Contents
Preface

1 Economics
I.Definitions
II.Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly
III. Further Topics

2 Law and Policy
I.Some interpretation Issues
II. Enacting the Antitrust Law
III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do?

3 Enforcement
I. Optinial Enforcement Theory
II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws
Appendix

4 Cartels
I. Cartels
II.Conscious Parallelism
III. Conclusion

5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine
I.The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law
II.Ride of Reason and Per-Se Rule
III. Conclusion

6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule
I.The Case for Price Fixing
II.Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments
III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tesrs: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule

7 Agreement
I.The Development of Inference Doctrine
II.Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory

8 Facilitating Mechanisms
I.Data Dissemination Cases
II.Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices
III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics

9 Boycotts
I.Pre-Socony
II.Post-Socony
III. Post-BMI/Sylvania
IV Conclusion

10 Monopolization
I.Development of Section 2 Doctrine
II.Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases
III. Predatory Pricing
IV Conclusion

11 Power
I.Measuring Market Power
II.Determinants of Market Power
III. Substitutabilty and the Relevant Market: Cellophane
IV Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa
V Measuring Power: Guidelines

12 Attempts
I.The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine
II.Dangerous Probability Requirernent

13 Vertical Restraints
I.Resale Price Maintenance
II.Vertical Nonprice Restraints
III. Manufacturer Retains Title
IV Agreement

14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing
I.Introduction
II.Early Cases
III. Development of Per-Se Rule
IV Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule
V Technological Tying
VI. Exclusive Dealing
Appendix

15 Horizontal Mergers
1.Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law
II.Horizontal Merger Law
III. Conclusion
Appendix

16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate
I. Vertical Mergers
II. Conglomerate Mergers
III. Concluding Remarks

17 Antitrust and the State
I.Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
II.Parker Doctrine
III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and lmmunity Doctrines
Index