The Principal Agent Model: | The Economic Theory of Incentives /

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Autores adicionais: LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques ; Editor
Publicado por : Edward Elgar, (Cheltenham, Inglaterra:) ISBN:1843762404. Ano: 2003 Tipo de Material: Livros
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Introduction Jean-Jacques Laffont


1.Adam Smith (1776), 'Of the Discouragement ofAgriculture in the Ancient State of Europe after Lhe Fali of Lhe Roman Empire', in An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 3: Of the Different Progress of Opulence in Different Nations, Chapter II, 1-8, reset

2.Chester I. Barnard (1938/1968), 'The Economy of Incentives', in The Functions of the Executive, Part III, Chapter XI, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 139-60

3.Kenneth J. Arrow (1963), 'Uncertainty and Lhe Welfare Economics of Medical Care', American Economic Review, LIII (5), December, 941-73

4.Mark V. Pauly (1968), 'The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment', American Economic Review, 58 (3, Part 1), June, 531-7

5.Richard Zeckhauser (1970), 'Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incentives',
Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 10-26

6.Michael Spence and Richard Zeckhauser (1971), 'Insurance, Information, and Individual Action', American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings, LXI (2), May, 380-87

7.Stephen A. Ross (1973), 'The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem', American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings, 63 (2), May, 134-9


8. J.A. Mirrlees (1999), 'The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part 1', Review of Economic Studies, 3-21

9. Bengt Holmstrom (1979), 'Moral Hazard and Observability', Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1), Spring, 74-91

10. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1983), 'An Analysis of the Principal-agent Problem', Econometrica, 51(1), January, 7-45

11. lan Jewitt (1988), 'Justifying Lhe First-order Approach to Principal-agent Problems', Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1177-90

12. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), 'Multitask PrincipalAgent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, Special Issue, 24-52

13. William P. Rogerson (1985), 'Repeated Moral Hazard', Econometrica, 53 (1), January, 69-76


14. J.A. Mirrlees (1971), 'An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVIII, 175-208

15. Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen (1978), 'Monopoly and Product Quality', Journal o! Economic Theory, 18, 301-17

16. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1977), 'Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market', Review o! Economic Studies, XLIV (3, No. 138), October, 407-30

17. David P. Baron and Roger B. Myerson (1982), 'Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs', Econometrica, 50 (4), July, 911-30

18. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1984), 'Regulation, Asyrnmetric
Information, and Auditing', Rand Journal o! Economics, 15 (4),
Winter, 447-70

19. Roger Guesnerie and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1984), 'A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-agent Problems with an Application
to the Control of a Self-managed Firm', Journal of Public Economics, 25 (3), December, 329-69

20. David P. Baron and David Besanko (1984), 'Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship', Information Economics
and Policy, 1 (3), 267-302

21. Douglas Gale and Martin Hellwig (1985), 'Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem', Review o! Economic
Studies, LII, 647-63

22. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1986), 'Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms', Journal ofPolitical Economy, 94
(3, Part 1), June, 614-41

23.Tracy R. Lewis and David E.M. Sappington (1989), 'Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems', Journal of Economic Theory, 49
(2), December, 294-313

24. Michael H. Riordan and David E.M. Sappington (1988), 'Optimal Contracts with Public ex post Information', Journal o! Economic
Theory, 45 (1), June, 189-99


25. Eric Maskin (1999), 'Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality', Review of Economic Studies, 66, 23-38

26. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), 'Subgame Perfect Implementation', Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1191-220

27.Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1986), 'Incentive Theory with Data Compression', in Walter P. Heiler, Ross M. Starr and
David A. Starrett (eds), Uncertainty, Information, and Communication: Essays in Honor o! Kenneth J. Arrow, Volume III, Chapter 10, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 239-53

28.Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1986), 'Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design', Review o! Economic Studies,
LIII (3, No. 174), July, 447-56

29.Jacques Crémer, Fahad Khalil and Jean-Charles Rochet (1998), 'Contracta and Productive Information Gathering', Games and
Economic Behavior, 25, 174-93

30. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1987), 'Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives',
Econometrica, 55 (2), March, 303-28

31. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (1990), 'The Principal-agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private
Values', Econometrica, 58 (2), March, 379-409

32. Mark Armstrong and Jean-Charles Rochet (1999), 'Multi-dimensional Screening: A User's Guide', European Economic Review, 43, 959-79

Name Index

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