br/>(iv)Non-Stop vs One-Stop Flights <br/>(v)Charter Services <br/>(vi)Inter-Modal Competition <br/>(ii)Supply ofAirline Seats to Tour Operators <br/>(c) AirTransportof Cargo <br/>(4) Competitive Assessment ofAirline Alliances and Mergers <br/>(a)Introduction<br/>(b) Determination ofAffected Markets <br/>(c) Counterfacrual <br/>(d) Assessment of Restrictions ofCompetition <br/>(i)Restriction ofCompetition by Object <br/>(ii)Restriction ofCompeticion by Effect <br/>(e)Efliciencies <br/>(1)Introduction <br/>(ii)General Assessment Framework Under Article 101(3) <br/>(iii)EfflciencyGains <br/>(iv)Pass-on to Consumers <br/>(v)Indispensability <br/>(vi)No Elimination ofCompetition <br/>(f) Commirments <br/>(i)Introduction <br/>(ii)Sior Releases <br/>(iii)Special Prorate Agreements <br/>(iv)Fare Combinability Agreements <br/>(v)Frequent Flyer Programmes <br/>(vi)Intermodal Agreements <br/>(vii)OtherCommitments <br/>(5) Prohibited Airline Mergers: Ryanair/Aer Lingus and Olympic/Aegean <br/>(6) Hardcore Restrictions <br/>(a)Price Fixing <br/>(b) Market Sharing <br/>(7) Abuses of a Dominant Position <br/>D. MaritimeTransport <br/>(1) Introduction <br/>(2) The Repeal of the Conference Biock Exemption <br/>(3) The Exemption ofMaritime Consortia <br/>(a) Background <br/>(b) Objectives aí the Latest Review <br/>(c) The Scope of rue Exemption <br/>(d) The Content of the Exemption <br/>(e) lhe Conditions for the Exemption <br/>(i)Market Sharelhreshold <br/>(ii)Notice Period <br/>(4) The Maritime Guidelines<br/>(5) Individual Exemption <br/>(6) Market Definirion <br/>(7) Agreements and Abuses of Dominant Position <br/>E. lnlandTransport <br/>(1) Road Transport <br/>(a) Transport ofGoods <br/>(b) Transport of Passengers; <br/>(2) Inland Waterways <br/>(3) Rail Transport <br/>(a) Transport ofGoods by Rail <br/>(b) Transport ofPasserigers by Rail <br/>(c) EU Liberalization in the Railway Sector: lhe Railway Packages <br/>(i)First Railway Package <br/>(ii)Second Railway Package <br/>(iii)Third Railway Package <br/>(iv)Rail Recast Directive <br/>(v)Fourth Railway Package <br/>(vi)Railway Interoperabiliry <br/>(4) Controlled Competition for PublicTransport: Regulation 1370/2007 <br/>(5) Antitrust Rules Applicable to Inland Transport <br/>(a) Artide 2 ofRegulation 169/2009: Technical Agreements <br/>(b) Article 3 ofRegulation 169/2009: Exemption for Groups ofSmall <br/>and Medium-Sized Companies <br/>(6) Market Definition <br/>(a)Freight <br/>(b) Passenger Transport <br/>(7) Prohibited Agreements <br/>(8) Abuses of a Dominant Position <br/>F.Transport Infrastructure (and Related Services) <br/>(1) Applicabiliry of Competition Rules to Transport Infrastructure (and <br/>Related Services) <br/>(a) EconomicActiviry <br/>(b) Services of General Economic Interest <br/>(2) Airport Infrastructure <br/>(a) Market Definition <br/>(i)Product Market <br/>(ii)Geographic Market <br/>(b) Discriminatory Landing Fees <br/>(c) Access to Airport Services (Ground-Handling) <br/>(3) Maritime Infrastrucrure <br/>(a) Market Definition <br/>(i)Product Market <br/>(ii)Geographic Market <br/>(b) Competition Concerns <br/>16. Pharma<br/>HaraldMische, Elena Kamilarova, and Dominik Schnichels<br/>A. Introductjon <br/>B. Overview of the Pharma Sector <br/>(1) Pharmaceutjcals <br/>(2) Market Players <br/>(i) Manufacrurers <br/>(ii)Generic Companies <br/>(iii)Distribution <br/>(iv)Demand <br/>(3) Regulatory Framework<br/>(i)Patents <br/>(ii)SPC <br/>(iii)MarketingAuthorization <br/>(iv)'Data Exclusivity' and 'Marketing Exclusivity <br/>(v)National Pricing and Reimbursement Rules<br/>(4) Antitrust Enforcemerir Priorities before the Sector Inquiry <br/>(5) Sector Inquiry and FolIow-Up <br/>(i)Sector Inquiry <br/>(ii)FolIow-Up<br/>C. Market Definition <br/>(1)Pharmaceutical Markets in Case Law <br/>(2)ATC Classification <br/>(3)Medicine Characteristics <br/>(4)GalenicFormulation <br/>(5)Producr Life Cycle <br/>(6)Future Markets<br/>(7)Distribution Channels <br/>(8)Upstream Markets <br/>(9)SupplySide <br/>(10) Geographic Markets<br/>(11)RecentAntitrust Decisions <br/>D. Dominance in Ahusive Conduct Cases <br/>(1) Commission Practice <br/>(2) National Cases <br/>(i)UK Cases (Reckitt Benckiser and Napp)<br/>(ii)The French Sanofi-Aventís Case <br/>E. Restrictive Practices Between Originators and Generic Companies <br/>(1) Main Competidon Concerns and the Economic and Legal Context of <br/>Generic Competition <br/>(a) Main Competidori Concerns <br/>(b) Dynamics ofCompetition Between Originator and Generic <br/>Companies <br/>(e) The Com petitive Process Leading to Generic Entry <br/>(2) Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agreements <br/>(i)Termino!ogy <br/>(ii)Forms of Value Transfer <br/>(iii)OverviewofUS and EU Debate <br/>(a) Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the US <br/>(i)Hatch-Waxrnan Act<br/>(ii)Potential Scope of the Patent Test <br/>(iii)Presumprion ofRestraint ofTrade <br/>(iv)US Supreme Court's 'Rule of Reason' Test <br/>(b) Pay-for-Delay Patent SetrLement Agreements under Article 101 <br/>(i)Review of Patent Settlements Under the 2008/2009 <br/>Sector Inquiry <br/>(ii)Pay-for-Restriction in Settlement Agreements <br/>(iii)Commission Decision in Lundbeck <br/>(iv)Commission Decision in Fentanyl <br/>(v)EU and UK Investigations in Servier and Paroxetíne Under <br/>Article 101 <br/>(vi)RelevantJurisprudence <br/>(3) Acquisition ofPatent Rights and Exclusive Licensing <br/>(a) Acquisition of API Technology <br/>(b) Merger Regulation vsArticles 101 and 102<br/>(c) RelevantJurisprudence <br/>(d) Exclusive Licensing<br/>(4) Exclusive SupplyAgreement <br/>ECompetition Between Manufacturers of Generic Medicines <br/>(1) National Pricing Systems and ilheir Impact on Generic Competition <br/>(2) lhe German Sickness Funds and the Dutch Preference Policy <br/>G. Case Law under Article 102 and National Law: Abuses by <br/>Originators <br/>(1) Mis!eading Representations in Government Procedures and Misuse of <br/>Procedures <br/>(a) Misleading Representations in Government Procedures <br/>(b) Misuse of Procedures <br/>(2) Acquisition of Competing API Techno!ogy (Servier Investigation) <br/>(3) Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agreements (Servier and Paroxetine <br/>Investigations) <br/>(4) Exclusionary Pricing Discounts in the Hospital Segment <br/>(the OFT's Napp Case) <br/>(5) Withdrawal and De! isting of a Product (the OFT's Reckitt <br/>Benekiser Case) <br/>(6) Denigration (the LAutorité de Ia concurrence's Schering-Plough and <br/>Sanofi-Aventis Cases) <br/>(7) Abusive Practices Against Competing Originator Companies <br/>(Boehringer Case) <br/>H. Parailel Trade in Pharmaceuricals <br/>(1) Rationale <br/>(a) lhe Specificity of the EU Interna! Market <br/>(b) lhe Interna! Market Objective <br/>(2) Restrictions of Paralie! Trade and Article 101: Supply Quotas and <br/>Dual Pricing <br/>(a) Supply Quotas and Article 101 <br/>(i)EU Case Law <br/>(ii)National Case Law <br/>(b) Dual Pricing<br/>(1)EU Case Law: Restricrion by Object <br/>(ii)Special Characteristics of the Pharmaceutical Sector <br/>(iii)National Case Law <br/>(3) Restrictions of Para!lel Trade and Article 102: Supp!y Quotas <br/>(a) EU Case Law: Absence of a Per Se Abuse Under Article 102<br/>(b) National Case Law <br/>(i)The Case Law of the French Competition Authoriry <br/>(ii) lhe Case Law ofthe Spanish Competition Authority <br/>(iii) The Case Law of the Belgian Competition Authority <br/>(iv) Conclusion<br/> <br/>IV STATEAJD<br/><br/>17. State Aid<br/>Tim Maxian Rusche, ClaireMicheau, Henri Pffaut, and Koen Van de Casteele<br/>A. Why State Aid Control? <br/>(1) TheOrigiris <br/>(2) Constant Conflict of Objectives <br/>(3) lhe 2012-2014 State Aid Modernization <br/>B. Notion of State Aid <br/>(1) Aid Granted by the State or Through State Resources <br/>(a)'Or' is to be Read as 'and' <br/>(b) State Resources ...May Be Private (As Long As ]Ihey Are <br/>Under Control) <br/>(c)mputabiiity <br/>(2) Advantage <br/>(a) Beneficiary of the Advantage<br/>(i)Notion ofUndertaking <br/>(ii)Indirect Beneficiary <br/>(b) Notion ofAdvantage <br/>(i)EconomicAdvantage <br/>(ii)The Market Economy Investor Principie/Private <br/>Creditor Principie <br/>(í)The Private Investor Principie <br/>(ii)Private Creditor Principie <br/>(iii)Saie ofState Properly <br/>(iv)Extensions <br/>(v)Infrastructure Projects <br/>(iii)TaxAdvantage <br/>(3)Selectivity <br/>(a)Notion of Selectivity <br/>(b) Tax Selectivity <br/>(i)Material Selectivity <br/>(i)De Jure and De Facto Selectivity <br/>(ii)The Test of Tax Selectivity<br/>(iii)Discretionary Power <br/>(iv)Justification by the Logic of the Tax System <br/>(ii)Regional Selectivity <br/>(4) Distortion of Competi tion and Effect on Trade <br/>(a) Affectation ofComperition and Trade <br/>(b) De Minimis Regulation <br/>(i)Scope <br/>(ii)Recipient <br/>(iii)Calcuiarion <br/>(iv)Transparent Aid <br/>(v)Appiication in Time <br/>(vi)FurtherConditions <br/>(vii)Monitoring <br/>(viii) Cumulation <br/>(ix)Controversy on the Nature of the De Minimis Rale <br/>(c) New SGEI De Minimis Regularion <br/>C. Compatibility of State Aid with the Internal Market <br/>(1) RefinedEconomicApproach <br/>(a) Well-Defined Objective ofCommon Interest <br/>(b) Weli-Designed lnstrument <br/>(c)Balancing of the Positive and Negative Effecrs/Overaii <br/>Positive Balance <br/>(d) TbeWayForward<br/>2) General Principies ofNecessity (Incentive Effect) and Proportionality <br/>(3) Compatibility on the Basis ofArticle 107(2) <br/>(a) Aid Having a Social Character Granted to Individual Consumers <br/>(b) Aid to Make Good Damage Caused by Natural Disasters or <br/>Exceptional Occurrences <br/>(c) Aid to Compensate for the Economic Disadvaritages Caused by the Division ofGermany <br/>(4) Compatibility Declared by the Commission on the Basis ofArticle 107(3) <br/>(a) Aid tu Prornote the Economic Deveiopment of Arcas where the Standard of Living is Abnormally Low or Where There is Serious <br/>Urideremployment (Art 107(3) (a)) <br/>(b) Aid tu Promote the Execurion ofan Importam Project ofCommon <br/>European Interest (Art 107(3)(b) first alternative) <br/>(c) Aid to Remedy a Serious Disturbance in the Economy of a Member <br/>State (Art 107(3)(b) second alternative) <br/>(d) Aid to Promore Culture and Heritage Conservation (Art 107(3)(d)) <br/>(e) Aid to Facilitate the Development of Certain Economic Activities or <br/>ofCertain EconomicAreas (Art 107(3)(c)) <br/>(1)State Aid for Environmental Protection <br/>(1)JnvestmentAid <br/>(ii)OperatingAid <br/>(ii)Aid for R&D 17.263<br/>(i)StagecfR&D 17.264<br/>(ii)Incentive EJfect ofRDAid <br/>(iii)Eligible Costs <br/>(iv)Aidfiir Rescuing and Restructuring Firms iv Dff1cuttv <br/>(iii)Other SoftLawofaHorizontal Narure <br/>(1v)Sofr Law Concerning Only Certain Sectors <br/>(f) Otber Categories to be Specified by Decision ofthe Council <br/>(Art 107(3)(e)) <br/>(g) Aid for the Coordínation ofTransporr <br/>(5) Compatibility Declared by the Council: Article 108 (2)<br/>(6) Servjces of General Econonilc Interest <br/>(a)Introduction: Definition and Legal Basis <br/>(b) Before Ajtmark: Compensation and State Aid Approach(e) TheAltmarkRuling <br/>(d) Anaiysis ofAltrnark: Positive Effects and Open Questions<br/>(e) The SGEI Package <br/>(i)The Monti-Kroes Package <br/>(ii)The New Package <br/>(i)Existence of na SGEl <br/>(ii)Entrustment Aet <br/>(iii)Parameters of Compensation <br/>(iv)Avoichznce of Overcompensation <br/>Selection ofthe Provider <br/>vi)De Minimis Regulation <br/>(vii) Block Exemption <br/>(viii) Framework <br/>(7) lhe General Biock Exemption Regulation <br/>D. State Aid Procedure <br/>(1) Legal Basis and Applicable Texts ofHard and SoEr Law <br/>(2) Notification and Assessment ofNew Aid (Chapter II Procedural <br/>Regulation) <br/>(a) Objective ofrhe Notification and Assessment Procedure <br/>(b) Legal Basis and the Principie ofNorification Requirement<br/>(c) Steps in the Notification and Assessment Procedure <br/>(i)Preparation and Filing of Notification <br/>(ii)Pre-Notification<br/>(iii)Preiiminary Investigation <br/>(iv)Formal Investigation Proceedings <br/>(d) Internal Commission Decision-Making Procedure <br/>(e)Delays and Mistakes in the Notification Procedure and How to AvoidThem <br/>(f) Moniroring ofApproved and Notification-Exempted State Aid<br/>(3) Unlawful Aid (Chapter III ofthe Procedural Regulation)(a) The Case Law on UnlawfulAid <br/>(b) The Codiflcation ofthe Case Law in the Procedural Regulation <br/>(e) Innovation in the Procedural Regulation: lhe Recoverylnjunction <br/>(d) Recovery ofUnlawful and incompatible Aid <br/>(i)Legal Basis and General Principies ofRecovery <br/>(i)Legal Basis of Reco vey <br/>(ii)Immediate and EJfect-ive Recovery According to <br/>NationalLaws<br/>(iii)Imposition of Compound Interest<br/>(ii)Defences Against Recovery <br/>(i)Defences That Can Be Invoked by the Member State <br/>('ii)Defences Jhat Can Be Invoked by the Beneficiary <br/>(iii)Specific Problems and Situations ofRecovery <br/>(i)Dornestic MotivationforRecovery <br/>(ii)Recovery and Insolvency Proceedings <br/>(iii)lhe Correct Addressee for the Recovery Claim <br/>(iv)Recovery Pracrice ofthe Cominission <br/>(4) Existi ngAid (Chapter IV Procedural Regulation) <br/>(a) lhe Distinction Between New and ExistingAid <br/>(b) Procedure for Existi ngAid <br/>(e) lhe Trearment ofBorderline Cases <br/>(5) lhe Rights oflhird Parties, in Particular: lhe State Aid Complaint <br/> (Chapter V Procedural Regulation) <br/>(a)Righrs ofThird Parties in General <br/>(b) StateAid Complaints <br/>(c) Chaliengeable Acts <br/>(i)Existing Aid <br/>(ii)Opening Decisions <br/>(iii)Injuncrions <br/>(iv)Administrative Letters in Response to Complaints <br/>(6) Action Seeking the Suspension and Provisional Recovery of State Aid in <br/>Front ofNational Courts<br/>(7) lhe Scope ofJudicial Review <br/>(a) Judicial Review: FailuretoAct <br/>(b) Judicial Review: Interim Relief<br/> (c) Judicial Review: Action for annulment <br/>Index <br/><br/><br/><br/> |