Competition Law and Policy in Latin America:

[ Livros ]
Autores adicionais: SILVEIRA, Paulo Burnier ; Editor
Publicado por : Wolters Kluwer, (Holanda:) Detalhes físicos: 374 p. ISBN:9789041160478. Ano: 2017 Tipo de Material: Livros
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Table of Contents
Editor and Contributors
António Comes
Vinícius Marques de Carvalho

Institutional Setups and Advocacy Efforts

New Competition Policy in Mexico
Carlos Mena Labarthe
§1.01 Introduction
§1.02 Overview of the Evolution of Competition Law in Mexico
[A] First Competition Provisions
[B] First Competition Law. The Real Emergence of a Competition Law
[C] The Strengthening of Competition Law
[1] Public Opinion as a Factor for Change
[2] Relevant Cases
[D] Transformation Factors That Became Amendments
[1] The 2006 Legal Reform
[2] The 2011 Legal Reform
§1.03 Paradigm Shift in Competition Law
[A] Political Context of the 2013 Constitutional Reform
[B] The 2013 Constitutional Reform
[1] Incremental Powers
[2] Institutional Design of Checks and Balances
[a] Autonomy Between the Investigative and the
Decision-Making Authorities
[b] More Accountability Obligations
[c] Creation of Specialized Courts
[C] The New Federal Law of Economic Competition
§1.04 Chailenges and a New Competition Framework
[A] Institutional Arrangements
[B] Fight Against Carteis
[C] Coordination with the IFT
[D] Application of the New Powers of COFECE to Conduct Market Investigations
[E] Market Studies
[F] Mergers
[G] Advocacy
§1.05 Conclusion

New Competition Policy in Argentina
Julidn Peiia
§2.01 Introduction
§2.02 Background
§2.03 New Developments
§2.04 Conclusions

New Competition Policy in Paraguay
Cynthia Andino
§3.01 Introduction
§3.02 Legal Framework
[A] Law No. 4956 (Competition Law)
[B] Rules to Law No. 4956
§3.03 Illegal Conducts Established in Law No. 4956
[A] Anticompetitive Agreements
[B] Abuse of Dominant Position
[C] Merger Control
§3.04 Relevant Conducts Not Classified in the Competition Law
[A] Unfair Competition
[B] State Aid
§3.05 CONACOM: Paraguayan Competition Authority
[A] CONACOM's Powers
[B] Board of Qualifications
§3.06 Procedure to Investigate and Punish Iliegal Acts Defined in Law No. 4956
[A] Anticompetitive Agreements and Abuse of Dominant Position
[B] Concentrations and Merger Contro
[C] The Administrative Sanctioning Procedure
§3.07 Conclusions
§3.08 Recommendations

Antitrust Compliance Programs - The Brazilian Experience
Marcela Mattiuzzo
§4.01 Introduction
§4.02 Compliance Programs in the Brazilian Context
[A] The Rise of Antitrust Compliance in Brazil – Enforcement by the New BCDS
[B] Antitrust and Anticorruption
[C] The Current Status of the Regulation
[11 Case Law - HSBC/Bradesco
§4.03 Antitrust Compliance in Other Latin American Countries
[A] Chile
[B] Mexico
§4.04 Final remarks

The Dissemination of the Competition Culture in Brazil: The Role Played by Civil Associations
Eduardo Caminati Anders & Guilherme Teno Castilho Missali
§5.01 Introduction
§5.02 Antitrust Compliance Initiatives: A Brief Outline
§5.03 Perceptions of the Competition Law in Brazil and Chailenges Ahead
§5.04 Case analysis: an example of civil association (IBRAC)
§5.05 Conclusions

Trends and Developments in Competition Advocacy in Latin America
Manha Martínez Licetti, Lucia Viliarán & Tanja Goodwin
§6.01 Introduction
§6.02 Why Advocacy Efforts Are Relevant in the Context of Latin America
§6.03 What is the Status of Competition Advocacy in Latin America?
§6.04 What Lies Behind the Successful Advocacy Initiatives in Latin America?
[A] Mexico
[B] Peru
[C] Colombia
[D] El Salvador
[E] Other Advocacy Strategies Conducted by Competition Agencies
§6.05 What Lessons Can Be Drawn from Recent Advocacy in Latin
America and the Useful Activities for the Future?

Pro-competitive Regulatory Assessment in Latin America
Ania Thiemann, James Mancini & Rosana Aragón Plaza
§7.01 Introduction
§7.02 Why Are Pro-competitive Regulatory Frameworks Good for
Latin American Economies?
[A] Competition is Beneficial to Consumers
[B] Competition Enhances Productivity
[C] Regulatory Restrictions on Competition Harm Growth
[D] Latin America Faces a High Regulatory Burden
§7.03 What Is Competition Assessment of Regulations?
§7.04 Recent Experience of Competition Assessment in Latiu America
[A] Assessments That Found Limitations to the Number or Range of Suppliers
[B] Assessments That Found Limitations to the Ability of Suppliers to Compete
[C] Assessments That Found Limitations to Incentives of Suppliers to Compete
[D] Assessments That Found Limitations to the Choices and Information Available to Consumers
§7.05 Emerging Opportunities for Competition Assessment in Latin America
[A] Ex post Assessment
[B] Digital Economy Innovations
§7.06 Conclusion

Enforcement Experiences: Anticompetitive Practices and Merger Contral

Bid Rigging in Public Procurement in Colombia: Evolution and Chailenges
Germdn Enrique Bacca Medina
§8.01 Introduction
§8.02 Bid Rigging in Public Procurement Evolution in Colombia
[A] Brief Historical Review Prior to Law 1340 of 2009
[B] Modernization of the Colombian Regime and Change in
the Strategy Against Bid Rigging in Public Procurement
[C] Most Relevant Cases Foliowing Law 1340 of 2009
[2] INPEC (2012) Case
[3] RAPISCAN (2012) Case
[4] VALME (2013) Case
[5] CORMAGDALENA (2013) Case
[7] NULE HOGARES (2013) Case
[8] IDIPRON (2013) Case
[9] PAVIGAS (2014) Case
[10] VIGILANCIA (2015) Case
§8.03 Conclusions

Predatory Pricing Policy for Latin American Emerging Economies
Pablo Márquez
§9.01 Introduction
§9.02 lhe Economics of Price Predation
[A] Exclusionary Pricing and Abusive Pricing Policy
[B] Market Power, Exclusionary Behavior and Price Predation
§9.03 Mainstream Standards for Predatory Pricing
[A] Per Se Legal Below Cost Selling
[B] Per Se lilegal Price Predation
[1] Below Marginal Cost Predation
[2] Below Average Variable Cost Predation
[3] Above-Cost Predation
§9.04 Predatory Pricing in Latin America
[A] Illegal Per Se Predatory Pricing
[B] Rule-of-Reason Approach to Predatory Pricing
§9.05 A Rule for Predatory Pricing Enforcement in Latin American Emerging Economies
[A] Justification for a Different Approach to Price Predation in Emerging Latin American Economies
[1] An Effect-Based Price Predation Standard for
Emerging Economies
[a] Dominance
[b] Pro-competitive effects
[c] Profits Sacrifice
[2] Administrability of a Below and Above-Cost Predation Standard
[a] Below and Above-Cost Predation in Latin American
Emerging Economies
§9.06 Conclusions

Bid Rigging in Ecuador
David A. Sperber
§10.01 Introduction
§10.02 Legal Framework
[A] Public Procurement Legislation
[B] Competition Legislation
[C] Anticompetitive Agreements
[D] Public Procurement and Competition Law
§10.03 An Overview of International Bid Rigging Cases
[A] United States of America: Multiple Listing Service, Inc.
[B] United Kingdom: Cirrus and Others
[C] Australia: Marine Hoses
§10.04 Ecuador Bid Rigging Cases
[A] TUBOS Case (Ministry of Industry and Productivity)
[B] CRONIX Case (Superintendence of Control of Market Power)
§10.05 Conclusions

The Case of Automotive Market in a Special Customs Area of Argentina
Alejandro Lucero & Fabidn Pettigrew
§11.01 Introduction
§11.02 The Special Customs Area Created by Law 19.640 and the Automotive Regime
§11.03 The Investigation Carried Out by the CNDC
[A] The Legal Frame of the Investigation
[B] The Fine
[C] The Judgment of the Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Comodoro Rivadavia

Exchanges of Information in Competition Law: The Chilean (Incipient) Experience
Javier Tapia & Vanessa Facuse
§12.01 Introduction
§12.02 The Institutional and Substantive Framework
[A] The Institutional Framework
[B] The Main Substantive Provisions
[C] The Concept of Agreement in Chilean Competition La
§ 12.03 Exchanges of Information as Support for Cartel Behavior
[A] Exchanges of Information on Quantity
[B] Exchanges of Information on Prices
[C] Multimarket Contacts
§ 12.04 "Residual" Exchanges of Information
[A] Market Structures and Characteristics of the Information
[B] General Guidance by Chilean Authorities
§12.05 Suniming Up

Ten Years Fighting Carteis: The Case of El Salvador
Aldo Henrique Cd.der Camilot

The Use of lndirect Evidences in the Fight Against Cartels in Brazil
Paulo Bumier da Silveira & Pablo Reja Sánchez
§ 14.01 Introduction
§ 14.02 Types of Bid-Rigging
§ 14.03 Cartel of Solar 1-leaters in Brazil
§ 14.04 Internationa! Trend
§14.05 Final Remarks

Shareholders' Damage Claims Against Company Directors for
Antitrust Violations? The Japanese Experience and Possible Lessons
to Brazil and Latin America
A manda A thayde
§ 15.01 Introduction
§ 15.02 The Japanese Experience on Shareholder Derivative Actions Against
Officers and Directors in the Antitrust Context
§15.03 Are Shareholder Derivative Suits Against Officers and Directors
for Antitrust Violations a Possible Reality in Brazil?
§15.04 Conclusion

The Relation Between Antitrust and Inteliectual Property Law on CADE's Case Law
Ana Frazão & Angelo Gamba Praia de Carvalho
§16.01 Introduction
§16.02 The Complex Relation Between IP Rights and Antitrust Law
§16.03 Legitimacy of Antitrust Intervention over IP rights: The ANFAPE Case
§16.04 CADE's View on Standard-Essential Patents and License Agreements
§16.05 Sham Litigation and Inteliectual Property
§16.06 Final Remarks

Merger Control in Mexico: Development and Outlook
Francisco Javier Núiiez Melgoza
§17.01 General Overview
§ 17.02 Evolution of the Regulatory Framework, 1993-2014
[A] Merger Control in the 1993 FLEC
[B] Changes to the FLEC in 2006
[C] Changes to the FLEC in 2011
[D] The Current Legal Framework
§17.03 Brief Review of Some Relevant Cases
[A] Mexicana/Aeromexico
[B] Coca-Cola/Jugos dei Valie
[C] Mexichem
[D] Televisa/GSF Telecom Holdings
[E] Nestle/Pfizer
[F] Cinemex/Cinemark
[G] Comex/Sherwin Williams
§17.04 Conciusions

International Cooperation

Regional Coordination in Cartel Investigations: The Liquid Oxygen Case
§18.01 introduction
§ 18.02 Reviewing the Facts of Liquid Oxygen Cartel Cases in Panama (2001),
Argentina (2005), Chile (2007), Peru, Brazil and Colombia (2010) and Mexico (2011)
§18.03 Reviewing Cooperation Agreements in Some of the Jurisdictions of the Liquid Oxygen Cartel Cases: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru
§ 18.04 Chalienges in Strengthening Cooperation in Cartel Cases for the Selected Jurisdictions
[A] Low Leveis of Cooperation Between Competition Agencies
[B] Prohibition to Exchange lnformation in Open Cartel Investigations
[C] Modest Developments in Implementing Leniency Programs in the Seven Jurisdictions, with the Exception of Brazil and Chile
[D] Proper Recognition of the Evidence Cathered Abroad
§18.05 Some Recommendations to improve Coordination Between Cartel
Enforcers in Latin America
[A] lmproving the Levei of Cooperation and Coordination Between
§18.06 Steps Towards Effective Exchange of Information in Paraliei investigations
§18.07 lmproving the Request of Evidence Abroad and Recognition:
Estabiishing Ideas for a Victim of an International/Regional
Cartel to Claim Private/Civil Damages Locally
§18.08 Final Remarks

The Defense of Competition in Mercosur
Eugênia Cristina Nilsen Ribeiro Barza & Marcelo Cesar Guimarães
§19.01 Introduction
§ 19.02 The Treaty of Asunclón and the Provisional Regulation of Competition Law
§ 19.03 The Protocol for the Defense of Competition of MERCOSUR (Fortaleza Protocol)
§ 19.04 New Directions for the MERCOSUR Antitrust Policy
[A] The Antecedents
[B] ThAgreement for the Defense of Competition of MERCOSUR
[C] A Review of the Agreement for the Defense of Competition of MERCOSUR and the Chalienges of Cooperation Within the Bloc
§19.05 Conclusion

Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for Competition Policy
Marta. Martínez Licetti, Graciela Miralies Murciego & Guilherme de Aguiar Falco
§20.01 Introduction
§20.02 The Competition Chapter
§20.03 The SOE Chapter
§20.04 Vertical Dimension of Competition-Related Commitments
§20.05 Final Remarks

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