Contracts in the New Institucional Economics /
[ Livros ] Série: The International Library of the New Institucional Economics, . 3. Publicado por : Edward Elgar, (Cheltenham, Inglaterra:) Detalhes físicos: 584 p. ISBN:1843766620. Ano: 2004 Tipo de Material: Livros
| Localização atual | Classificação | Exemplar | Situação | Previsão de devolução | Código de barras | Reservas do item |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães | 330.1 C764 (Percorrer estante) | 1 | Disponível | 2019-1251 |
Visitando a Biblioteca Agamenon Magalhães percorrendo as estantes Fechar navegador da prateleira
| 330.09 H939h História do Pensamento Econômico/ | 330.1 B348g Growth, Industrial Organization and Economic Generalities/ | 330.1 C652f The Firm, the Market, and the Law/ | 330.1 C764 Contracts in the New Institucional Economics / | 330.1 C764 Controversies and Challenges in the New Institucional Economics / | 330.1 E19 Economias do compartilhamento e o direito / | 330.1 F816 Franchise Contracting and Organization/ |
Contents
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Claude Ménard Introduction Claude Ménard
PART I NATURE AND LIMITS OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS
1. Oliver E. Williamson (1985), 'Assessing Contract', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1 (1), 177-208
2. Jean Tirole (1999), 'Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?', Econometrica, 67 (4), July, 741-81
3. Victor P. Goldberg (1976), 'Regulation and Administered Contracts', Beil Journal of Economics, 7 (2), Autumn, 426-48
4. Benjamin Klein (1980), 'Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 70 (2), May, 356-62
5. Oliver E. Williarnson (1983), 'Credible Conimitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange', American Economic Review, 73 (4), September, 519-40
6. Arthur L. Stinchcombe (1990), 'Orgamzing Information Outside the Firm: Contracts as Hierarchical Documents', in Information and Organizations, Chapter 6, Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA and Oxford: University of California Press, 194-239, references
7. Yoram Ben-Porath (1980), 'The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange', Population and Development Review, 6(1), March, 1-30
8. Stewart Macaulay (1963), 'Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study', American Sociological Review, 28 (1), February, 55-67
PART II CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTRACTS
9. Paul L. Joskow (1987), 'Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coa! Markets', American Economic Review, 77 (1), March, 168-85
10. Scott E. Masten and Keith J. Crocker (1985), 'EfficientAdaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas', American Economic Review, 75 (5), December, 1083-93
11. J. Harold Mulherin (1986), 'Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (1), Spring, 105-17
12. Victor P. Goldberg and John R. Erickson (1987), 'Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke', Journal of Law and Economics, XXX (2), October, 369-98
13. Thomas M. Palay (1984), 'Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting', Journal of Legal Studies, XIII (2), June, 265-87
14. Keith J. Crocker and Kenneth J. Reynolds (1993), 'The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement', RAND Journal of Economics, 24 (1), Spring, 126-46
15. Stéphane Saussier (2000), 'Transaction Costs and Contractual Incompleteness: The Case of Électricité de France', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42 (2), June, 189-206
16. Mary M. Shirley and Lixin Colin Xu (1998), 'Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts Between Government and State Enterprises', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 14 (2), October, 358-78
PART III ENFORCEMENT ISSUE
17. Avner Greif (1993), 'Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition', American Economic Review, LXXXIII (3), June, 525-48
18. Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler (1981), 'The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance', Journal of Political Economy, 89 (4), 615-41
19. Thomas M. Palay (1985), 'Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1 (1), 155-75
20. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast (1994), Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild', Journal ofPolirical Economy, 102 (4), 745-76
21. Alan Schwartz (1992), 'Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies', Journal Legal Studies, XXI, June, 271-318
22. Gary D. Libecap and Steven N. Wiggins (1985), 'The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Field Unitization', Journal of Political Economy, 93 (4), 690-714
23. Benjamin Klein (1996), 'Why Hold-Ups Occur: The SeIf-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships', Economic Inquiry, XXXIV (3), July, 444-63
Name Index
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