Table of Contents

1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
1.2 Structure

2 Competition Policy Analysis - An Interated Aproach
2.1 introduction
2.2 Fundamental Level
2.2.1 Competition Is'worth protecting
2.2.2 Competition Needs protection
2.2.3 Competition Policy is Worth it
2.3 Strategic Level
2.3.1 Characterisatior and rationalisation
2.3.2 Welfare Effects
2.3.3 Enforcernent
2.4 Operational Level
2.4.1 ldentifying the relevant market
2.4.2 Assessing Market power
2.4.3 Applying Economic frameworks
2.5 Summary and Conclusion

3 Strategic Behaviour of lncumbents - Rationality, Welfare and Competition Policy
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Characterising Strategic Behaviour
3.3 Rationalising Strategic Behaviour
3.3.1 Entry and Strategic (Re)Actions to Entry
3.3.2 Advantages of lncumbents
3.4 Welfare Effects of Strategic Behaviour
3.4.1 Characterising the Competitive Benchmark
3.4.2 Characterising the Welfare Effects of Strategic Behaviour
3.5 Strategic Behaviour and Antitrust Enforcernent
3.5.1 Essential Features of Antitrust Policy
3.5.2 Antitrust Enforcement Options Towards Strategic Behaviour
3.6 Summary and Conclusion

4 Fighting Predation
4.1 introduction
4.2 Characterising Predation
4.3 Rationalising Predation
4.4 Welfare Effects of Predation
4.5 Enforcing Predation
4.5.1 Enforcement in Various Legislations
4.5.2 Characterising Enforcement Stages
4.5.3 Evaluating Enforcement Options in a Linear Duopoly Predation Model
4.5.4 Towards a Policy Framework to Enforce Predation
4.6 Summary and Conclusion

5 Conclusions
6 Annex
6.1 Estimating Customer Losses Due to Cartelisation - Evidence from the Lysine Cartel in the United States
6.2 Estimating the Potential Welfare Effects of a Merger - Evidence from the Nuon-Reliani Case in the Netherlands
6.3 Antitrust Implications of Franchise Agreements
6.3.1 Characterising Franchise Agreements
6.3.2 Rationality of Franchise Agreements
6.3.3 Franchise Agreements and Potential Antitrust Conflicts
6.3.4 Summary and Conclusion
6.4 Critical Loss Analysis in Market Definition and Merger Control
6.4.1 Definition and Economic Foundations
6.4.2 Important Properties ofCritical Loss Analysis
6.4.3 Applications of Critica! Loss Analyses
6.4.4 Summary and Conclusion
6.5 The Luflhansa-Germania Case at a Glance introduction
6.5.2 The Facts
6.5.3 The Antitrust Case
6.5.4 Outlook
6.6 Proofs
6.6.1 Allocative and Productive Inefficiencies in Monopoly
6.6.2 Instability of Carteis in One-Shot Games
6.6.3 Stability of Cartels in Supergames
6.6.4 Resource Allocation by an Antitrust Authority
6.6.5 Profitability of a Price Increase
6.6.6 Deriving the Price-Cost Margin for a Differentiated Good
6.6.7 Price Effects of Mergers in a Differentiated Bertrand Model
6.6.8 Sufficient Percentage Cost Reduction to Prevent Price Increases in a Homogenous Product Merger
6.6.9 Sufficient Percentage Cost Reduction to Prevent Price increases in a Differentiated Products Merger
6.6.10 Assessment of Markei Power
6.6.11 Proof of lnequality (75) in Section 4.4
6.6.12 Proof of lnequality(76) in Section 4.4
6.6.13 Proof of lnequalitie (79) and (80) in Section 4.5.2.2
6.6.14 Proof of lnequality(83) in Section 4.5.2.26.6.15 Proof of lnequality(85) in Section 4.5.2.2
6.7 Data Tables
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Boxes
List of Abbreviations
List of Mathematical Symbols
References