Contents
Preface to the Sixth Edition
Preface to the Fifth Edition
Preface to the Fourth Edition
Preface to the First Edition

Chapter 1.The Setting for Antitrust Analysis
100 Prologue
101 Organization; cavcat
102 Bibliographic note
Antitrust Study, Generally
103 Economic power
104 The antitrust laws:
(a) Nature of the statutes
(b) Legislative history; congressional role
105 Economic theory, uncertainty, and the judicial role
1 A.The Role of Competition: Analytic Model and Useful Tendency
The Value of Perfect Competition
106 Perfect competition defined
107 Competition and efficiency
108 The dynamic adjustment process
109 Consumer decisions as the basis for market choice:
(a) Consumer preferences weighted by wealth
(b) Consumer choice "mistaken"
110 Competition unhelpful or limited:
(a) Externalities
(b) Public goods
(c) Economies of scale
(d) Additional imperfections
111 The value of perfect competition and the role of antitrust policy
Perfect and Imperfect Competition Compared
112 Price and output decisions:
(a) Monopoly
(b) Perfect competition compared
(c) Oligopoly
113 Allocative efficiency
1114 Barriers to entry
115 Cost minimization
116 Promotion and product differentiation:
(a) Product identification
(b) Product differentiation
117 Other values of competition:
(a) Income distribution
(b) The distribution of opportunities
(c) The control of unchecked power
(d) Fairness in economic behavior
(e) Economic stabilization
Possible Grounds for Deemphasizing Competition
118 The example of public restraints
119 Economies of scale:
(a) Efficiency and firm sue
(b) Data
(c) Implications
120 Invention and innovation:
(a) The argument
(b) Size
(c) Concentration
(d) Synthesis
112 Adjustment pains
122 Social responsibility
123 Countervailing power
124 The theory of second best
Workable Competition
125 The problem
126 Criteria
127 Summary
1B.Enacting the Antitrust Laws
128 Common-law background:
(a) Middleman offenses
(b) Monopoly
(c) Restraints of trade
(d) Conspiracy
(e) Limiting corporate powers
129 Political background:
(a) Reform sentiment
(b) Political manifestations
130 Enactment of the Sherman Act: legislative history and contemporary political understanding:
(a) Relationship of Sherman Act and common Iaw
(b) Senator Sherman
(c) H.Thorelli
(d) R. Hofstadter
(e) Antitrust policy goals in light of legislative history
131 Sherman Act: procedure and early cases:
(a) Procedure
(b) Early cases
132 The 1914 legislation
133 Later statutes and guidelines
1C.Procedures for Enforcing the Antitrust Laws
134 Sanctions generally
Criminal Punishment
135 Which statutes?
136 Frequency: governrnent practice
137 Appropriateness of criminal taw
138 Differentiating antitrust offenses according to remedy?
(a) Statutory language
(h) Criminal offense distinguished
(c) Behavioral prerequisite for damages
(d) Denying some private equity actions
Equitable Relief
139 Proceeding in equity
140 Private suits in equity
141 Consent decrees:
(a) Nature and significance
(b) Modification
(c) Third-party interests
(d) Judicial role
142 Cease and desist orders:
(a) ETC jurisdiction
(b) ETC proceedings
(c) ETC remedial powers
(d) Judicial review
(e) Rulemaking
(f) Intragovernmental coordination
Private Actions
143 Treble damages:
(a) Generally
(b) Proving damages
(c) Joint and several liability; contribution
144 Standing and related doctrines: an introduction
145 Standing and limitations concerning the directness of injury:
(a) Introduction
(b) Passing on and consumer recoveries
(c) Employees
(d) Derived injuries
(e) Other business or property questions
(f) Clayton Act §7 violations
(g) Parens patriae
(h) Equity suits compared
146 Antitrust injury:
(a) Introduction; relationship of antitrust injury doctrine to standing
(b) Brunswick
(c) Cargill
(d) Atlantic Richfield (ARCO)
147 Class actions
148 Plaintiff participation in defendant's antitrust violation
149 Unclean hands in nonantitrust suit Preparing and Trying Antitrust Cases
150 Venue and jurisdiction
151 Investigations and discovery
152 Pleadings; summary judgment
153 Jury trial
154 The big case
155 Appeals
Repose
156 Advisory opinions and clearances
157 Statütes of limitation
(a) Private suits: generally
(b) Government suit tolls statute of limitation
(c) Government suits
158 Res judicata
(a) Merger and bar
(b) Collateral estoppel
(c) Government judgments and private suits
(d) Res judicata and state law
1D. The Reach of the Antifrust Laws
159.Introduction
Exemptions
160.Regulated industries
(a)Background
(b) "Public interest" mandate to regulators
(c) Primary jurisdiction and pervasive regulation
(d) Where regulation is less pervasive
161 Labor unions
162 Other exermptions
(a) Agricultural organizations
(b) Bank mergers
(c) Professional sports
State Law and State Action
163 State law: primacy, invalidity, or accommodation
(a) Generally
(b) Express primacy for state law
(c) Invalid state laws
164 Preemption by the antitrust laws
(a) State antitrust laws
(b) State laws limiting competition
165 Antitrust irnmunitv for state action
(a) Initial development
(b) Adequate supervision and clearly articulated purpose to displace competition
(c) Compulsion
(d) Immunity of governrnent bodies
(e) Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984
(f) Distinguishing private from governmental action
Interstate commerce
166 Sherman Act
167 Clayton Act; FFC Act
Foreign Commerce
168 Extraterritorial reach
(a) Statutory development
(b) Comity
(c) Act of state
(d) Sovereign immunity
(e) Extraterritoriality and other jurisdictions' competition laws
169 Restraints affecting exports
1E.The Patent System
170 Prologue:
(a) Relevance of patent laws to antitrust
(b) Introduction to patents
(c) Trade secret and copyright protections
Premises of the Patent System
171 Rationale
172 Costs of a patent system
173 Patents as incentives
(a) Generally
(b) Need for protection
(c) Nonpatent incentives
(d) Development incentives
Operation of the Patent System
174 Patentability
(a) Patentable subject matter
(b) Conditions of patentabiity
175 Standard of invention
176 Obtaining a patent
177 Patent validity
Remedies
178 Patent misuse doctrine
179 Antitrust remedies

Chapter 2. Horizontal Restraints: Collaboration Among Competitors
200 Prologue
2A.Development of the Rule of Reason and the Per Se
Illegality of Price Fixing
201 Anticompetitive effect of cartels:
(a) The cartel problem
(b) Cheating in carteis
(c) Cartel justifications
(d) Preventing cut throat competition
(e) Preserving needed capacity
(f) Reducing uncertainty
(g) Financing desirable activities
(h) Countervailing power
(i) Assessment
Sherman Act 1
202 Trans-Missouri
Addyston Pipe & Steel
203 Joint Traffic
204 Standard Oil
205
Chicago Board of Trade
206
Trenton Potteries
207
208 Appalachian Coals
Socony-Vacuum Oil
209
210
211
212 Per se rules:
(a) Rationale
(b) Meaning: scope of inquiry
(c) Meaning: coverage of category
2B. Modern Applications: Determining Which Restraints Are Reasonable
213 Introduction
214 Cartel variations:
(a) Allocating markets
(b) Other limits on price competition
Top co Associates
215
216 Palmer
Broadcast Music ('BMJ)
217
Maricopa County Medical Society
218
National Sociely of Professional Engineers
219
220
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NGAA)
221
California Dental
222
223 Joint ventures - introduction
224 Goverrment health care enforcement policy statements
225
226 National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993
227
228 Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors
229
2C. When Does an Agreement Exist?
230 Introduction
Oligopoly theory
231 The oligopoly or shared monopoly problem
232 Oligopoly—basic model and theory
(a) Simple case
(b) Elements of successful oligopoly
(c) Cartels compared
(d) Relevance of number of firms
(e) Oligopoly pricing in the absence of cooperative behavior
233 Factors affecting Iikelihood of oligopolistic coordination:
(a) Introduction
(b) Divergent interests
(c) Available channels of verbal and nonverbal communication
(d) Price comparability of products
(e) Nonprice competition
234 Factors affecting the potential gains from successful coordination, express or tacit
(a) Fringe expansion
(b) Substitute products or new entry
235 Evidence on oligopoly pricing in the economy
(a) Measuring economic performance and concentration
(b) The empirical evidence on concentration and oligopoly pricing
Tacit and inferred Express Agreements
236 What constitutes an agreement?
237 Eastern States
Interstate Circuit
Theatre Enterprises
American Tobacco
238
239
240 The object of courts' inquiry:
(a) What issue?
(b) Indications of express collusion
(c) Motivation and acts against self-interest
(d) Poor economic performance
(e) Summary
241 Matsushita Electric
Intra enterprise Conspircy
242 Introduction
Copperweld
243
1244 Additional intraenterprise conspiracy issues
2D.Facilitating Practices
245 Introduction
246
247 Data dissemination
American Column & Lumber
Maple Flooring
248
249 Historical notes on information exchange
Container Gorp.
250
251
252 General Motors
253 Basing point pricing
(a) Description
(b) Economic effects
(c) Collusion or competition?
(d) Legal issues
Cement Institute
254
255
256 Remedies for basing point pricing
257 duPont
2E. Concerted Refusals to Deal
258 Introduction
259 Early cases:
(a) Eastern States
(b) Gemeni Manufacturers
(c) Motion picture cases
(d) McCann
Fashion Originators' Guild (FOGA)
260
261
Kior's
262
263
(a) American Medical
(b) Molinas
264
Associated Press
265
266
Northwest Wholesale Stationers
267
268
Indiana Federation of Dentists
269
270 NYNEX
271 Additional varieties of concerted refusals to deal
272 Summary
2F. Influencing Government Action
273 Introduction
Noerr Motor Freight
274
Calfornia Motor Transport
275
Professional Real Estale
276
Omni Outdoor Advertising
277
Indian Head
278
279 National Organization for Women (NOW)
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTL4)
280
2G. Intellectual Property Licensing and Settlements
281 Introduction
Price-Restricted Licenses and the IF-Antitrust Tension Generally General Electric
282 The IP-antitrust conflict:
(a) Is there a conflict?
(b) Formalistic resolutions
(c) Resolving the conflict
283 Use, assignment, or licensing
284 Price and related restrictions in IP licenses:
(a) Reasons for refusing to license without a price restriction
(b) Output limitations
(c) Territorial limitations
(d) Exclusive licenses
(e) IP licenses and vertical restraints
285 Suppression; compulsory licensing
(a) Nonuse explained
(b) Precedent
(c) De facto compulsory licensing
(d) Compulsory licensing
286
287
288 Post-GE developments:
(a) Does GE survive?
(b) Unpatented product or non manufacturing patentee
(c) Multiple patents
(d) Multiple licenses
Use Restrictions
289 Introduction
290 Price discrimination, patent exploitation, and use restrictions
(a) Discrimination's nature and prerequisites
(b) Discrimination's consequences
(c) Discrimination and patent exploitation
(d) Use restrictions and discrirninatory royalties
291 The legality of use restrictions:
(a) Genera/Talking Pictures
(b) Limiting use of purchased patented product
292
IP Settlements
293 The problem:
(a) Private benefits of IP settlement
(b) Social benefits of settlement
294 The legality of IP settlments
295

Chapter 3.Monopoly
300 Prologue
Sherman Act §2
301 Useful definitions
SA.Monopolization
The Distinction Between Monopoly and Monopolization
302 The bad conduct element
303 Early landmarks
(a) Standard Oil
(b) American Tobacco
(c) American Can
(d) United States Steel
304
Aluminurn (Alcoa)
305
306
1307 Remedies in Alcoa
308
309 American Tobacco
Leverage and the Single Monopoly Profit Theorem
310 Is leverage an act of monopolization ora way to enjoy monopoly profits?
Griffith
311
Refining the Notion of Exclusionary Behavior
United Shoe
312 The monopolization test: Grinmell
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321 Microsoft remedies
Legislative Deconcentration
322 Deconcentration: no-fault monopoly and oligopoly
(a) S. 2614
(b) S.1167
(c) Rationale
323 Oligopoly and single-firm monopoly compared
324 Sherman Act §2 coverage
Vertical integration and Dealing with Competitors
325 Vertical integration in brief:
(a) Overview
(b) A second monopoly? Or is it only price discrimination?
(c) Avoiding successive monopoly
(d) Avoiding inefficient input substitudon
(e) Long-run effects on market structure and performance
(f) Summary
326 Otter Tail Power
327 Berkfy Photo
Aspen Skiing
328
329
330 AT&T divestiture
Trinko
331
332
Predatory Picing
Barry Wright
333
334
Brooke Group
335
AMR Corp
336
337
Patent Accumulation
338 Patent accumulation: development and acquisition
339 The authorides ou accumulation
340
341
313.Monopoly Power
342 Introduction
343 Monopoly and market power:
(a) Defining monopoly in terms of market power
(b) The price of monopoly
(c) Market power as power over price
(d) Market power and the goals of the antitrust laws
344 Ways of measuring market power:
(a) Introduction
(b) Difficulty of direct measurement
(c) Unexploited power
(d) Prospective power
(e) Power inferred from conduct
345 Determinants of market power:
(a) Buyer responsiveness determines seller's power
(b) Price at which buvers' alternatives are assessed
(c) High margins under monopolistic competition
346 Market definition, the relevant market, and market share
(a) The market definition concept
(b) Market share and market power
(c) Group power
347 More about product market definition:
(a) Differentiated products, different brands
(b) Physically different products
(c) Elasticity versus cross-elasticity
348 Geographic market definition
349 Competitors, supply substitution, and entry:
(a) Expansion by immediate competitors
(b) Supply substitution
(c) Entry
350 Summary of market power: unavoidable approximations
351 Market definition and measurement under 1992 govemment merger guidelines
Horizontal Merger Guidelines
352 Determining the relevant market and monopoly power in practice
Aluminum (Alcoa)
353
354
du Pont (Gellophane)
355 du Pont's profits
356
357
358
Microsoft
359
360
3C. Attempt to Monopolize
361
Lorain journal
362
363
364 American Airlines
Spectrum Sorts
365

Chapter 4. Vertical Restraints
400 Prologue
4A.Restricted Distribution
401 Introduction
Vertical Price Fixing
402 Introduction
403 Low dealer markups can increase sales and manufacturer profits
404 RPM as an instrument of a dealer cartel
405 Higher markups from RPM could purchase better distribution:
(a) High markups may buy dealer salesmanship and marketing
(b) Absent RPM, free riding could limit dealer efforts
(c) Markups may purchase market penetration
406 Should RPM be deemed legal ifit increases a manufacturer's output?
407 RPM could facilitate price coordination among manufacturers
408 RPM could facilitate the unilateral exercise of manufacturer market power
D,Miles
409
410 Fair trade laws
411 Maximum vertical price fixing: Albrecht
Khan
412
Sole Outlets; Territorial and Customer Limitations
413 Territorial limitations generally:
(a) Forms and degrees of limitations
(b) Motivations
Packard Motor Car
414
415 Customer limitations
(a) Controlling resellers
(b) Allocating customers among dealers
(c) Reserving customers to the manufacturer
GTE Sylvania
416
417
418
Agency and Similar Relationships
419 Agency and partial vertical integration
420
Refusal to Deal and Vertical Agreement
421 The vertical agreement puzzle
Colgate
422
423 Parke Davis
Monsanto
424
Business Electronics
425
4B.Tying Arrangernents
426 Introduction and variations
427 Business reasons for tying:
(a) Monopoly in the tied product
(b) More "efficient" pricing of tyng product.
(c) Price discrimination
(d) Disguising price
(e) Cost savings
(f) Quality control or improvement
(g) Summary
428 Development in patent cases
(a) Motion Picture Patents
(b) Later elaboration
(c) Tying by patentees and the antitrust laws
429 Tying under the Clayton Act
Clayton Act §3
International Salt
430
Vorthern Pacfic Railwat
431
432 Coercion to purchase related products
433 Voluntary ties:
(a) Unrestrained choice
(b) Preferential price
434 United States v. Loew 's
435
436
437 Mandatory package licensing of patents:
(a) Patentee's reasons
(b) General rule
(c) Related patents
(d) ldentifying a mandatory package
438 Patent royalty base:
(a) Duration of payments
(b) Sale price of unpatented products
439 International Business Machines
Jerrold Electronics
440
441
442
443 Fortner Enterprises
444
445 Coping with noninjurious fies
Jeffeison Parish Hospital
446
Microsoft
447
Eastman Kodak
448
4C.Exclusive Dealing
449 Introduction
450 Objects of exclusive dealing:
(a) Preempting outlets
(b) Assured markets or prices for sellers and buyers
(c) Promoting dealer loyalty and investment
(d) Other cost savings
Standard Oil (Standard Stations)
451
452
453 Motion Picture Advertising Service
454
455 Tampa Eletric
456
457
458
Barry wright
459

Chapter 5. Mergers: Horizontal, Vertical, and Conglomerate
500 Prologue
5A.Concentration Levels and Merger Motivations
501 The extent of concentration
502 Merger motives:
(a) Anticompetitive reasons
(b) Easier expansion or enny
(c) Operating efficiencies and scale economies
(d) Financial gains without new efficiencies
(e) Financial gains with new efficiencies
(f) Management goals
(g) Substituting better management
(h) Defensive mergers
(i) The net reckoning
5B. Introduction to Merger Law
503 Early Sherman Act cases:
(a) Northern Securities
(b) Union Pacific
(c) United States Steel
(d) Columbia Steel
Clayton Act §7
504 Legislative history of amended §7
(a) Brown Shoe
(b) D. Bok
505 Market definition; multiple rnarkets involved
(a) lmportance monopoly and merger compared
(b) Multiple rnarkets
506 Modern merger practice and premerger notification
5C.Horizontal Mergers
507
Brown Shoe
508
509
Philadelphia National Bank
510
511
512
513
514 Continental Can
515 Von Grocery
516 Reduced antagonism to mergers
General Dynamics
517
518 The failing company defense
319 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: introduction
Horizontal Merger Guidelines
520 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: basic operation
Stapks
521
522
523
524 Uses of the Philadelphia Bank holding
525 Merger simulation
526 Recent investigations and settlements
527 Hospital mergers
528 Tenel Health Gare
529
Butterworth
530
531
532
533 Efflciencies:
(a) Introduction
(b) Economies of scale or of production allocation
(c) Economies outside the horizontal context
(d) Financing efficiencies
(e) Acquiring efficiencies through contract, not merger
534
535
536
537 Interlocking directorates
5D. Vertical Mergers
538 Early development:
(a) Sherman Act cases
(b) du Pont (General Motors)
Brown Shoe
539
540 Vertical mergers under 1984 government guidelines:
(a) Entry barriers raised
(b) Vertical mergers facilitating coliusion
(c) Evasion of rate regulation
(d) Efficiencies
(e) Applications of the Guidelines to vertical rnergers
541
542
5E.Conglomerate Mergers
543 The conglomerate problem
Procter & Gamble (Clowx)
544
545 Eliminating potential competition:
(a) Generally
(b) The relationship between present and potential future competition
(c) Potential competition and joint ventures
546 Subsequent potential competition decisions:
(a) The toehold doctrine
(b) Bendix
(c) Falstaff Brewing
(d) Marine Bancoiporation
547 Predation, pricing discipline, and the powerfull firm:
(a) Predation
(b) Pricing discipline or leadership
548 Conglomerate mergers under 1984 government guidelines
549
550 Reciprocity:
(a) Generally
(b) Purposes
(c) Relevant questions
(d) Agreements
(e) Mergers
Consolidated Food
551
552 International Telephone & Telegraph:
(a) Claims concerning Grinnell's dominance and the competitive advantages it would gain through the merger
(b) The economic concentration claim
(c) The settlements
553
554 Recent conglomerate mergers and government enforcement

Chapter 6. Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act
600 Prologue
Robinson-Patman Act §2(a) and §2(b)
601 General requirements of 2(a)
602 The development of §2:
(a) The original provision
(b) Background of the 1936 legislation
6A. Primary-Line Injury ¶ 603
604 Utah Pie
605 Brooke Group
6B. Secondary-Line Injury
Morton Salt
606
607
Texaco
608
609
610 Borden
611
6C. Afirmative Defenses Under §2(a) and §2(b) Cost Justfication
612 Introduction:
(a) Scope of defense; burden of proof
(b) The relevant costs
Borden
613
Meeting Competition in Good Faith
614 Introduction
615 Good faith and knowledge of rivals' prices
(a) A.E. Staley Man ufacturing
(b) United States Gypsum
(c) Great Atlantic & Pacfic Tea (A&P)
616
617 Good faith and pricing systems:
(a) A.E. Stanley Manufacturing
(b) - Falis City Industries 1(i18
619
6D. Supplementary Provisions
Buyer Liability
620 Congressional concern with buyers
621 Aulomatic Canteen
Great Atlantic & Pricfic Tea (A &P)
622
Brokerage
Robinson-Patman Act §2(c)
623 The brokerage prohibition:
(a) Statutory purpose as stated by the Supreme Court
(b) Requirements for violation and availability of defenses
(c) When brokerage is "for services rendered"
(d) Identifying "a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu there of"
(e) Application to commercial bribery
(f) Buyer liabilitv
Discriminatory Allowances or Services
Robinson-Patrnan Act §2(d) and §2(e)
624 The prohibition on discriminatory allowances or services:
(a) The statutory concern
(h) Requirements for violation and availability of defenses
(c) When is an allowance or service "available on proportionally equal terms"?
(d) The competing customer requirement
(e) Distinguishing price discrimination from promotional allowances
(f) Buyer liability
Appendix. Selected Statutes
ShermanAct
Clayton Ad
Federal Trade Commission Ad
Table of Gases
Index