TABLIE OF CONTENTS

Foreword

Summary Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Chapter 1

SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY FOR JOINT VENTURE INFRINGEMENTS
by
Jolling K. de Pree & Stefan C.H.Molin

1. Introduction
II. Legal Basis for Attribution of Liability: Single Economic Unit
III. Joint Venture + Shareholders = Single Economic Unit?
A. Full-Function Joint Ventures
B. Other Joint Ventures

IV. Imposition of Fines / Joint and Several Liability

V. Conclusion

Chapter 2

COMPETITION POLICY IN MEXICO: A TALE OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY
by
Eduardo Pérez Motta

1. Introduction
II. Competition Regime
III. Enforcement of FLEC: Relative Monopolistic Practices
IV. Competition and Economic Development
V. Second Generation Amendments to the FLEC
VI. Bibliography

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Chapter 3

BRAZILIAN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: GENERAL OVERVIEW AND RECENT TRENDS
by
Barbara Rosenberg et al

1. Merger Control
A. Historical Context
B. General Overview of the Brazilian Merger Review Process
II. Cracking Cartels in Brazil
A. General Overview of the Brazilian Conduct Investigations
B. Investigation Proceedings
C. Leniency / Amnesty Programme
D. Cease-and-desist commitments or settlements (a Brazilian plea bargaining)?
E. Short Note on Criminal Enforcement
F. Trends

Chapter 4

BRAZIL'S ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
by
Mariana Tavares de Araujo and Ana Paula Martinez

Chapter 5

ENFORCERS' PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
by
A. Paul Victor
Alexander Italianer
Jon Leibowitz
Mariana Tavares de Araujo
Jolling K. de Pree
Barbara Rosenberg

Panel Discussion

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 6

THE UNILATERAL EFFECTS ANALYSIS IN THE 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE AGE OF RESTRAINT?
by
Kevin J. Arquit

1. Introduction
II. The Evolution of the Guidelines Away From Their Role as a Constraint on Agency Discretion and Toward Their Use as a Tool of Increased Enforcement
A. Evolution of the Guidelines
III. The Pendulum Swings: Unilateral Effects in the 2010 Revised Guidelines
A. The 2010 Revisions Signify Greater Ambition to Intervene But Appear Not to Contain Any Overall Guiding Doctrine or Limiting Principle
B. The Revised Guidelines Include Several Changes Regarding Unilateral Effects Intended to Expand Agency Discretion
C. Four Areas Pose the Greatest Problems Regarding Unilateral Effects: Upward Pricing Pressure, Merger Simulation, Innovation, and Variety
D. The 2010 Revised Guidelines Create Uncertainty Concerning Not Only How the Agencies Will Act, But Also How Courts Will React to the Changes
IV. Conclusion

Chapter 7

UNILATERAL EFFECTS IN EUROPEAN MERGER ANALYSIS
by
Thorsten Mager

I. Introduction
II. Determining Unilateral Effects by Means of the Dominance and Siec Test
A. The "Old" European Merger Regulation
B. Heinz/Beech-Nut
C. The "New" European Merger Regulation
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III. Analysis of the EU Commission's Case Law
A. Volvo/Renault Vi
B. Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions
C. Philips! Marconi Medical Systems
D. Oracle! PeopleSoft
E. Ryanair/Aer Lingus
F. Arsenal/DSP
IV. Conclusion

Chapter 8

PRICING OF DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS IN THE 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
by
Michael N. Sohn

1. The Role of Market Definition in AnaIyzing Pricing Effect

II. Diversion Ratios and Upward Pricing Pressure

Chapter 9

UNILATERAL EFFECTS IN MERGER ANALYSIS
by
Kevin J. Arquit
Joseph Farrell
Thorsten Mager
Miguel de Ia Mano
Alison Oldale
Michael N. Sohn

Panel Discussion

TABLE OF CONTENN

Chapter 10

CARTELS IN THE EU: PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS FOR DEFENDANTS AND CLAIMANTS
by
David Anderson and Rachel Cuff

1. introduction
II. The Defendant's View from Three Feet
A. Raids and Inspections
B. Access to the Commission's File
C. Oral Hearing and the role of the Hearing Officer
D Clarity of Procedural Steps

III. The Defendant's View from Three Thousand Feet

A. Leniency
B. Levei of Fines
C. Parental and Successor Liability
D. Settlements
E. Timing and Delay
F. Transfer of Information Between Competition Authorities

III. The Defendant's View from Thirty Thousand Feet

A. The Commission as Legisiator, Prosecutor, Judge and Jury
B. Impact of Possibility of Criminal Sanctions and Extradition
C. Impact of Human Rights Argument
D. Impact of Increase in Damages Actions
E. A Time for Change?

IV. The View from the Other Side: Damages Claimants

A. Obstacies to Effective Damages Actions, and Possible Fixes
B. Public and Private Enforcement Never the Twain Shall Meet or a New Way Forward?
V. Moving Forward: Are We on the Right Path?

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Chapter 11

NATIONAL JUDGES AND THE APPLICATION OF REGULATION 1/2003: REMARKS AND PROPOSALS
by
Enrico Adriano Raffaelli

1. Introduction
II. Interaction Between National Judges and European Commission In Implementing EU Antitrust Law Pre-" Modernisation"
III. Evaluation of the Functioning of the New Rules Over Their First Five Years of Application
A. The Cooperation Instruments Provided by Article 15 (Cooperation with National Courts)
B. The Binding Effect of European Commission Decisions Introduced by Article 16(1)
C. The Codification of the European Commission's Supremacy
IV. Critical Aspects of the Framework Introduced by Regulation1/2003
A. Risk of Limiting National Judges' Independence
B. Preliminary Reference under Regulation 1/2003: Remarks and Unresolved Issues
C. The Binding Effect of Commission Decisions and Its Impact on Res Judicata
D. The Peculiar, Institutional Nature of the European Commission
E. Challenging the Compatibility of Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 with the concept of due process and other fundamental principles
V. Conclusions and Proposals

Chapter 12

EU COMPETITION POLICY
by
Laurence Sorkin
David Anderson
Enrico Adriano Raffaelli
Rein Wesseling

Panel Discussion

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 13

COMPETITION POLICY, ABUSIVE DOMINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: SOME REFLECTIONS
by
Maher M. Dabbah

I. Overview
II. The "Contexts" of the Topic
III. The Different Types
IV. Is Abusive Dominance a Serious Issue in the Developing World?
V. Under-Enforcement Against Abusive Dominance

A. The " Dominance" of Anti-cartel Enforcement and Competition Advocacy
B. The Perception of Abusive Dominance Cases as "Hard" Cases
C. The Question of Resources
D. The Provisions, of the Law
E. Political Constraints

VI. An International Perspective
VII. A Comment On Exploitative Abuses
VIII. Conclusions

Chapter 14

ABUSE OF DOMINANCE, COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE SOUTHERN TIP OF AFRICA
by
D.M. Davis

1. The South African Response
II. The Role of the Doctrine of Abuse of Dominance
III. Economic Development
IV. The Need for Responsible Legislation
V. The Potential Dangers
VI. Conclusion

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Chapter 15

COMPETITION POLICY, ABUSIVE DOMINANCE AND ECONOMJC DEVELOPMENT
by
Tad Lipsky

1. Introduction
II. Lessons of the Past

Chapter 16

COMPETITION POLICY, ABUSE OF DOMINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
by
Frédéric Jenny
Maher Dabbah
Dennis Davis
Wilhiam Kovacic
Tad Lipsky
Eduardo Pérez Motta

Panel Discussion

Chapter 17

LUNCHEON ADDRESS
by
Ken Auietta

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 18

ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
by
Daniel A. Crane
John Frank
Julia Holtz
Lawrence A. Jacobs
Miguel de Ia Mano
Damien Neven

Carl Shapiro

Panel Discussion