Preface
Abram J. Chayes
Introduction
Robert H. Mnookin and Jonathan R. Cohen

PART 1: Negoticition Theory Revisited
1.Toward a Theory of Representation in Negotiation joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Michael Watkins
Commentary
The Shifting Role of Agents in Interest-Based Negotiations
Lawrence E. Susskind

2. Authority of an Agent: When Is Less Better?
Roger Fisher and Wayne Davis
Commentary
Rational Authority Allocation to art Agent
Max H. Bazerman

3. Minimtzing Agency Costs in Two-Level Games: Lessons From the Trade Authority Controversies in the
United States and the European Union
Kalypso Nicolaïdis
Commentary
Minimizing Agency Costs: Toward a Testable Theory
Gordon M. Kaufman

PART II: Agency in Context

4. Challenges for International Diplomatic Agents
Eiieen F. Babbitt
Commentary
The Role of Agents in International Negotiation
Bruce M. Patton

5. Law and Power in Agency Relationships
Jeswald W. Salacuse
Commentary
Law and Power in Agency Relationships
Janet Martinez

6. Agency in the Context of Labor Negotiations
Robert B. McKersie
Commentary
Agency in the Context of Labor Management
Kathleen Valie

7. Legislators as Negotiators
David C. King and Richard J. Zeckhauser
Commentary
Turning the Tables: Negotiation as the Exogenous Variable
lona than R. Cohen
8. First, Let's Kill Ali the Agents!
Michael Wheeier
Commentary
Unnecessary Toughness: Hard Bargaining as an Extreme Sport
Brian S. Mandell

PART III: Prescriptive Implications

9. Major Themes and Prescriptive Implications
Lawrence E. Susskind and Robert H. Mnookin

10. Agents in Negotiations: Toward Testable Propositions
Terri Kurtzberg, Don Moore, Kathleen Valley, and Max H. Bazerman
Annotated Bibliography of Selected Sources
Pacey C. Fos ter and lona than R. Cohen

Index
About the Authors